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US Naval Postgraduate School
From the Editor
Special Operations Forces have perpetually been on the frontlines of the world’s 
military conflagrations, using every tool and skill currently available to them to 
prevent potential fuel from catching fire. SOF battle the blazes of sectarian war, 
locate the spot fires of extremist infiltration, and help people clear away the ashes 
and get back on their feet after conflict. Many of you have been involved in coun-
tering insurgency in one capacity or another, and you’ll appreciate the personal 
stories our authors in this issue of CTX have to tell. 
The first story is not about fighting bad guys, but about how those who fight 
bad guys turn their skills to saving lives and delivering humanitarian relief. SOF 
Lieutenant Commander Gilbert Villareal describes what happened after Ty-
phoon Yolanda (also known as Typhoon Haiyan) smashed the Philippines in late 
2013. Dealing with the aftermath demanded as much of his training and courage 
as his counterinsurgency missions ever had. Disaster relief, LTC Villareal admits, 
doesn’t seem “sexy” to most SOF warriors. But it is deeply rewarding and well within 
the scope of the special operations mandate.
The next two pieces, by retired Pakistani Air Commander Jamal Hussain, take 
us back to the commando raid that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011. The first 
essay addresses the question of how four US helicopters managed to cross into 
Pakistani airspace, fly 100 nautical miles to Abbottabad, carry out the attack, 
and (minus one Blackhawk that crashed) escape back over the Afghan border 
before Pakistan’s air defenses could react. The second essay rebuts, point by point, 
investigative reporter Seymour Hersh’s recent retelling of the bin Laden raid as a 
top-level conspiracy of mass deception.
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) fought a 30-year insurgency against 
the armed forces and government of Sri Lanka that nearly tore the country apart. 
Colonel Sylvester Perera describes how he and his fellow commanders struggled 
to adapt their legacy British-style training and strategic planning to counter 
the highly mobile and innovative LTTE. A united national front, COL Perera 
concludes, is vital for the future of Sri Lanka. 
Major Daniel Pace uses his experience in Baghdad during the surge of US forces 
in 2007 to highlight the price a country may pay if it fails to unite after internal 
conflict. His platoon succeeded in replacing disrupted government services and 
channels of influence with its own improvised systems in an important Sunni 
neighborhood. But this success paradoxically deepened sectarian distrust once it 
came time for the Americans to pull out.
The skies around us, Captain Benjamin Seibert points out, are increasingly filled 
with those remote-controlled aircraft called drones. Drones are great for recon-
naissance, lauded and vilified for their ability to deliver missiles, and promoted 
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as the next big thing in online shopping. CPT Seibert warns, however, that drones and their attendant technologies are a 
terrorist’s dream, and no one seems to know what to do about the danger. 
Extremists have already shown us how quickly and effectively they can spread their ideology in cyberspace and how useful 
the internet is as a means of recruitment. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Schultz draws parallels between the open seas and 
the electronic frontier, and suggests that it’s time we looked back to the age of privateers for inspiration about how to deal 
with cyber terrorists.
Nations and international organizations, including the UN and NATO, have embraced a concept for crisis management 
called the comprehensive approach (CA), which purports to enable the coordination of assets to contain and resolve crises. 
The problem with CA, as Lieutenant Colonel Sándor Fábián points out, is that no one agrees on a common definition for 
the concept, much less what it entails. 
For our CTAP interview, Dr. Doug Borer of the US Naval Postgraduate School interviews counterinsurgency and crisis 
response specialist David Kilcullen about current trends in counterinsurgency planning and operations. Dr. Kilcullen also 
discusses ISIS at length: are we in the midst of a new Thirty Years’ War, fomented to a large degree by information tech-
nology? That, warns Dr. Kilcullen, is a question worth asking. 
We have two book reviews in this issue. The first, by Major Bradley J. Krauss, explores American Force: Dangers, Delusions, 
and Dilemmas in National Security by senior national security expert Richard K. Betts. While this book might seem to 
lie somewhat outside the CT-COIN realm, MAJ Krauss recommends it for military personnel like himself who are reen-
tering academia after a long period of active service, and need to “jump-start” their capacity for critical thinking about 
international relations. The second book, The Hour between Dog and Wolf: Risk Taking, Gut Feelings, and the Biology of 
Boom and Bust by John Coates, examines the nexus between biology and decision making in high-stress environments. 
Lieutenant Adam Karagouz describes some of the implications for risk-taking organizations like special operations teams.
In this issue’s Moving Image review, Ian Rice finds the AMC television series Turn: Washington’s Spies satisfying for both 
its historical reenactment of eighteenth-century irregular warfare and as sheer entertainment. Turn follows a number of 
characters on both sides of the American Revolution as they seek to undermine their opponents’ base of support among 
the colonists through intrigue and espionage.
Be sure to take a look at the latest publications from the Joint Special Operations University in our Publications An-
nouncements. Write to CTXeditor@GlobalEcco.org and let us know what you think about what you’ve read in CTX or 
anything else in the CT world that’s on your mind. You can also keep up on global CT news and comment on articles 
by “liking” Global ECCO on Facebook. If you are interested in submitting an article for possible publication, send it to 
CTXSubmit@GlobalEcco.org.
ELIZABETH SKINNER
Managing Editor, CTX 
CTXEditor@globalecco.org
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Disaster Response: A Not-So-Sexy  
Kind of Job
LCDR Gilbert G. Villareal,  
Philippine Navy 
When Typhoon Yolanda hit the Philippines in early November 
2013,1 I was a staff officer with the Philippine Fleet (Division category), while at 
the same time serving as the deputy commander of a SEAL-type unit of the Naval 
Special Operations Group (NAVSOG). It was my last week on these two assign-
ments before I was to pursue a more traditional career path as a naval officer 
in the Philippine Navy. My experience dealing with the aftermath of Yolanda 
taught me some important lessons that I believe could be vital for commanders 
and any military personnel assigned to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 
Response (HADR) in an area devastated by natural calamity or war. I am writ-
ing through the lens of my experience as a staff officer of a battle group, an 
assessment officer with SOF experience, and a contingent officer on the ground 
conducting HADR. Many SOF personnel consider HADR to be an unsexy kind 
of deployment: a time-consuming aspect of “soft power” projection suitable for 
regular soldiers and reserve forces or in the United States, the National Guard. 
There’s supposedly no action in the HADR theater, nothing special or even 
significant about this kind of mission. After all, the thinking seems to go, if the 
Navy and other conventional forces can do this kind of trivial military operation, 
why should the SOF be expected to respond?
When dealing with both adversaries and crisis management, however, the 
SOF are very capable and can respond to any situation. As Yolanda struck the 
Philippines, the entire Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was on alert. As 
a member of the battle staff, I was 
assigned to monitor all events 
concerning naval units, especially 
those naval assets and personnel 
that were dispatched to the areas 
devastated by the typhoon. I 
was also tasked with a collateral 
duty, to monitor and approve the 
deployment of all SEALs assigned 
to NAVSOG units across the 
Philippines, whether they were 
in training, already deployed, or 
otherwise tasked. As the typhoon 
ravaged the country, particularly 
Samar province, we all monitored 
the effects, trying to determine 
what we could do and what we 
needed to deploy to mitigate the 
damage and help the survivors. In 
my dual role, I informed my SEAL 
commander that the majority of 
our men from each area command 
of the AFP—Luzon, Visayas, 
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and Mindanao, including a company from our headquarters sized for quick 
response—were being pulled out of training and other deployments to comple-
ment the ongoing HADR mission.
Adversary from the Field 
After that first day spent monitoring the situation, I tried to contact the team 
leader of a squad of SEALs assigned to a navy command post in the city of 
Tacloban, the capital of Samar province. I could not reach him by phone or mili-
tary radio. After two days, we finally made contact through a team from NAVSOG 
that augmented the Naval Task Force. This team immediately directed a contin-
gent of Naval Logistics Support Vessels, which were loaded with personnel and 
relief goods to support the victims of Yolanda, to the stricken city.
When I finally spoke to him, the team leader was in tears as he described the 
enduring drama he and his men had experienced. He said that the four members 
of his team were accounted for; they had survived the storm surge and saved all 
the naval personnel in the command post. But they regretted not being able to 
save others, especially the 56 policemen and 23 army personnel who were also 
stationed inside the command post compound at the time. Only 10 policemen 
and 12 soldiers survived the storm surge.2 
How did the four SEALs manage to survive such tragedy? As the team leader 
talked to me, one thing he kept mentioning was the training he had received as 
a SEAL. Everyone at his post was shocked at how fast the water rose, he told me; 
all of the people in the compound were shouting, but no one was moving or 
initiating any action. Although his men were good swimmers, he said, they knew 








that even they could not survive among all the debris being carried by the water, 
and seconds count in such a situation. The four SEALs punched a hole through 
the wooden roof of their barracks. Two men took ropes from the laundry lines, 
tied these lines to coconut trees, and brought them down through the hole in 
the roof. At this time, the team leader told me, the water was six to seven feet 
high, and they couldn’t see anything because of the rain and the wind. They 
kept shouting to the others in the compound, but the only ones who responded 
were the navy personnel in their barracks. That’s what the officer kept telling 
me: the navy men were the only ones the SEALs saved. The men held onto the 
ropes as the water level quickly increased to 10 feet, with strong wind and rain 
and seawater flowing everywhere. The men managed to get up onto the roof and 
hold on to each other until the flood subsided several hours later. The majority 
of the people inside the compound, including those in the police and army 
barracks, were drowned. According to the team leader, they were all taken by 
surprise and were swept away by the flood. As the water rose, he and his men 
thanked God that they were saved, but he was also proud and thankful that his 
SOF skills helped him and his men survive, and pushed them to save others who 
were at the threshold of death. He felt that his training automatically came back 
to him when he needed it.
When the water went down, the men and everything around them were left 
soaking. The sight of all the dead bodies in the compound—hanging from 
electric poles and trees, or lying in the grass and strewn about—left most of the 
survivors traumatized, except, as the SEAL leader asserted, his team. He was again 
in tears as he talked to me. The first thing he did after the waters subsided was 
consolidate his team and the survivors inside the compound. He then divided 
them into five groups: one group to search for and retrieve any survivors 
I WAS AMAZED 
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FAST SOF UNITS 
REACTED.
8CTX | Vol. 5, No. 4
inside the compound; 
the second group to 
gather supplies, especially 
food and water and any 
communications equip-
ment; the third group to 
assist the first group in 
looking for survivors and 
also to gather the bodies 
of the victims; the fourth 
group to start fixing the 
compound’s structures, 
especially the roofs and 
the barracks; and the fifth 
group to search for the 
nearest coordinating office 
or government command 
post that still had elec-
tricity and communica-
tions. This turned out to 
be over 10 kilometers away 
in Tacloban City and took 
more than a day for the 
team to reach.
This was the first day after 
Yolanda made landfall on 
Samar province. The gov-
ernment, including me, a 
staff officer of the Philip-
pine Fleet, had no means 
of communication in the 
crucial first 24 hours after 
the devastation. I can’t 
say whether bureaucracy 
and politics played any 
role at that time, but the 
management of the crisis 
had some shortcomings. 
Government officials did 
not anticipate how great 
the damage would be.   
Regarding my other set of duties, all NAVSOG personnel in the impact area and 
in the headquarters were alerted before Yolanda hit, were accounted for once the 
storm subsided, and by the second day were deployed all over the Philippines, 
with the majority of them going to Samar province. This is an example of how 
quickly and easily SOF units can be deployed and delivered, and how SOF can 
adjust to any given mission.
While I was monitoring the deployment of the NAVSOG personnel, I also checked 
some of the AFP units that were augmenting the contingent in devastated areas 
Distribution of supplies to people in the coastal barangays affected by the typhoon  
in Samar Province, Philippines
Picture of LC 551 (Philippine Navy Logistic Ship)—It carried more or less 3,000 people from Samar 
to Cebu immediately after Typhoon Yolanda.  It also served as the initial command and control 
platform of the Armed Forces for the Philippines immediately after the typhoon. It helped bring 
supplies and relief goods to the victims of Yolanda.
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of the Philippines. I was amazed to see how fast SOF units like the NAVSOG, the 
Army Rangers, the Army Special Forces, and the Air Force Special Operation 
Wing reacted. They were the ones who immediately responded and were already 
prepared to depart by the time I contacted them. On that first day, they were 
waiting either in the airport for C-130 transports or on the pier for ships to take 
them to their areas of responsibility, such as Tacloban City and Samar province. 
This was the situation during those crucial first three days: some AFP units, even 
the reserves, were still waiting for instructions. Some were delayed because they 
had to wait for the relief goods and supplies intended for the victims. But some 
were still waiting for decisions from higher command. AFP camps, such as the 
General Headquarters and Villamor Air Base, were quickly flocked by volunteers 
and overwhelmed with contributions of goods, but there were administrative 
problems with the relief efforts, such as determining who would be in charge. 
Without going into further detail on these problems, the purpose of this 
narrative is to look at how SOF units can be effectively deployed in crises for 
HADR, which the United States and some other nations call a Military Operation 
Other Than War,3 and the projection of “soft power” as a means of humanitarian 
assistance.4 HADR is an important role for any military and requires military per-
sonnel to be capable of a rapid response to any given calamity, whether natural or 
manmade. The more quickly and efficiently they can react, the more effective the 
armed forces of a nation will be in any crisis.
Boots on the Ground
After a week of monitoring the storm’s aftermath as a staff officer in the Philip-
pine Fleet, I was relieved from my desk duties and assigned to go to Samar as a 
fleet assessment and coordinating officer. I was again tasked with dual functions: 
I would be an assessment officer for post-disaster damage and a liaison officer 
to coordinate certain requirements for the naval assets and personnel located 
in Samar. Following a week’s leave, I reported to Tacloban City. While I was 
in Samar, I both heard and witnessed for myself story after story of survival, 
heroism, professionalism, cooperation, courage, and resiliency of people pulling 
their lives back together after the storm. Comparing it to some of my previous 
HADR operations, I have to say that the aftermath of Typhoon Yolanda was the 
worst situation I have ever encountered in my life. The heavily damaged no-
man’s land that I had seen in 2000 during the All-out War against insurgents in 
the southern Philippines was no match for the devastation created by Yolanda, 
which looked like a combination of a no-man’s land and a zombie land. All 
the dramas of life had unfolded—stories of ordinary and extraordinary human 
behavior and of instinctive survival were conveyed not only by the news media 
but by the different people I talked with and interviewed. There were no rich 
and poor people, privileged people, or people with high political status in this 
disaster. Everyone upon whom the wrath of nature fell was equally a victim.
When I arrived in the Tacloban area, the authorities’ focus was still on ensuring 
stability, but the local government and its provincial disaster management 
team (PDMT) were already in close coordination with international organiza-
tions, including the United Nations and the US Joint Special Operations Task 
Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P), as well as the governments of Israel, Canada, Japan, 
China, South Korea, and others. The PDMT comprised contingents of the AFP, 
the Philippine National Police, other concerned agencies, and various volun-
teers. I was part of the navy contingent of the AFP. A majority of the contingents 
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8th Infantry Division, which had to take the lead in organizing and spearheading all of the AFP contingents that arrived for 
disaster response, even though most of its personnel were missing. Infrastructure from the brigade headquarters down to 
the company outpost was critically damaged by the typhoon. I was told that most of its personnel were among the casual-
ties of the storm. As I learned this, some questions came up for me, which I noted in my logbook: If your unit or even you 
yourself are prepared to respond to a natural or manmade disaster but you become the victim of such a disaster, what will 
you do? What can others do? Do we have contingency plans for such a situation?
This thought struck me with fear, but then I remembered 
the SEAL team leader who rescued the navy personnel 
during the typhoon. It came to my mind that instinct and 
skills are the essential requirements to keep oneself and 
one’s family safe in every situation that might arise. Disaster 
survival skills should be taught so that they become instinc-
tive for everyone, especially to our families and fellow 
military personnel.
A Model for Disaster Response
During the week that I stayed in the Tacloban area, I saw 
how countries could cooperate with one another to help 
the Philippines, especially in devastated areas like Samar 
province. It was so enlightening—and somehow amazing 
to me—to witness how countries could coordinate in times 
of disaster and to see the positive response of all these 
countries’ representatives, whether military or government 
officials. They all respected the host country’s officials, down 
to the provincial and local governments. Again, question 
after question came to my mind: Could this also be a 
model for insurgency and terrorist incidents? In the event 
of insurgency or terrorist activity, should the host nation 
remain in control? Will decision making in large-scale 
emergencies come down to the local government officials in 
the affected area? If this protocol could work in a disaster-
stricken nation, it seemed like it should also work for other 
problems.
US disaster response to other nations, such as the post-
typhoon Philippines, takes a comprehensive approach. 
Through initiative and the assets that were already in place, 
the United States was one of the first responders in the 
aftermath of Typhoon Yolanda. The JSOTF-P dispatched 
personnel and air assets for immediate assistance. The 
Disaster Assistance Response Team, the US Agency for International Development, and the Office of US Foreign Disaster 
Assistance quickly followed, assessing the situation and trying to fill all essential requirements in the worst-hit areas. I 
experienced firsthand how these US teams managed a rapid-response situation, including some innovation and adjustment 
that were needed in the post-typhoon environment. At the same time, there were lots of responders in the area who were 
eager to do their jobs. They respected the host country representatives, especially the local government officials who were 
in control in the disaster area—even the AFP was not the leading agency at that time. In the report I wrote for my com-
manders, I suggested that the disaster response I witnessed could serve both as a model for doctrine development and the 
basis for best practices in a HADR operation, especially in a country like the Philippines that is prone to typhoons, earth-
quakes, and other types of natural and manmade disasters.
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The Vital Role of the Special Operations Forces
When I thought about the intervention methods and the deployment of responders during my time in Tacloban, it oc-
curred to me to include in my report a discussion of the ways in which SOF could play a vital role in the HADR mission. But 
I have my own reservations about presenting this idea. If disaster relief became a formal role for our SEALs, some would 
perceive it as a role for lesser men, not for SOF, who are trained to be elite warriors and killers. Most of my fellow SOF war-
riors would hate me for making them take on a “not sexy” job like disaster response.5 But I truly believe that SOF can make 
the difference in saving hundreds or even thousands of lives 
if they are deployed not only as trained first-responders 
but also as the first people sent into disaster-stricken areas. 
Humanitarian assistance and disaster response may not 
seem sexy, especially for specialized soldiers who take pride 
in their killer instincts, but they can make a big difference 
by giving people the precious gifts of life and hope.6 In my 
career, I have participated as a responder in three major 
disasters: flash floods, a sunken ship, and the typhoon. In 
each instance, my capacity and my capability were chal-
lenged to the utmost limit. The work was rewarding and 
fulfilling, even though I have also had experience with 
combat missions and fighting as a SEAL operator. The HADR 
mission is always on my bucket list of priorities—it keeps 
me going and meets my professional goal of helping other 
people in times when they need help the most. But what 
also keeps me thinking about the deployment of SOF units 
for HADR is not just the experiences I’ve had, but also the 
fact that I can see how advantageous it would be to develop 
SOF as highly professional specialized response units. 
There are five factors that I believe make SOF ideal as im-
mediate responders in a disaster.
1. SOF are rapidly deployable compared to their 
conventional counterparts. SOF units can be immediately 
inserted into any disaster-stricken area and make an initial 
assessment of conditions before the conventional support 
or other units are deployed to the area. In another typhoon 
scenario, for example, SEALs could conduct an initial 
damage assessment of the piers and coastal infrastructure, 
conduct a hydro survey, and fulfill other essential require-
ments for ships carrying food, medicines, shelters, and other 
relief goods. Lack of information about the safety of some 
of the piers and wharves damaged by Typhoon Yolanda was 
a problem for responders. Some ships, for instance, hesitated to dock at some of the piers in Samar province, which 
meant their cargo did not reach the people who needed it.  
 
Ranger and SOF units could also clear vital roads blocked by the calamity so that trucks carrying troops and goods 
could reach the affected areas. Paratroopers could assess the airport and airstrips to find alternate landing zones as 
needed after any calamity. It took two or three days after Yolanda passed to clear the Tacloban airport because there 
were no trained personnel on the ground. If paratroopers had been dropped immediately after the typhoon struck 
the province, airlift and supplies could have been quickly provided to the victims, thereby saving hundreds more 
lives. The Civil Affairs Group could conduct morale briefings, give people the information they need to survive, 
and provide support and comfort in a post-disaster situation.
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2. SOF are highly specialized and have the skills to 
do initial assessments before the main effort of 
delivering support and logistics begins. Most 
SOF personnel have skills in multiple languages 
and could serve as communicators, not only to 
higher command but also to the local people. SOF 
personnel could also identify and set up the best 
tactical command post or command and control 
area.
3. SOF personnel are the most disciplined members 
of the military. They have a high workload capacity 
and a high sense of tolerance and professionalism. 
Most of the work that follows the initial assess-
ment after a disaster is about helping people and 
saving lives. Minute by minute, responders hear 
people screaming for help and begging for rescue. 
Some soldiers have difficulty in this situation, espe-
cially when dead bodies are scattered all around. A 
SOF operator can better tolerate these conditions 
and fulfill the task of prioritizing who needs to be 
saved.
4. A SOF officer is the best initial ground commander 
for HADR. If the disaster area has no initial com-
mand or authority left functioning, a SOF officer 
is the most fit to organize crisis management. His 
training and deployment—including leadership 
training—have prepared him to respond to this 
kind of management situation. When a Philippine 
SOF commander was tasked to head the initial 
contingent of the AFP after Typhoon Yolanda, he 
performed his duties quickly and efficiently before 
transferring them to the local government and the 
army division. His performance made a difference, 
and he was even praised by the US president for 
how well he performed during that crucial time of 
chaos and uncertainty.
5. Information operations, including Civil Affairs 
and psychological warfare, is another important 
aspect of special operations. This function is vital 
for all responders and units, international and 
local, acting in support of a HADR operation. 
A fellow student at the US Naval Postgraduate 
School proposed building a website that would 
cater to responders and units conducting and 
supporting HADR operations, with information on 
safe navigational routes and cleared road networks; 
updates on casualties and medevacs; airport 
clearance; important relief supplies; a directory 
of victims and families looking for lost members; 
and so on, to help coordinate all the international 
units and relief organizations, including military 
responders.
These are the lessons I have learned as a SOF disaster 
responder. My experience can serve as a case study for how 
SOF can be deployed effectively in what may be a “not-so-
sexy” job, but one that could positively affect hundreds 
of lives by giving disaster victims hope and helping them 
survive manmade and natural disasters like Super Typhoon 
Yolanda in the Philippines. v
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The Phantom Raid Air CDR (Ret.) Jamal Hussain,  Pakistani Air Force
The computerized log register at the Air House shows that  
at 0207 local time on 2 May 2011, an urgent telephone call for the air chief came 
in.1 When the air chief came on the line, the army chief, his land counterpart, 
informed him of confirmed reports of aerial activity, weapons fire, and a heli-
copter crash around the northeast garrison town of Abbottabad. “Is there any 
flying activity from the PAF [Pakistani Air Force]?” the army chief inquired. The 
air chief replied in the negative. The only reason PAF helicopters would be flying 
at that late hour of the night was if they were on a search-and-rescue mission to 
find a PAF aircraft reported to have crashed in the area during night flying. The 
air chief would have been informed about a downed aircraft, so that was not 
likely to be the reason for the activity. The army chief confirmed that, besides 
the suspicion that the air intrusion may have originated from the western border 
on a mission that was not yet clear and appeared to be the handiwork of the 
Americans, no other details were available at that time. 
Unsettled by this alarming news, the air chief wondered what could be the objec-
tive of such a brazen raid. As far as his knowledge went, Abbottabad had nothing 
of strategic value to defend, or the PAF would have deployed point-defense radar 
and other air defense systems to protect it against air or land attacks. Maybe the 
Indians actually believed their own oft-repeated mantra about Kashmiri terrorist 
training camps at Manshera, adjacent to Abbottabad, and had undertaken a 
foolhardy venture. Or perhaps the Americans, under the misperception that 
some of Pakistan’s strategic assets were located in Abbottabad, had conducted an 
airborne assault to seize them. That notion made little sense, however, because if 
the United States ever did mount an operation to take over or destroy Pakistan’s 
nuclear weapons, it would conduct a mass multiple-point raid rather than a 
stealthy solitary one. Whatever might be the motive of the aggressor, however, 
an immediate response from the PAF was warranted. 
While still speculating about the motive and the nature of the apparent aerial 
attack, around 0210 the air chief issued orders to his air defense commander to 
scramble a pair of F-16 fighters from the nearest base. Their instructions were 
to go over Abbottabad and look for any flying intruders. If any were detected, 
the fighters had clear orders to engage and shoot the intruders down, regardless 
of their country of origin. This was really a very bold and courageous decision, 
because by then it was becoming increasingly likely that the United States, rather 
than India, was the aggressor. To protect the nation’s honor and assert its sov-
ereignty, the PAF was prepared and ready to challenge and engage a far superior 
adversary that could boast an annual budget of US$171 billion, compared to the 
relatively meager annual budget for the PAF of about US$1.01 billion.2
In addition to getting regular updates on the progress of the scrambled jets, the 
air chief gave instructions for the immediate enhancement of the entire country’s 
air defense alert status and directed the duty staff to report to him on the status 
of all air defense radars. He wanted to know whether any radars had picked up 
intruders from either side of the border or had experienced any jamming.
AT 0207 
LOCAL TIME 





THE AIR CHIEF 
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Note: This essay was written in 
September 2011, four months 
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As the hours passed, news started to trickle in that 
confirmed an aerial intrusion from the west, apparently 
by US forces, that targeted a solitary compound within 
a kilometer of the Pakistani Army’s Military Academy 
at Kakul. The goal of the mission appeared to be the 
capture or elimination of a key al Qaeda leader whom 
the Americans suspected was holed up in the compound. 
The scrambled fighters, meanwhile, had reported from 
over the site, and despite an extensive search, could not 
locate any aerial activity in or around the locale. As was 
later learned, the helicopters that had led the air assault 
had completed their operations and exited the area, and 
were returning to their home bases in Afghanistan by 
the time the Pakistan F-16s had arrived on the scene. 
At around 0835 Pakistan Standard Time, US President 
Barack Obama appeared on television and triumphantly 
announced that, through a bold heliborne operation inside 
Pakistani territory, “a small team of Americans” had killed 
the number-one US enemy, Osama bin Laden. “Justice has 
been done,” the president said.3
This news made headlines in all 
major international and local news 
sources by the following morning 
and dominated the news over the 
following days; one such headline 
cryptically stated, “Obama Gets 
Osama.” 4
The fact that four foreign helicop-
ters were able to penetrate more than 100 nautical miles 
inside Pakistani airspace without being detected by the 
country’s air defense network and remain there for nearly 
two hours (approximately 80 minutes for the ingress and 
exit phases and 40 minutes over the site) was of serious 
concern and warranted a major investigation. Later in 
that same morning, the air chief convened a very high-
level team headed by a three-star air marshal to conduct 
a thorough probe into the incident and submit a report. 
Because all official activities at the Air House and at all 
the air defense units, including the status of the radars and 
other systems, are electronically recorded, the investiga-
tion would be able to accurately determine the status of 
the sensors during the critical period and whether any 
target was picked up or a unit experienced jamming.   
The investigation report was completed within three 
weeks and scrutinized at the highest level at Air Headquar-
ters. Its salient findings were (1) all PAF radars that were 
deployed during the period under scrutiny were serviceable 
and operational; (2) no targets were picked up by any of the 
deployed sensors, nor did any sensors experience jamming; 
and (3) there were no system failures or any slackness on the 
part of the air defense operators on duty. 5
And yet four helicopters were able to cross the Afghan-
Pakistani border undetected by a fairly sophisticated air 
defense network, penetrate over 100 nautical miles into 
Pakistan, operate for more than half an hour, and return 
to Afghan airspace before anyone in Pakistan’s security 
forces knew they were there. The report highlighted 
system limitations and technological deficiencies against 
a sophisticated aggressor, along with inadequate low-level 
radar coverage on the western border, as possible explana-
tions for the undetected raid.
To understand how this incident could have happened 
without some degree of incompetency or outright failure 
of the air defense network and its operators, it helps to 
have some basic knowledge of the nation’s air defense 
network, its strengths, and its limitations.   
The outermost layer in a nation’s air defense system is the 
detection of incoming air raids. Ground-based radars are 
the primary means by which most 
countries with air defenses main-
tain a constant vigil against the 
intrusion of hostile air elements. 
Airborne radars like the airborne 
early warning and control plat-
forms do supplement a country’s 
air defense ground environment, 
but they are expensive alternatives 
and are used primarily to supplement certain limitations 
of ground-based radars. These systems are very useful 
during crises and wars, but to keep them operational on 
a 24/7 basis during peacetime is prohibitively expensive. 
Even the United States cannot afford such a luxury. 
Ground-based radars come in two distinct versions: 
high-level and low-level. High-level radar is optimized to 
pick up high-flying targets and, depending on the altitude 
of the target and the power of the radar, can easily detect 
targets up to 250 miles away. Low-level radars, which have 
the ability to reduce the amount of “ground clutter” (i.e., 
signals reflected from the ground) they pick up, are used 
to detect low-flying targets. Because of the earth’s curva-
ture, the maximum range at which a target flying at 250 
feet or less above ground level can be detected is generally 
about 25 miles. To overcome this limitation and the 
interference of natural and manmade obstacles, such as 
hills and buildings, a series or network of radars is needed 
to illuminate a particular area. Figure 1 shows a schematic 
diagram to illustrate the principle.




Pakistan has to monitor its airspace for both high- and low-
level air incursions from its eastern, western, and southern 
borders. Given that high-level radars have a range of over 250 
miles and a very wide cone of coverage, six to seven such units 
operating on a 24/7 basis can adequately cover the entire 
airspace of the country. Low-level monitoring of the borders, 
in contrast, presents a significant challenge. Because low-level 
radars have limited range and a much smaller cone of illumination, these units 
must be deployed linearly and in depth to give enough early warning of low-
flying intruders to the air defense units. To cover the entire length of the coun-
try’s borders would require more than 250 such radars to be deployed. Moreover, 
because of their specialization, low-level radar units have a limited lifespan and 
if operated on a 24/7 basis, will have to be overhauled at regular intervals. In 
less than a decade, they will have outlived their usefulness and must be replaced. 
Continuous low-level radar coverage of the entire border of Pakistan is, therefore, 
not possible. It may be remembered that even the United States, with an annual 
defense budget of over $700 billion, cannot afford the luxury of perfect radar 
coverage along its southern border with Mexico, which time and again is breached 
by drug smugglers flying low in small aircraft to drop their deadly merchandise. 
How, then, does the PAF attempt to overcome this severe limitation?
The procurement and operational deployment of the PAF’s air defense radar 
network are governed by the threat perception, an official posture that is 
formalized by the service in conjunction with the relevant authorities at the 
highest level. In the current scenario, the PAF has complete high- and low-level 
radar coverage along its eastern border with India. During the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in the 1980s, much of the western border, especially the northern 
border with Afghanistan, was provided with round-the-clock low- and high-
level coverage, and the Air Force paid a high price in terms of the wear and tear 
on its equipment due to the constant vigil. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1988, 
the aerial threat from the west was downgraded. As long as coalition forces 
ruled the air “waves” in Afghanistan and Pakistan remained an ally in their war 
against the Taliban and al Qaeda insurgents, the PAF envisaged no serious aerial 
threat from that quarter. Currently, although a complete high-level umbrella 
covers the western border, low-level cover is limited. Only those installations 
in locations that have been identified as vital have point defense radars and 
ground-to-air defenses. There are enough gaps in low-level coverage that an 
adversary could penetrate Pakistan’s airspace from the west and avoid detection. 
The success of US Operation Trident Spear, as the bin Laden operation was 
called, was vital for the United States in general and the Obama administration 
in particular. The planners left no stone unturned in their efforts to ensure 
that the raid achieved its objective, utilizing every operational, electronic, and 
avionic option available to them. To avoid detection, they carefully mapped 
the footprint of some of the low-level radars en route and chose a path beyond 
the array’s surveillance ranges. In addition, the aircraft flew very fast at very low 
altitude and through valleys wherever possible, thus further reducing the chances 
of detection. Furthermore, the two Blackhawk helicopters that carried out the 
actual mission had been specially modified to incorporate stealth technology. 
Special paints and modified design features made these platforms virtually invis-
ible to the current generation of radars. Not satisfied with these measures, the 
planners made sure the helicopters were equipped with radar warning receivers 
and jammers. Should Pakistani radars have illuminated the choppers despite 
AS LONG AS  
COALITION 
FORCES 
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Figure 1: Line-of-sight range limitation of low-level radar systems
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NOTES 
1  The Air House is the official residence of the chief of staff of the 
Pakistani Air Force.
2 Figures are approximate. For details of the US Air Force 
budget estimate for Fiscal Year 2010, see Department of 
the Air Force, SAF/FMB, United States Air Force: FY 2010 
Budget Overview (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of the Air Force, 
May 2009): http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/shared/media/
document/AFD-090508-028.pdf . For the Pakistani Air Force’s 
figures, see “Defence Budget for FY-2012–2013 Announced,” 
Pakistan Military Review (blog), n.d.: http://pakmr.blogspot.
com/2012/06/defence-budget-for-fy-2012-2013.html 
3    For a transcript and video of President Barack Obama’s remarks 
announcing the death of Osama bin Laden, see Macon Phillips, 
“Osama Bin Laden Dead,” What’s Happening (blog), 2 May 
2011: https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/05/02/
osama-bin-laden-dead  
4 Will Durst, “Obama Gets Osama,” The Blog (blog), Huffington 
Post, 6 May 2011: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/will-durst/
obama-gets-osama_b_858762.html
5  The low-level radars deployed on the northwestern border were 
of vintage German origin, dating back to 1978. US aircraft would 
have the electronic countermeasure capability to plot and jam 
these radars with relative ease. Pakistan’s radar inventory currently 
also includes units from several nations, including the United 
States and Germany. The performance of all radars is recorded and 
preserved in cassettes and tapes, which allowed the investigators to 
determine whether the protocol for radar deployment (determined 
by the current security status) was followed, and whether the ones 
that were operating in the border sector in question experienced 
any jamming. The investigation’s recommendations included a 
revision of the deployment protocol. 
their stealth capability, the US pilots would have gotten a warning through their 
radar warning receiver and been able to resort to jamming. From an operational 
viewpoint, jamming is a last resort to be used only when it is confirmed that the 
opponent’s radar system has detected the intrusion. In the event, the raid went 
undetected, and no jamming was required. 
The US planners had one final ace up their sleeves. While the operation was in 
progress, they were continuously monitoring Pakistan’s communications for any 
sign of reaction. If Pakistan had reacted in time by scrambling fighters, Admiral 
Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was standing by to ring 
up his counterpart and inform him that it was an American raid and that Paki-
stan should not interfere. If Pakistan decided to engage the intruding helicopters 
anyway, the United States would free its own fighters, which were already patrol-
ling the Afghanistan-Pakistan border armed with the latest beyond-visual-range 
missiles. The PAF fighters would then be challenged by a force of significant 
numerical and technological superiority. Very few episodes in the history of 
aviation can match the meticulous planning, deployment of cutting-edge tech-
nology, and professional execution that characterized the helicopter-led assault 
on the Abbottabad compound, deep in Pakistani territory. 
Could the current air defense network of Pakistan have done any better against 
such a sophisticated operation? Perhaps not. What needs to be done to prevent 
another such intrusion? Given the severe imbalance between the capabilities 
of the US Air Force and the PAF, the answer probably lies in negotiations and 
diplomacy. If negotiations should fail and it is called upon to defend the nation, 
the PAF is ready to take on any adversary, even the US Air Force, and will fight to 
the bitter end, regardless of the cost. v
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Seymour Hersh Reignites the Bin Laden  
Raid Controversy
Air CDR (Ret.) Jamal Hussain, 
Pakistani Air Force
The news that broke in Pakistan on the morning of 2 May 2011, 
that a US special operations team had conducted a daring night raid inside Paki-
stan to eliminate terrorist Osama bin Laden, left the Pakistani public in a state of 
shock and utter disbelief. At first, a significant majority in the country refused to 
accept that bin Laden could have sought refuge—or, possibly, been given shelter 
by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)—at a location scarcely more than 
a stone’s throw from the Army’s prestigious military academy at Kakul. As the 
narrative unfolded over time, however, the truth about the presence of bin Laden 
in Abbottabad and his elimination by a US SOF team finally dawned on a deeply 
humiliated nation, but most people remained highly skeptical about the official 
American version of the raid. 
An exposé by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, “The Killing of Osama bin 
Laden,” published in the May 2015 London Review of Books, categorically rejected 
the American claim that “the mission was an all-American affair, and that the 
senior generals of Pakistan’s army and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) were not 
told of the raid in advance.”1 A sizable section of the Pakistani public agreed with 
Hersh’s assertion, igniting a fresh debate over the raid within Pakistan that had 
the skeptics gloating, “I told you so.” While Hersh’s reputation for professional 
integrity makes it hard to dismiss this latest piece on the bin Laden raid, at the 
same time, his past acclaim should not guarantee automatic acceptance of his 
viewpoint. 
Before embarking on a critical examination of the bin Laden raid narrative as 
pieced together by Hersh, it would help to briefly assess one of the assumptions 
on which he apparently bases his version of events. Hersh claims that the heli-
copters carrying the SOF operators could have ingressed deep (about 100 nautical 
miles) inside Pakistani airspace undetected only if someone high in Pakistan’s 
military command were complicit with the raiders. If this conjecture is faulty, as 
I believe it is, then Hersh’s entire analysis is built on a dubious foundation.
On the night of 1 May 2011, in the border sector where the raiders crossed into 
Pakistan’s airspace, there were only a few low-level radars deployed between Pe-
shawar and Abbottabad, whose primary function was to facilitate and monitor 
local Pakistan Air Force (PAF) activity. Because friendly NATO and International 
Security Assistance Force airpower operating across the border in Afghanistan 
had full control of the airspace, no serious threat was envisaged from the western 
front—hence, comprehensive low-level radar coverage of the western front was 
not considered necessary.2
The PAF does have airborne sensors in the form of airborne early warning and 
control (AEWC) platforms, which can greatly enhance low-level detection 
capability when deployed in a given sector. There were no AEWC aircraft in the 
air when the raid materialized on that fateful night, however, because these very 
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exercises. With the aid of the electronic surveillance and electronic 
countermeasure capabilities that it possessed, the US Air Force could 
therefore easily have plotted the range of the handful of low-level 
radars deployed in the sector and selected a route well beyond their 
detection capability. Using a combination of stealth technology, 
nap-of-the-earth flying (terrain masking, flying under the radar), 
and a route plotted to keep them in the shadow of the hills, flying in 
undetected was, to use a cliché, a piece of cake for the raiders. It is 
believed that in addition to all of these precautions, the flight team 
had a contingency plan to spoof and jam the PAF radars if any units 
still managed to pick up the aircraft.3 
Hersh’s assumption that the PAF had the wherewithal to guarantee 
detection of four ultra-low flying helicopters, two of which were 
masked with stealth technology, even over such a distance, displays 
his naïveté about the workings of air defense systems. In any inves-
tigation, when the investigator accepts certain assumptions as truth, 
there is a subsequent tendency to cherry-pick only that evidence that 
supports the initial assumptions, even if it comes from sources that 
are normally considered unreliable and unacceptable. What follows 
is a chronological sequence of key events before, during, and after 
the actual raid, as portrayed by Hersh.
1. Bin Laden’s presence in Pakistan was disclosed by a “walk-in”—a retired 
senior ISI officer who came unbidden to the US embassy in Islamabad in 
August 2010. The officer told officials there that bin Laden was being kept 
in protective custody by the ISI at an isolated compound in Abbottabad.
2. General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the powerful chief of the army staff, and 
Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the head of the ISI, initially 
denied any knowledge of bin Laden’s presence in the country but eventu-
ally had to concede that he was in their custody. They were persuaded to 
cooperate with the CIA-conceived plan to kill or capture bin Laden after 
negotiating for some quids pro quo, particularly regarding military aid. 
3. Kayani and Pasha were kept in the loop about the air raid and were made 
responsible for ensuring that the PAF stayed out of the way.4 They were 
also told in no uncertain terms that any efforts to relocate bin Laden 
from his Abbottabad hideout would have serious consequences not only 
for the Pakistani generals but for their country as well. For their part, 
Kayani and Pasha insisted that “you can’t have a big strike force. You have 
to come in lean and mean. And you have to kill him, or there is no deal.” 5 
4. The two sides jointly agreed that the United States would wait a week 
before formally announcing that bin Laden had been killed by a drone 
strike in the hilly region of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, a story 
that Pakistan would subsequently confirm. The crash of one of the 
Blackhawks as it attempted to drop team members onto the Abbottabad 
compound’s rooftop, however, made it impossible to keep the raid a 
secret. Once it was clear that the mission had succeeded, a backroom 
argument began in the White House: “Should Obama stand by the 
agreement with Kayani and Pasha and pretend a week or so later that bin 
Laden had been killed in a drone attack in the mountains, or should he 
go public immediately? The downed helicopter made it easy for Obama’s 
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political advisers to urge the latter plan. ... Obama had to ‘get out in front 
of the story’ before someone in the Pentagon did.” 6
5. Much to the dismay of US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Obama 
acted on the advice of his political team, taking all the credit for the 
mission with only a vague mention of any involvement by the Pakistani 
government: “It’s important to note that our counterterrorism coopera-
tion with Pakistan helped lead us to bin Laden and the compound 
where he was hiding.” 7 Kayani and Pasha had little choice but to accept 
the official US version, refuting any involvement with the US plan or 
prior knowledge of bin Laden’s presence in the country. The appearance 
of incompetency was a lesser evil for them than complicity.    
6. Hersh maintains that the sea burial of bin Laden’s remains cannot be 
verified and, according to his unnamed source, never took place. In his 
telling, the remains were either strewn over the Hindu Kush mountains 
or interred in some undisclosed location.     
Each of these points presents some problems. On the subject of the ISI walk-in 
postulated by Hersh, although such a possibility cannot be ruled out, Hersh 
fails to provide any credible source to support this story beyond the one un-
named former US intelligence official who is the sole source for almost the entire 
article. The US administration provided a slightly different version of events. In 
the initial press briefing after the raid, a senior intelligence official confirmed, 
in guarded terms, that Pakistan had provided crucial information that intensi-
fied the CIA’s focus on the Abbottabad compound. “‘The Pakistanis did not 
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us information that helped us develop a clearer focus on this compound over 
time. … [T]hey provided us information attached to [the compound] to help us 
complete the robust intelligence case that … eventually carried the day.’” 8 One 
reporter’s version of the story claimed that “the ISI had given the CIA a mobile 
phone number without knowing its significance and that US surveillance of 
that number led eventually” to an al Qaeda courier and finally to bin Laden.9 
This was apparently the extent of the cooperation to which Obama had briefly 
referred in his triumphant announcement.10  
The purported initial denial by Kayani and Pasha of bin Laden’s presence in 
Pakistan and their subsequent admission that the al Qaeda leader was in their 
custody raise a number of questions. If, as Hersh maintains, bin Laden had 
been in the ISI’s custody in Abbottabad since 2006, then-President and Army 
General11 Pervez Musharraf must have known about it and given his consent and 
approval to the scheme. What stopped Musharraf from using this priceless asset 
to save his rapidly sinking political ship in 2007?12 An offer from him to then-US 
President George W. Bush to eliminate America’s most wanted terrorist—with 
or without officially admitting the role of Pakistan in his capture—would have 
been a God-sent opportunity for both of them. For Bush, bin Laden’s capture 
and/or destruction would have been the crowning glory of his presidency, and 
would have given a significant boost to the Republican Party and the election 
campaign of the Republican candidate John McCain in the 2008 US presidential 
election. In an interview with CNN’s Piers Morgan in late May 2011, however, 





THIS PRICELESS  
ASSET?
Former Presidents George W. Bush and Pervez Musharraf
November 2015
21
and clearly stated that had he known, he would have extracted maximum benefit 
for himself. 
If there was complicity, and [bin Laden] was there for five years, I 
get directly involved. That means I was complicit. ... Now, if that was 
the case, I would like—I would have wanted to take leverage out of 
it. When I was at the receiving end in the 2007 [inaudible], I should 
have done something with this Osama bin Laden card and gained 
advantage. ... I would have done something to turn the tables in my 
favor. ... I would have used this card in my favor.13
Even conceding that Musharraf missed the trick, what prevented Kayani and 
Pasha from relocating bin Laden to a much more securely guarded facility when 
they were initially confronted with his presence in Abbottabad? A cynic might 
insist that they must have been blackmailed, coerced, or bought off. To begin 
with, it is simply bizarre to imagine that the ISI would hide a priceless asset 
like Osama bin Laden in such an undefended and vulnerable spot—that is not 
how the service is known to operate. Far less valuable assets than bin Laden 
are guarded very heavily when in ISI custody. Just as important, once Kayani 
and Pasha were coerced into accepting the US raid plan, could they not have 
suggested an alternative that would have still allowed the US administration to 
come out smelling of roses without discrediting the entire nation of Pakistan?14 
If, as Hersh insisted, bin Laden was in the custody of the ISI, the agency could 
have moved him physically, dead or alive, to a remote region of the inaccessible 
Afghan frontier where the brave SOF team could have staged their heroic raid 
with far less danger. The failure of the top Pakistani generals to do so would have 
painted them as dim-witted at best, or traitors at worst. While one may disagree 
with many of the policies of the top leadership of the Pakistani armed forces, 
dismissing them as dimwits or traitors is something not even their harshest 
critics would do. The Hersh version just does not hold water.  
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Did Kayani, Pasha, and Gates honestly believe, as Hersh implies, that two fully 
laden Blackhawks could unload heavily armed SOF personnel in a fairly well-
built-up area of Pakistan and sit there for a minimum of 30 minutes, and that 
the entire incident would go unnoticed by the local populace?15 Given the level 
of cooperation between the ISI and the CIA, as described by Hersh, would it 
not have made more sense to pre-position a helicopter and a small team of CIA 
operatives inside the compound, and after taking possession of bin Laden (dead 
or alive), have them fly off to Afghanistan and then claim, as agreed, that bin 
Laden was eliminated in a drone strike elsewhere? Was Obama so politically 
naïve that he gave his blessing to the delayed announcement scheme, or had he 
planned to double-cross the “not-so-bright” Pakistanis and his own secretary of 
defense from the outset? 
Hersh claims that Obama was able to extract tremendous political mileage 
from the bin Laden raid, to the point that it was touted as one of his crowning 
overseas achievements and helped him win reelection in 2012 with relative ease. 
If Obama blatantly lied to the American public about the raid, however, were his 
Republican enemies so simpleminded that they could not see through the farce 
and expose him? A charge of such magnitude, if proven, was bound to have led 
to Obama’s subsequent impeachment. Does Hersh want us to believe that, like 
Kayani and Pasha, the Republicans are also morons? 
Finally, Hersh questions the ceremonial sea burial of bin Laden’s remains. His 
undisclosed sources suggest that the sea burial never took place and that the 
remains may have been either tossed overboard from the helicopters as they flew 
over the Hindu Kush mountains or buried elsewhere. While his assertions are 
within reason, Hersh does not give any verifiable source to back up his claim. In 
either case, it makes sense for the White House to have made a public display 
of the body’s disposition in a way that prevented bin Laden’s followers from 
turning his burial site into a pilgrimage place for radicals—if any part of him 
were anywhere on land, someone was bound to claim they knew where it was. 
Scattering bits of his body across the mountains (and thus leaving his death 
uncertain), as Hersh claims took place, if it became known, could easily incite 
a violent backlash among his followers and imitators while making Americans 
feel squeamish. The sea burial may in fact have been a lie, but it was a good idea 
nevertheless.
For the general public in Pakistan and the international audience abroad, the 
failure of the ISI, renowned the world over for its professionalism in the murky 
world of espionage, to detect the presence of Osama bin Laden so close to the 
army’s prestigious military academy for more than four years is very hard to 
swallow. While the hunt for bin Laden had the highest priority in the United 
States, the mere possibility of his presence in Pakistan was a nightmare scenario 
for both the ISI and the national leadership. Whether the ISI captured him and 
handed him over to US forces or killed him outright, either action could have 
had major fallout within Pakistan because of bin Laden’s cult following among 
a section of the public. Harboring him was equally dangerous and likely to be 
viewed as an extremely hostile act by the United States and its Western allies. 
Besides economic and political sanctions, Pakistan could have found itself 
directly in the crosshairs of the American military. The world is a witness to the 
destruction of Afghanistan and the Taliban-led Afghan government after they 
dared to refuse to hand over bin Laden to the United States in 2001. 
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Besides the helicopter crash that woke up the neighborhood, the shooting and 
blasting of doors by the commandos continued for the next 40 minutes. Ac-
cording to journalist Jane Corbin, neighbors had alerted the local police about 
the crash of a helicopter, but the police were told to stand down by the Abbot-
tabad army high command.16 The possibility that the Americans had warned 
the Pakistanis at the last minute about a raid on a high-value target, without 
specifying who, and that the local authorities judiciously turned a blind eye, is a 
theory Pakistan’s security analysts favor.17
Given the murky history of rogue elements within Pakistan’s military and intel-
ligence who are sympathetic to Islamic militants, the possibility that these sym-
pathizers provided support to bin Laden and his motley group at their hideout 
in Abbottabad cannot be ruled out.18 There is still, however, no conclusive proof 
whether the presence of bin Laden was known by the country’s top intelligence 
and military commanders, or whether he was indeed in their custody. The one 
possible explanation for the failure of the ISI to detect bin Laden’s presence 
was its leaders’ firm belief and fervent hope that he was either dead or—more 
likely—barely surviving on the fringes of the Pakistani-Afghan border. The ISI 
never seriously hunted for bin Laden within Pakistan, thus falling victim to its 
own canard. 
In conclusion, the broad contours of the official US account of the bin Laden 
raid appear plausible, but as the deputy director of the CIA told one reporter, 
“there are parts of the US account the world may never be told. ... ‘Not a hun-
dred percent of the story is out there.’” 19 Exaggerations concerning the tactical 
details of the behind-the-scenes intelligence work and the actual raid, such as 
those depicted in the Hollywood film Zero Dark Thirty, are at best the kind of 
propaganda tool very commonly wielded by the victor.20 
Seymour Hersh needs to take a closer look at his sources and revisit his mono-
graph on the real story behind Operation Neptune Spear, as the bin Laden 
raid was known to its planners, if he wishes his latest work to be taken seriously 
within academia. v
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The Sri Lankan Civil War: A Personal 
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As a member of the Sri Lankan armed forces, I have served 
since 1992 in various capacities that dealt with the planning and execution of 
counterterrorist operations against the ruthless insurgent organization known 
as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The effort to eliminate the 
terrorists completely from Sri Lankan soil through military strategy and politi-
cal and national will superseded all other national priorities and was ultimately 
successful. In this article, I discuss my operational experience in different stages 
of the conflict with the LTTE, the progress the armed forces achieved over time, 
and our success adapting small-group tactics to overcome LTTE strongholds and 
defenses. Finally, I describe my experience in the post-conflict period and offer 
recommendations for how to achieve sustainable peace in Sri Lanka.  
Historical Origins of the Conflict
Sri Lanka’s geostrategic situation is a prime factor in the country’s ethnic divi-
sions. The northern tip of the island is only a few miles from the Indian coastal 
state of Tamil Nadu, which is home to more than 50 million primarily Hindu 
ethnic Tamils (see map 1). The territorial dispute between the majority Sinhalese 
population and the Tamils goes back more than 2,000 years, to a time when a 
Tamil king from the Indian mainland is said to have invaded Ceylon (the name 
of the island before it became a republic in 1972), and his descendants continued 
to struggle with the Buddhist Sinhala kings for territory. Tamils, however, do 
not believe that they are a migrant community and view the north and east of 
Sri Lanka as their ancestral homeland of Eelam. This is their core issue, similar in 
some ways to that of the Palestinians in Israel. 
Like India, Ceylon was occupied by the British 
Empire until 1948. Under colonial rule, Tamils 
played a large role in the civil service and business 
communities, but when independence came, they 
did not want to be ruled by the majority Sinhalese, 
whose policies they felt were discriminatory. Over 
the ensuing years, Sri Lanka’s leaders and political 
parties failed to effectively address these issues, 
including the growing separatist movement. The 
armed insurgency that arose in the country’s north 
in the 1970s was the culmination of these failures.
The LTTE was formed in 1976 by Velupillai 
Prabhakaran, who envisioned not only a separate 
Tamil state that would encompass the historically 
Tamil northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka, 
but also a greater Eelam (“Precious Land”) aligned 
with the state of Tamil Nadu in India. The so-called 
First Eelam War began in 1983 when the killing of Map 1: Greater Tamil Nadu
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Sinhalese government soldiers in an LTTE ambush led to violent anti-Tamil riots. 
The Second Eelam War began in 1990 after Indian peacekeeping forces pulled out, 
and the violence between Tamil guerrillas and government forces escalated once 
again. Although the armed Tamil insurgency has been put down for now, the seeds 
of separatism, rooted in this historical perspective, will continue to sprout.
Anti-Terrorist Operations against the LTTE in Sri Lanka 
(1992–1996)
On 3 November 1990, I joined the Sri Lankan Army as an officer cadet and 
underwent training at the General Sir John Kotelawala Defense University in 
Colombo and the Sri Lankan Military Academy in Diyatalawa. On 14 De-
cember 1992, after successfully completing my military training, I was commis-
sioned as a 2nd lieutenant attached to a regiment of the 6th Infantry Battalion, 
called the Gemunu Watch. In 1993, I completed a degree in defense studies at 
the Kotelawala Defense University and subsequently joined my battalion in the 
eastern part of the country, where we conducted limited operations against the 
LTTE in the area. 
Around that time, following the withdrawal of the Indian Army’s peacekeeping 
force and with massive support from the Tamil diaspora, the LTTE insurgency 
had reached a stage of open combat. Our battalion’s aim, therefore, was to 
destroy the LTTE cadres who were operating from the nearby jungles and thus 
clear the threat they posed to our main camp and the nearby Sinhala and Muslim 
villages. Our warfare strategy was conventional, and we remained focused on 
one objective at a time. Because of this, our enemy always had the information 
advantage. While we were on the offensive, the LTTE were able to either with-
draw or cut off our troops and inflict heavy casualties by throwing the collective 
strength of their local forces at us. Accordingly, we were able to achieve only very 
limited success in these early stages. The experiences I describe in the following 
sections illustrate just how resourceful and tenacious the LTTE were in fighting 
for their independence, and what the Sri Lankan armed forces had to undertake 
and learn in order to defeat them. (See appendix A for a list of these engage-
ments and their dates and locations.)
The Reinforcement of Pooneryn Camp
The Pooneryn military sector is in the northwest of Sri Lanka, separated by 
Kalmunai lagoon from the city of Jaffna to the north. A route connecting Jaffna 
with the south used to run up through Pooneryn. The Elephant Pass causeway, 
the other main route between the north and south, lies about 12 miles east of 
Pooneryn. The Pooneryn military sector was established to seal off the Tamils’ 
Jaffna peninsula stronghold and pave the way for an assault on Jaffna from 
Pooneryn itself. Nagathivanthurai Naval Base, to the northeast of the Pooneryn 
sector, was monitoring civilian and LTTE movements on the lagoon. The area 
south of Pooneryn was under LTTE control. 
On 11 November 1993, at 0020 hours, the LTTE launched a massive attack on 
the Pooneryn Army Camp. On this particular day, I was serving as a platoon 
commander in the Gemunu Watch, which was conducting search-and-clear 
operations in the eastern jungles. About four hours after the attack began, we 
were heli-lifted to Palaly Air Base, situated in the northern part of Jaffna, to try 







to reinforce the besieged Pooneryn Camp (see maps 2 and 3). The air force’s Bell 
212, Bell 412, and MI-17 helicopters from Palaly attempted to insert our first 
platoon by air but were forced to withdraw under heavy LTTE fire. Simultane-
ously, at about 1500, after seven hours of sailing, a group of commandos made 
an attempt to land off Kalmunai (the western tip of Pooneryn). Heavy LTTE fire 
did not allow these reinforcements to gain a foothold on the beach, while the 
accompanying naval vessels were unable to get close enough to the shore to give 
effective covering fire because of the shallow water. Ultimately, all our attempts 
to insert forces failed due to heavy resistance.  
On the following day, 12 November, the air force launched 
air strikes against the LTTE forces, but our efforts to land 
any aircraft near the Pooneryn base failed again due to 
continuous attacks by the Tigers. By this time, some of 
the surviving soldiers from the army camp had managed 
to make contact with us by radio. They told us that their 
group of about 550 men had moved down the southwest 
coast of Pooneryn and therefore could be reached more 
easily than the main army camp. In the evening, our pilots 
dropped supplies, including food, medicine, and batteries, 
to the besieged men. Finally, on 13 November, our team 
of commandos, supported by infantry, made a successful 
beach landing southwest of Pooneryn. Simultaneously, our 
pilots accomplished their assigned task and safely reached 
the soldiers’ location. As a platoon commander, I landed 
with the battalion a few miles away from the main base in 
Pooneryn as reinforcement. As we moved in, we evacu-
ated wounded soldiers and rushed them to a helicopter 
landing area that we had cleared. We were able to clear the 
area with enough heavy fire to enable the naval troops and 
helicopters to land. In response to our successful landing 
and advance, the LTTE forces started to withdraw from 
Pooneryn. On 14 November, the fourth day after the initial 
attack, we consolidated our control of the entire camp.
During the First and Second Eelam Wars (beginning 
in 1983 and 1990, respectively), the LTTE stayed on the 
offensive, and the government had to react to their innovations.1 Pooneryn is a 
vast area guarded jointly by the army and navy. When the Pooneryn base was at-
tacked in the incident I described above, the full strength of the camp was 1,500 
soldiers, while the total strength of the LTTE cadres at that time was understood 
to be over 5,000. The LTTE’s guerrilla tactics—including infiltrating through the 
forward line of troops, attacking from the rear, and wearing a uniform similar 
enough to allow them to mingle with the regular army soldiers—contributed 
greatly to their successes. The LTTE also concentrated all their resources against 
security forces in their major offensive operations. They managed to overrun 
many military bases, inflicting heavy losses and damage, just as they had in their 
attacks in Pooneryn.    
Operation Riviresa: The Liberation of Jaffna
Operation Riviresa was the largest operation ever launched by the Sri Lankan 
security forces; its objective was to take Jaffna from the LTTE. During a brief 
Map 2: Jaffna, showing Pooneryn, Palaly, and Kalmunai
Map 3: The Pooneryn Operation
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cessation of hostilities following national elections and 
a change of government in 1994, the LTTE was able to 
regroup, restock, and train sufficient cadres to enhance its 
offensive capability. This raised concerns within the govern-
ment, and our worst fears were realized in late April 1995, 
when the LTTE downed two military aircraft using surface-
to-air missiles and repeatedly attacked naval craft, thus 
severely hindering the army’s movements into and out of 
the Jaffna Peninsula. At this point, the Sri Lankan govern-
ment decided that offensive action to regain the peninsula 
was imperative. Accordingly, our battalion trained for three 
months on Kayts Island, situated to the west of Jaffna, 
focusing on the skills for fighting in built-up areas. Because 
there were no civilian inhabitants on the island, we did our 
training with live fire. After completing this training, in July 
1995 we were transported to Kankesanthurai Harbor, on 
the northern coast of Jaffna, by naval mechanized landing 
craft. Our reserve strike division launched a preliminary 
operation (called Thunder Strike) to capture the town of 
Achchuveli, approximately 16 kilometers north of the city 
of Jaffna (see maps 4 and 5). This was a highly successful 
operation in which the LTTE suffered heavy casualties. Its 
outcome largely supported Operation Riviresa by boosting 
troop morale and reinforcing Palaly Air Base.
On 1 October 1995, just before Operation Riviresa began, 
our battalion launched an offensive to expand the Palaly 
forward defensive line along the Kankesanthurai–Jaffna 
road. We took Mallakam town, which is 10 kilometers from 
the town of Jaffna, by surprise, and were able to destroy a 
large number of terrorists during the LTTE’s foiled coun-
terattacks. Subsequently, on 17 October, we shifted our 
battalion to the Point Pedro–Jaffna road (the easternmost 
approach of Operation Riviresa) and started our advance 
from Achchuveli town along with the western approach 
along the Palaly–Jaffna road (see map 5).
For the first time in the history of Sri Lanka, the armed forces launched an offen-
sive operation involving three divisions. Our two infantry divisions launched the 
operation along a narrow front on converging axes using conventional tactics. 
We were vulnerable to LTTE indirect fire, but the concentration of force, which 
was applied at the right time and place, helped to outnumber the LTTE and 
subsequently demoralized them. Unprecedented concentrated fire from artillery, 
mortars, and tanks, combined with air and continuous ground assaults, broke 
the will and cohesion of the LTTE forces. On 2 December, we entered Jaffna city 
but found it abandoned—it looked like a ghost town. The LTTE had taken ev-
erything before their withdrawal, and the inhabitants had fled. In the aftermath 
of the operation, we resettled the 600,000 civilians who had camped on the west 
side of Jaffna Peninsula during the operation. This operation was a turning point 
for the LTTE as a guerrilla force, and the point at which the mindset of the Tamil 
population began to turn away from supporting the LTTE, who were moving 
toward a losing endgame.
Map 4: Operations Riviresa and Thunder Strike
Map 5: Operation Riviresa
November 2015
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Operation Sath Jaya: The Liberation of 
Kilinochchi  
About seven months later, on 18 July 1996, having 
experienced a battlefield defeat at Mullaitivu (the main 
town of Mullaitivu District, situated on the northeastern 
coast of the Northern Province), Minister of Defence 
General Anuruddha Ratwatte ordered Operation Sath 
Jaya to be launched on 26 July. The goal was to liberate 
the LTTE stronghold of Kilinochchi (the main town in Sri 
Lanka’s north, located 100 kilometers southeast of Jaffna) 
and rebuild the reputation of the government after that 
demoralizing defeat. Our earlier victory during Operation 
Riviresa gave our forces the 
experience they needed to 
plan for the liberation of 
Kilinochchi. At the begin-
ning of the operation, I was 
the second in command 
of Bravo Company. Our 
battalion started the march 
into LTTE territory from 
Paranthan toward the east 
as a deception and met with 
strong enemy resistance. 
Only about five kilometers 
in, the LTTE intercepted our 
troops and launched a heavy 
attack. On the following 
morning, as the troops again 
attempted to move in the 
same direction, the LTTE 
staged another counterat-
tack. We suffered heavy 
casualties, including two 
platoon commanders and 
many senior noncommis-
sioned officers. 
After two days of intense 
fighting on the eastern flank, 
Special Forces opened another approach from west to east 
on our western flank. Subsequently, my battalion with-
drew from the eastern feint and made our real move on 
the western front. On 26 September, when our battalion 
tried to break out toward Kilinochchi from the new 
approach, the LTTE launched a spoiling attack with heavy 
artillery and mortar fire support. We lost 168 soldiers, 
including some officers. Tragically, my company com-
mander died in my lap as the result of a gunshot wound to 
his chest. Nevertheless, we managed to kill all of the LTTE 
cadres who took part in the spoiling attack. The com-
manding officer appointed me to take over as company 
commander and ordered me to continue our operation 
to capture Kilinochchi town, which we achieved against 
heavy resistance on 30 September 1996. 
Operation Unceasing Waves II
On 27 September 1998, on my first day back with the 
battalion after attending overseas training with the 
Indian armed forces, the LTTE launched a successful 
attack against my battalion’s defenses in Kilinochchi, 
10 miles south of Elephant Pass (see maps 6 and 7). I 
was the commander of Bravo Company, 6th Battalion, 
Gemunu Watch, for an operation codenamed “Unceasing 
Waves II.” Our battalion 
was holding a defensive line 
facing southward toward 
the LTTE stronghold. At 
around 0100 hours, our 
defenses began to receive 
small arms fire, along with 
a heavy barrage of artillery 
fire. During this attack, the 
LTTE also started shelling 
the tactical headquarters of 
the brigade and battalions. 
The guerrillas penetrated 
our defenses from the flanks 
and started firing from our 
front and rear with massive 
fire support. After we had 
spent many hours of fighting 
off their ceaseless assaults, 
the LTTE managed to cut 
our forces off from the rear 
and surround our defenses. 
They fired rocket-propelled 
grenades at the tanks, 
armored personnel carriers, 
ambulances, and other 
vehicles that were involved 
in reinforcement and the evacuation of casualties. Our 
battalion nevertheless remained intact, and we effectively 
repulsed all the waves of assaults, but at the cost of heavy 
casualties. 
After two days of fighting, at 1700 hours we received 
orders to withdraw from the defensive line toward 
Elephant Pass, but we were still completely surrounded by 
the LTTE. We eventually managed to conduct a tactical 
withdrawal in contact. By that time, I had lost one of 
my platoon commanders and many soldiers. The LTTE 
subsequently took control of the town of Kilinochchi 
and a five-mile stretch of the A9, the Jaffna–Kandy road, 
Map 6: Operation to take Kilinochchi: Major routes
Map 7: Operation to take Kilinochchi: Force array
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which remained in their hands until the army liberated 
the area in 2009. Conversely, on the same day that the 
LTTE captured Kilinochchi, security forces took the city 
of Mankulam, the main township south of Kilinochchi. 
Strength and Leadership Problems for the 
Sri Lankan Forces  
A major issue for military leaders and planners during 
this time was a lack of adequate forces. Army personnel 
were not equipped and trained adequately to conduct 
offensive operations, and the army had an acute shortage 
of the troops it needed to conduct operations and hold 
ground, problems that were evident from the beginning 
of the conflict. Unfortunately, successive governments did 
not address these deficiencies, and there were numerous 
incidents at Kokavil, Mulathive, Elephant Pass, and 
Mandathive where our forces failed to counter LTTE 
attacks. During the initial period 
of the Second Eelam War, in 1990, 
Sri Lanka’s armed forces were in 
a defensive posture except for 
domination patrols to destroy 
or capture enemy soldiers and 
equipment; destroy installations, 
facilities, and key points; and 
harass enemy forces. These patrols 
also provided security for larger 
units as needed. The navy and air 
force took a supportive role by 
providing logistical support to the 
army where it did not have land 
access to its bases and camps.
Operation Riviresa was one of the 
major operations conducted by 
Sri Lanka’s armed forces against 
the LTTE, and it was both well-
planned and well-coordinated. The primary objective of 
the operation was the capture and liberation of the town 
of Jaffna and the rest of the Jaffna peninsula. By contrast, 
during Operation Sath Jaya to capture the LTTE strong-
hold of Kilinochchi, the country’s political leadership 
overrode the advice of military commanders and drove 
the army to stretch its forces beyond the practical limits of 
defense. Political leaders were wrongly convinced that the 
LTTE would collapse after the recapture of Jaffna city. 
Operation Riviresa had us advancing along two road axes, 
which enabled us to protect our flanks throughout the 
offensive and prevent any counterattack by the LTTE. 
During Operation Sath Jaya, however, a shortage of troops 
left our southern flank mostly open to the LTTE’s counter-
attacks. We marched into the LTTE stronghold of Kilino-
chchi on a single axis and sustained heavy casualties from 
LTTE artillery and mortar fire, in addition to their coun-
terattacks and spoiling attacks. The broad front and width 
of Operation Riviresa provided enough maneuverability 
for our troops and armor, while by comparison, Operation 
Sath Jaya’s narrow front restricted the maneuverability of 
the assaulting troops and armor. Furthermore, because we 
focused our operation on a single objective, the LTTE were 
able to throw their entire strength at us, delay the opera-
tion, and inflict heavy casualties. During both operations, 
we observed that our relief system to rotate soldiers into 
and out of the front lines did not function well, which 
meant that soldiers were exhausted from remaining 
continuously on the battlefront. New recruits and soldiers 
who were not trained prior to the operation accounted for 
most of our casualties. 
During the initial stages of the 
Eelam Wars, our manpower short-
ages meant that we were unable 
to maintain security even in areas 
where the war did not reach. 
When the LTTE began losing 
battles in the northern and eastern 
regions that had been under their 
control, they began to carry out 
periodic attacks on economic, 
political, and social targets in the 
south. The LTTE’s most lethal 
weapon was suicide bombings, for 
which we had no answer. 
From these experiences, I came 
to understand that the success of 
operations depends primarily on 
sound intelligence, which depends 
in turn on the structure and function of the intelligence 
agencies. In the fight against the LTTE, there were many 
government agencies and departments with various 
structures and functions dedicated to conducting strategic 
planning for operations. They functioned in isolation, 
however, which made it difficult for them to integrate 
their work and also slowed the dissemination of informa-
tion and intelligence. To complicate things further, the 
various branches of the intelligence agencies and the 
people working within them tended to compete with 
one another rather than cooperate. In most cases, these 
agencies were unable to provide clear situational pictures 
developed from the available intelligence, but rather 
were inclined to provide just some information collected 
from a few sources. LTTE strategies, tactics, motives, and 
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intentions shifted constantly, depending on the local and international situa-
tions, but the information provided by the intelligence services throughout the 
conflict was almost entirely inaccurate, which meant that the military lost the 
initiative. 
In one instance, the military did receive an accurate intelligence picture, and the 
subsequent operation was successful. In 1995, the LTTE attacked the Weli Oya 
area, in the northeastern part of the Sri Lankan mainland, but thanks to good 
information, the Sri Lankan Army was able to cut off and ambush the insurgent 
fighters, who lost over 300 cadres killed or injured. This was the first time the 
LTTE had lost such large numbers. Other than this one event, however, the intel-
ligence provided to the military lacked answers to the vital questions of when, 
where, what, and how—the most fundamental aspects of a useful intelligence 
picture. As a result, our operations either were ineffective or became nightmares 
of shock and surprise for our troops.
Because the intelligence agencies entirely failed to understand the importance 
of good intelligence and how it could be exploited in warfare, the LTTE took 
advantage of the situation to conduct a large number of successful surprise 
attacks on high-value targets. LTTE terrorists assassinated several political and 
military leaders, including, in 1993, President Ranasinghe Premadasa. This 
situation ultimately led to misunderstanding and a loss of credibility between 
the intelligence agencies and the ground troops.
Another area in which the LTTE had an advantage was in using public relations 
to build support for their fighters and their cause. The army did not have any 
experience handling either public relations or the media, so we did not inform 
the public about our successes or failures or do anything to counter LTTE 
propaganda. The LTTE were therefore very effective at winning sympathy and 
financial support from the Tamil diaspora and others around the world.
The Fourth Eelam War (July 2006–May 2009)
After I graduated from the Army Command and Staff College in 2006, I was 
posted as brigade major to the 214th Infantry Brigade in Vavuniya, one of the 
major districts in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka.2 At this time, LTTE leader 
Prabhakaran had boycotted all attempts at peace made by the new government, 
and after a long ceasefire (2002–2006), fighting began again. My brigade’s 
mission was to conduct an operation along two approaches from the east and 
the west to liberate the LTTE stronghold in a region called the Wanni (see maps 
8 and 9). The situation had become critical after several attacks on military 
convoys in my brigade’s area of operations. My commander ordered me to 
provide an effective plan to deploy troops on two major roads from Vavuniya to 
the west coast. The goal was to stop clashes in which Tigers were inflicting heavy 
casualties on the brigade and killing a number of civilians. 
I did a thorough study of the brigade’s area of responsibility and the many 
incidents that had occurred there, such as Claymore ambushes and suicide 
attacks on military convoys and civilian buses on the southern roads that 
lead toward the west coast. These roads were supposed to be protected by the 
military in conjunction with specially trained police, but I found that there 
was no proper coordination, understanding, or confidence between police and 
military personnel. After discussing the matter with the brigade commander,  
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I organized a training team with a few officers and Other 
Rank (non-commissioned) instructors and prepared a 
syllabus for a police refresher military training course. I 
planned the training to focus mainly on field craft, tactics, 
map reading, and weapons training, along with lectures on 
leadership, motivation, and team-building. The training 
was completed within two months as planned, under my 
close supervision and control. The police officers who went 
through the course started respecting the military more, 
because we had trained them in the skills they needed. Sub-
sequently, we deployed police troops very effectively along 
the main roads, while the military conducted offensive 
operations against Tiger forces in the jungle. This training 
and cooperation allowed us to greatly reduce the overall 
threat and the number of incidents that occurred.
Changing Strategy 
After efforts to negotiate a settlement with the LTTE during 
the fifth round of peace negotiations failed, in July 2006 the 
army started an all-out assault against the LTTE with the 
blessings of the new government.3 The LTTE itself shifted to 
an open offensive posture using semi-conventional tactics, 
such as establishing camps and bases and holding defensive 
lines. As the insurgents became more visible militarily, we 
realized that there should be a shift in our own strategy, 
away from the conventional warfare we had been practicing 
in the previous Eelam Wars toward an insurgent-centric 
approach that aimed to isolate and destroy the LTTE. 
During Operations Riviresa and Sath Jaya, we concentrated 
more on capturing ground, a strategy that did not have much impact on the LTTE 
organization itself. Now all military efforts would be directed according to this 
unconventional strategy, which was completely new to our experience. 
Thus, in mid-2006, using all the resources available, we began major—and what 
turned out to be final—offensives against the LTTE in a bid to end the three-
decade–long conflict. Unlike previous phases of the war, this time the entire 
army enjoyed complete operational freedom to launch the offensive, using the 
best men to do the tasks. We adapted the unconventional tactics of small-group 
operations in broad fronts along all three approaches from the south. The 
privilege of exercising mission command and initiative went to junior leaders, 
including Other Rankers. I should mention here that the small-group operations 
conducted by special infantry operations training (SIOT) platoons were com-
mendable. These SIOT platoons carried out special operations in the immediate 
vicinity (within four to five kilometers) against strong LTTE defenses that were 
preventing the security forces’ advance. We never limited small-group operations 
to the elite forces but committed the SIOT platoons extensively. In the meantime, 
we used the rest of the battalion manpower to find, fix, and destroy the insur-
gents and hold the ground thus captured. These operations were very successful. 
Subsequently, in August 2008, I was selected to hold a staff officer appointment 
at the United Nations Missions Force Headquarters in Haiti and left Sri Lanka 
to take up this new post.
Map 8: The Wanni Operation, 2006
Map 9: Wanni District, 2006
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Elements of Our Victory against the LTTE (2007–2009)
Our army finally achieved victory in 2009, after liberating the Eastern and 
Northern Provinces and giving freedom to the Tamil people who had been 
under the thumb of the LTTE. When we analyzed and compared the earlier 
and later stages of the conflict, what stood out was the change in military 
training. Since independence in 1948, army training in Sri Lanka had consisted 
of traditional maneuver training based on British doctrine, with the addition of 
some improvised training that would suit the Sri Lankan environment. During 
the ceasefire of 2002 to 2006, the army conducted SIOT training to address 
LTTE fighting strategies. SIOT operations took away the freedom of movement 
that the LTTE elements had enjoyed over the decades of insurgency, bringing 
the battlefronts within four to five kilometers of LTTE camps. Simultaneously, 
Special Forces and commandos began to operate in the rear areas of LTTE terri-
tory. In the course of my studies, I learned that during World War I, the German 
army adopted a similar formation that they called “stormtroop” units.4 These 
units gave lower-ranking officers the opportunity to form small, agile groups 
equipped with a wide variety of combat weapons and specialties. Furthermore, 
the NCOs were involved in the decision-making process and were entrusted with 
real responsibilities. This improvisation paved the way for 
the introduction of “Blitzkrieg” at a higher level in World 
War II and brought success to the Germans in their major 
offensives.
In the final operation to defeat the Tigers, our profes-
sional military leadership and guidance, clear military 
aims, political leadership, and national will came together, 
shaping our military strength to meet our need. All three 
components of the Sri Lankan military’s fighting power—
conceptual, moral, and physical—had gone through rapid 
changes to prepare the forces to fight decisively against the 
LTTE. As for our military strategy, Operation Riviresa was 
the first time we used a “multi-thrust line” approach rather 
than fighting on a single front. The LTTE had never seen 
this maneuver before, and as a result, they had to dissipate 
their combat power to confront each line, weakening their 
overall combat cohesiveness and combat synergy. The small-group concepts 
adapted by our forces were a very effective innovation. 
During the final phase of operations conducted against the LTTE, we maintained 
constant momentum and the impetus of the offensive by both securing the land 
we captured from the LTTE and relentlessly carrying out offensives. Due to the 
paucity of troops, this strategy could not be adopted in earlier offensives, and 
accomplishing it was another significant factor that contributed to victory. In ad-
dition, our navy destroyed 10 LTTE ships (seaborne warehouses) in blue waters and 
completely cut off the supply route of the LTTE. This turned out to be a pivotal 
point in the campaign, which, along with the liberation of Jaffna in 1995, aided 
the Sri Lankan Army’s operations on land to bring the majority of Tamils under 
government control and led to final victory. Without the stronghold of Jaffna, the 
LTTE could not mobilize the Tamil majority against the government of Sri Lanka 
as they did in the 1987 Vadamarachchi Operation in eastern Jaffna, when the 
government had to stop fighting due to pressure from the Indian government. 
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The Post-Conflict Situation
After completing my assignment to the UN mission in Haiti, I returned to 
Sri Lanka immediately after the victory over the LTTE. I was appointed com-
manding officer of the 8th Battalion of the Gemunu Watch (Infantry). My duties 
were in the war-affected areas, assisting with rehabilitation, resettlement, and 
reconciliation programs in a post-conflict environment. I worked extensively in 
civil-military coordination alongside governmental and nongovernmental local 
and international agencies engaged in development. My duties were sometimes 
a terrible challenge, because most of the people, victims of the protracted war, 
were very poor and frustrated. I realized that defeating an insurgency does not 
bring the conflict to a conclusive end. I had to put all my efforts into managing a 
post-conflict society for peace building, within a framework called disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration. Despite all our work, however, it seems that 
Sri Lanka is still facing these challenges: pro-LTTE elements continue to make 
strong attempts to propagate the Tamil separatist ideology and discredit the Sri 
Lankan government’s efforts to bring sustainable peace.
To meet these post-war challenges, the Sri Lankan government should double 
the strength of its intelligence community. I do not, however, see the need to 
maintain military bases all over the country to stop the reemergence of another 
separatist movement. Looking back, I believe that “Black July” in 1983, the day 
on which Sri Lanka had the worst riot in its history, was a turning point for the 
LTTE, because it gave the separatists a fine opportunity to build support for their 
movement. Until then, none of these groups, including the LTTE, could muster 
more than 20 sympathizers at a time. In other words, the Tamil insurgency that 
waged a 30-year struggle for a separate homeland in Sri Lanka had an accidental 
birth. A sound intelligence system would have helped us defeat that movement 
before it grew large enough to be dangerous, and it is what will allow us to 
launch an operation at any given time to defeat any future threat. 









At the strategic level, we need a central intelligence organization. There is no 
proper mechanism or body to coordinate the work and exchange of personnel 
between the various intelligence branches. We need to build a common security 
and intelligence database, conduct joint training and joint operations, and 
share technology, expertise, and experience that will enable us to embrace new 
technological concepts. Further, friendly foreign nations could have a role in 
this organization to coordinate intelligence. At the operational level, we should 
design a research and development unit that caters to local intelligence require-
ments as they evolve to counter the separatist ideology. At the tactical level, we 
need to institute periodic and extensive training and awareness programs to 
impart the skills that will allow individuals to identify resistance networks while 
they are still at an early stage.
Now it is time to forget the bitter past and leave behind the war mentality. We 
defeated the LTTE in an effort to find a lasting solution to the problem of violent 
insurgency. If we try to live in the past, then in the years to come, all our sacri-
fices will have been in vain. The government must take all precautions to avoid 
the blunders that were made in 1983. We need to win the hearts and minds of 
the Tamil community and address their core issues. To lessen the mistrust among 
communities, we must think as Sri Lankans at all levels. v 
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NOTES
1  For a timeline of the Sri Lankan civil war, see “Sri Lanka Profile—
Timeline,” BBC, updated 9 January 2015: http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-south-asia-12004081
2  In 1999, I was selected to be the aide-de-camp to the general 
officer commanding, 52nd Division, and later to the overall 
operations commander, Colombo. Subsequently in 2002, with 
the rank of captain, I served as staff officer 3 in the training wing 
of the Kotelawala Defence University in Colombo. I returned in 
2004 as a major to the 6th Battalion of the Gemunu Watch, which 
was deployed in the east, and served as the operations and training 
officer. The following year, I was selected to follow the Army 
Command and Staff College course.  
3  The LTTE had cut the water supply to a part of the Eastern 
Province, and at this point the army launched a full-scale attack to 
retake the sluice gates and secure the water supply. 
4 Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in 
the German Army, 1914–1918 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 
1989). 
5  This map depicts an important part of the final campaign to defeat 
the LTTE insurgency.  The blue arrows indicate the advance of Sri 
Lankan military forces along multiple lines of thrust. The place 
names and dates indicate when and where the SRA captured 
LTTE-occupied areas.
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No Rank Appointment Station/Unit Location
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From To
1  Cadet Student General Sir John Kotelawala 
Defence University/Sri Lanka 
Military Academy
Diyathalawa 1990/11/03 1993/10/08





3 Capt Company 
commander
6 Battalion the Gemunu Watch Jaffna, Kilinochchi
Elephant Pass
1996/09/27 1999/07/01
4 Capt ADC to GOC 52 Division/Overall Operations 
Command 
Jaffna/Colombo 1999/07/01 2001/10/22
5 Maj Staff officer/
instructor
General Sir John Kotelawala 
Defence University/Sri Lanka 
Military Academy
Ratmalana 2001/10/24 2003/12/22
6 Maj Operations and 
training officer
6 Battalion the Gemunu Watch Batticaloa 2004/03/15 2005/01/31
7 Maj Brigade major 214 Brigade Vavuniya 2005/12/29 2006/11/02
8 LTC Directing staff/ 
adjutant 
Sri Lanka Military Academy Diyathalawa 2006/11/02 2008/08/18
9 LTC Staff officer, UN 
MSN Haiti
United Nations Stabilization 
Mission 
Haiti 2008/08/20 2009/08/20
10 LTC Staff officer I 
(Posting/Promotions) 
Military Secretary’s Branch, Army 
Headquarters
Colombo 2009/09/25 2010/04/15
11 LTC Commanding officer 8 Battalion the Gemunu Watch Batticaloa 2010/04/16 2012/01/30
12 LTC Directing staff Defence Services Command and 
Staff College Sapugaskanda
Sapugaskanda 2012/01/31 2015/12/23
Appendix A: Timeline of My Participation in Operations against the LTTE
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The Use and Misuse of Influence in 
Counterinsurgency
MAJ Daniel Pace, US Army
In 2007, the US military was heavily invested in the war in Iraq. 
Following the initial success against the regular Iraqi army, the American war 
effort became mired in counterinsurgency operations against the numerous 
criminal and insurgent groups that rose to fill the power vacuum left in the wake 
of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein’s fall. Faced with the decision to pull out 
altogether or to double down on US involvement, the George W. Bush adminis-
tration opted for the latter course and sent an additional 30,000 troops into Iraq, 
in what was called “the surge.” These troops were tasked with establishing security 
and providing breathing space for the budding government of Iraq to establish 
control over the country. In March 2007, my platoon—1st platoon, Charlie 
Company, of the 1st Squadron, 4th US Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division—deployed as 
part of this effort. Over the course of 15 months, we were able to establish effective 
security, services, and economic prosperity in our piece of Baghdad, Mahalla 838.1
Though our efforts were successful, in hindsight, many of our solutions were ad 
hoc and achieved only immediate security rather than contributing to long-
term stability. In particular, while we succeeded in building influence with the 
Iraqi people in our area, the influence we built was between the population of 
Iraq and the US military—represented by my platoon—rather than between 
the population of Iraq and the government of Iraq. With a more thorough 
understanding of influence, particularly how it is generated and maintained, the 
US military could have been more successful in achieving long-term stability in 
Iraq. This article summarizes my platoon’s activities in Iraq and analyzes those 
activities through the lens of an academic understanding of the concept and ap-
plication of influence to describe how we built influence with the population of 
Mahalla 838, what the effects of the influence campaign were, and how counter-
insurgency campaigns might improve on our performance in the future.
Mahalla 838
Mahalla 838 was a heavily Sunni neighborhood in the center of Baghdad. At 
the time of the US invasion in March 2003, the population was well educated 
and included many high-ranking technical officials from the Saddam Hussein 
regime, including the deposed president’s cardiologist, the head of the Iraqi 
Dental Association, and numerous retired senior military officials. The mahalla 
functioned through a combination of Gemeinschaft (the local community)—led 
by a number of traditionally influential people with strong tribal ties and 
strengthened by the homogeneity of the Sunni population, which provided a 
degree of social consensus—and Gesellschaft (the larger society), which consisted 
of the generally rational system of laws constructed and enforced by the Ba’ath 
party government.2 Basic necessities in the community were provided by a dual 
system: partly official and partly unofficial. While the distribution of many 
important goods was managed by a system of government-issued ration cards, 
locally owned shops provided the majority of the population’s other necessities. 
IN HINDSIGHT, 
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Utilities were provided by the government through a well-developed, govern-
ment-controlled infrastructure. 
Rebuilding the Mahalla 
The US invasion upset this balance between the official and the ad hoc providers, 
and unraveled the existing system. Within a few weeks, the Ba’ath party’s mecha-
nisms for control of the population vanished. Based on conversations we had 
with local residents, the basic community-level structure continued to function 
for a while, but as various insurgent and criminal organizations gained power 
in Iraq between 2004 and 2006, the community began to break down. Families 
with the means to leave—often the wealthiest and most influential—did so, and 
former government employees in a wide variety of fields, from electrical engi-
neers to army generals to dentists, were either banned from further government 
service by the US de-Ba’athification mandate or fired by the new Shi’a-dominated 
Iraqi government. US forces patrolled the neighborhood on occasion but lacked 
sufficient presence and local involvement to gain any influence over the popula-
tion. Perhaps because the population was largely Sunni, the reorganized Iraqi 
government mostly ignored the mahalla’s needs, except to station a national po-
lice unit (entirely Shi’a) at the north end. This police unit spent little time patrol-
ling the area but would fire indiscriminately into the neighborhood whenever 
they were attacked by the ever-increasing number of hostile Sunni insurgents. 
Thus, the police had only limited, coercive influence over the population.3
This was the situation in the mahalla when my platoon arrived in March 2007. 
Because of a lengthy pre-deployment education program based on the US Army’s 
then-newly published counterinsurgency field manual, the platoon had a basic 
understanding of population-centric warfare.4 To secure the mahalla, the platoon 
first had to connect with the people and separate them from the insurgents. 
This required an influence campaign.5 The strategy we used evolved over a 
few months, but by June it was clear that, if we were to complete our mission, 
the campaign would have to combine the restoration of essential services, the 
establishment of security, and intimate knowledge of the population.
But how could this be accomplished? Despite pressure from senior US military 
leadership to better integrate Sunnis into civil structures, the Iraqi government 
largely continued to ignore the population of Mahalla 838. Electrical power, 
which was distributed by the government, was rarely provided to the neighbor-
hood, and government distributions of propane—an essential commodity in 
Iraq—were suspiciously absent. The mahalla’s people had by and large turned to 
the black market to fill these shortages, which drew them closer to the anti-US 
and anti-government elements of society. On the one hand, the traditional and 
rational authority structures were failing and had already lost the ability to influ-
ence the population. On the other hand, by exploiting scarcity and the neighbor-
hood’s welfare, insurgent and criminal elements were gaining influence over the 
people.6 My platoon saw this lack of government support as an opportunity to 
establish a degree of influence over the population, but in hindsight, we failed to 
replace or augment the legitimate rational and traditional authority structures. 
Instead, we destroyed the existing black market organizations and replaced them 
with a scarcity- and welfare-driven influence organization of our own.7
With money from a specially designated fund, we procured and distributed 










During the summer of 2007, Mahalla 838 was dangerous to both US and Iraqi 
government forces because a number of Sunni insurgents operated freely there. One 
of the techniques employed against us was the house-borne improvised explosive 
device (HBIED).  While effective at killing coalition forces, the technique alienated 
many of the people in the mahalla, since they were killed by the attacks more often 
than we were.  As our influence campaign progressed, these attacks became less 
frequent, and stopped altogether by the winter of 2007/2008.
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838 Black Market Electrical Generator
 When the government stopped providing electricity to 
the mahalla after the invasion, Iraqis began setting up their own 
generators and selling power to the population. The generators 
were poorly maintained, inefficient, and dangerous, but provided a 
great deal of influence to the owner.  This generator caught fire and 
burned down during our tour. 
US-Purchased, Locally Owned Generator in 838
 Recognizing the influence gained by providing essential 
services, we provided these generators to friendly local 
entrepreneurs through the microgrant program. This provided the 
population with electricity and provided us with a friendly, influential, 
local business owner with a vested interest in keeping the mahalla 
safe and prosperous.  
CERP-Funded Playground
 This playground was another Commander’s Emergency 
Response Program (CERP) project. Dr. Mo mentioned that the 
children of the mahalla had not been able to play anywhere safely  
for several years and recommended building a few playgrounds. They 
were very popular.  We hired friendly local contractors  
to do the work.
US-Hired Sunni Security Personnel in 838
 As part of the Sons of Iraq initiative, we hired local young 
men to provide security in Mahalla 838.  While our intent was to 
eventually integrate them into the local Iraqi National Police unit, 
we were never successful in doing so, since there was resistance to 
integration from both the local personnel and the government.  
Mahalla 838
 The general atmosphere of the mahalla
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apply Malcolm Gladwell’s model of social influence, our 
funds were naturally channeled through the most effec-
tive “connector” in the mahalla, a locally influential man 
named Dr. Mo.8 As a connector, Dr. Mo had a knack for 
understanding who could do what and for connecting 
us with willing and capable local businessmen, as well as 
reliable sources of information about local criminals. Over 
the course of six months and with Dr. Mo’s assistance, the 
platoon induced compliance with our program through a 
combination of deliberate coercion and enticement.9 We 
gained a large degree of influence over key figures in the 
mahalla, arrested or killed enough local criminals to virtu-
ally eliminate attacks, and employed a large percentage 
of the population in a series of local improvement and 
security projects.10 At the time, we regarded this strategy 
as a success, but in retrospect, there was a trade-off for 
the gains we made that ultimately undermined stability 
in our area and insofar as the same strategy was followed 
elsewhere, in the Sunni areas of Iraq as a whole.
A Post-Surge Vacuum
Due to the difficulty of over-
coming sectarian tension between 
the Sunni population and the 
Shi’a government, we never 
integrated the independently 
functioning community we had 
developed into the legal Iraqi 
governmental system. The Shi’a 
police were nominally involved 
in security, but in reality, the bulk 
of the police work was conducted 
by either the platoon or the Sunni 
security forces we trained and paid. This undermined 
one legal method of government population control. 
Additionally, by creating local Sunni sources of scarce, 
traditionally government-supplied products, we removed 
the government’s second means of gaining influence over 
the population: the provision of welfare.11 Removing 
these links to the government ensured that when US forces 
departed, we left an influence gap.
Faced with the reality of an often hostile Shi’a government 
and left suddenly without US forces to serve as a source 
of influence and stability, the population of Mahalla 838 
likely felt abandoned and isolated. It is not difficult to 
imagine, especially given the presence of an internally 
loyal Sunni security force, that a large number of residents 
would have been willing to abandon the Iraqi government 
for an organization with more cultural overlap, such as the 
Islamic State (ISIS). It is possible that some of the residents 
of Mahalla 838 are fighting with ISIS today.
In retrospect, it is clear that the members of my platoon 
should have used our ability to create influence differ-
ently. Given the initial hostility between the population 
and the new government, it was necessary for us to 
secure influence over the population ourselves, but in 
the last six months of the deployment, with security 
and prosperity largely restored, we should have made a 
concerted effort to strengthen the mahalla’s ties to the 
government. Restoring the link between the Sunni leaders 
of the mahalla—both the traditional sources of authority 
and the new managers of scarcity that we created—and 
the legal Iraqi government would have worked toward 
long-term stability rather than against it.12 By tying the 
economic structures we developed to corresponding 
structures at the regional level, we could have enabled the 
local elements of the Iraqi government to use welfare as 
a source of influence, and by tying our security structure 
directly to the national police, we could have enabled the 
Iraqi government to begin the 
long process of encouraging first 
compliance and then conversion 
to its point of view in our small 
piece of Iraq.13 Had our unit been 
more successful at this process, 
and had the hundreds of other US 
units conducting the same mis-
sion across Iraq achieved a similar 
kind of success, it is possible we 
could have helped prevent the 
current Iraqi civil war. 
A Lesson to Be Learned
In future counterinsurgency campaigns, the US military 
must learn from these mistakes. When working through 
a partner-nation government, US military leaders must 
remember that while gaining influence over the popula-
tion is important, the source of the influence is equally 
important. Influence built between US forces and the 
population is not the same as influence built between the 
population and the government, and long-term stability 
in a fragile country requires the latter, not the former. In 
the future, US policymakers and commanders must ensure 
that the partner-nation government is seen as the primary 
provider of security, economic opportunity, and welfare, 
especially in areas where the population does not initially 
support the government or its policies.14 Conducting 
these influence campaigns will be difficult, but numerous 
scholars have studied this problem and written useful 
TO SECURE THE 
MAHALLA, THE 
PLATOON FIRST 
HAD TO CONNECT 
WITH THE PEOPLE.
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NOTES
1  A mahalla is the Iraqi word for a subsection of the city, equivalent 
to a district. The mahalla is used by the Iraqi government as a unit 
of population division, and the number is included on all official 
census, identification, and ration card documents.
2  Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the 
Reconstitution of Social Order (New York: Free Press, 1999); Max 
Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New 
York: Free Press, 1947), 325–58. 
3  The facts presented in this paragraph come from my personal 
experience in Mahalla 838. Over the course of 15 months, 
I interviewed hundreds of citizens of the area, including the 
members of the police unit itself, during census data collection and 
other counterinsurgency operations. This paragraph represents an 
aggregate of the information gathered during those interviews.
4 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, FM 
3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (Washington, D.C.: HQ, Dept. of the Army, 
December 2006): http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/
Materials/COIN-FM3-24.pdf 
5  An influence campaign is a series of planned actions to affect the 
behavior of a target population with the intent of causing that 
population to support the influencer’s political objectives. See Kim 
Cragin and Scott Gerwehr, Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence 
and the Struggle against Terrorism, MG-184-RC (Santa Monica, 
Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2005), 14: http://www.rand.org/
pubs/monographs/MG184.html   
6 Anthony R. Pratkanis, “Social Influence Analysis: An Index of 
Tactics,” in The Science of Social Influence: Advances and Future 
Progress, ed. Anthony R. Pratkanis (New York: Psychology Press, 
2007), 56. 
7 Alexus G. Grynkewich, “Welfare as Warfare: How Violent 
Nonstate Groups Use Social Services to Attack the State,” Studies 
in Conflict and Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008): 350–70. 
8  In his model, Gladwell refers to personality archetypes as 
connectors, mavens, and salesmen, which work together to spread 
ideas throughout a population. The connectors, through their 
internal networks and innate likability, tie people together; the 
mavens investigate and share information on the topics that 
interest them; and the salesmen identify individuals’ needs and 
persuasively recommend helpful ideas. According to Gladwell, this 
system spreads ideas quickly and effectively. Malcolm Gladwell, 
The Tipping Point (New York: Little, Brown, and Co., 2000), 
33–88. 
9  Dr. Mo (a pseudonym) became very wealthy during our tour. From 
information I saw in 2011, he still seemed to be doing quite well. 
10 Compliance, in this case, is the objective of an influence campaign, 
which aims to alter a population’s behavior without regard to its 
beliefs. See Cragin and Gerwehr, Dissuading Terror, 15–16.  
11 Grynkewich, “Welfare as Warfare”; Pratkanis, “Social Influence 
Analysis,” 56.
12 Weber, Theory of Social and Economic Organization, 325–58.
13 Conversion is the influence objective that seeks to produce the 
desired behavior in a population by changing its underlying beliefs. 
See Cragin and Gerwehr, Dissuading Terror, 19.
14 Grynkewich, “Welfare as Warfare.” The fact that the United States 
needs to carefully evaluate whether the government of a post-
conflict partner-nation will be willing to or capable of governing 
in a manner that supports US interests is another matter entirely. 
While the answer is essential to the outcome of a US influence 
campaign, this issue is outside the scope of this paper.
15 A few of the most practical recommendations are Grynkewich’s 
“Welfare as Warfare” for the use of welfare to win popular 
support; Pratkanis’s index of tactics on influence in “Social 
Influence Analysis”; and Gladwell’s The Tipping Point on 
connectors, mavens, and salesmen.
works about their findings and recommendations.15 During the conduct of the 
campaign, metrics must be developed to track government influence over the 
population, and commanders must be willing to accept the immediate tactical 
risk inherent in the relatively long process of allowing the partner-nation govern-
ment to develop influence, rather than the commanders’ developing unilateral 
influence themselves. While maintaining unilateral influence makes operations 
easier for US forces in the short term, it ultimately undermines US interests in 
the region. Without influence, the partner-nation government will be unable to 
effectively control its population, an outcome that discourages regional stability 
and will ultimately result in future conflicts. v
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The Dark Side of Drones: Implications  
for Terrorism
CPT Benjamin Seibert, US Army
In recent years, rapid advancements in drone technology have 
raised questions, not only at the tactical level but also at the academic level, 
about the potentially revolutionary ways drones will affect how terrorists operate 
and what such technology will be capable of. As historian Walter Laqueur 
warned, “Society has … become vulnerable to a new kind of terrorism, in which 
the destructive power of both the individual terrorist and terrorism as a tactic 
are infinitely greater.” 1 This article discusses some of the likely effects that drones 
will have in this world of postmodern terrorism by analyzing the capabilities of 
drones, their appeal to terrorists and terrorist organizations, and the way drones 
can achieve the psychological impact that terrorists desire.  
Drone Capabilities 
Before discussing what drones are capable of, it is first necessary to define what 
is meant by the term drone. The word is not an accurate representation of the 
machines, but it has been adopted in mainstream communications to broadly 
denote a constantly changing form of mobile technology. For example, the word 
drone has been used by the media to refer to airplanes, rotary-wing aircraft, 
boats, and wheeled vehicles when these machines are unmanned and remotely 
operated. More commonly, however, the word drone refers to unmanned aerial 
vehicles, or UAVs. These are any aircraft, fixed- or rotary-wing, capable of op-
erating without a pilot on board. Fixed-wing UAVs range from the recreational 
model airplane to larger military reconnaissance and attack aircraft. The Pred-
ator and Reaper UAVs used by the United States are two examples of this latter 
military craft. Rotary-wing UAVs range from the small, lightweight quadcopter 
to a full-sized helicopter operated by remote control. Quadcopters are com-
mercially available and are most commonly used to take aerial photographs, 
while larger unmanned helicopters have a wide variety of industrial, commercial, 
and military applications. For the purpose of this article, the word drone is used 
specifically to refer to these fixed- and rotary-wing UAVs.
What are these drones capable of ? A foiled 2011 terrorist plot to attack the US 
Capitol building and the Pentagon provides an example of a model airplane’s 
capabilities. Analyst Marc Goodman writes that the planner of the attack, 
Rezwan Ferdaus, “wanted to use 1/10 scale models of the F-4 Phantom fighter 
aircraft in the attack, noting that they can be purchased fully assembled with 
Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation equipment, were capable of traveling 
up to 160 mph, and could carry a payload of 10 to 12 pounds.” 2 Goodman goes 
on to note that some model airplanes are capable of carrying up to 33 pounds 
and that bombing capabilities are also commercially available.3 “For only $16.95 
anyone can buy the Chinese-made Quanum ‘bomb’ drop system for remote con-
trol aircraft—either fixed- or rotary-wing. This 23.5 centimeter long case splits 
open to release a 103 gram payload of the user’s choice.” 4 The system is available 
for purchase on Amazon today, and although the weight capacity is small, the 
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heavier payloads. This recalls the infamous quote from the 
1966 film The Battle of Algiers, when the captured terrorist 
leader Ben M’Hidi is questioned about the morality of 
using baskets to deliver explosives. He responds, “Of 
course, if we had your airplanes, it would be a lot easier for 
us. Give us your bombers, and you can have our baskets.” 5 
Thus, the presumed technological limitations of terrorist 
organizations are becoming increasingly irrelevant, and 
weapons that were the monopoly of advanced militaries 
are becoming accessible to anyone. Although significant 
limitations remain, the technology is catching up at an 
alarming rate. Ferdaus is not the only recent example. In 
2013, German officials conducted a raid on a group of 
individuals thought to have been radicalized by Islamic 
extremism and discovered model airplanes that were re-
portedly capable of carrying enough explosives to destroy 
a commercial building.6  
The Payload
The problem of acquiring and preparing explosives for use 
remains a gap between the desire and the deed, however, 
and the astute observer will note that in these previous 
two examples, the would-be terrorists possessed drones 
capable of delivering explosives, but not the explosives 
themselves. Marc Sageman of the Foreign Policy Institute 
remarks that although instructions for creating explosives 
are available online, the actual production of them is 
extremely dangerous.7 Sageman warns, “Law enforcement 
authorities should not become complacent; the number 
of wannabe terrorists remains large, and by the law of 
averages some are bound to be smart and bold enough to 
pull off an attack.” 8 The 2013 Boston Marathon attack and 
the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing are two examples from 
the United States in which terrorists did beat the law of 
averages and carried out lethal attacks using commercially 
available resources. Regulating the sale of commercial 
components after they have been successfully used, as was 
done with chemical fertilizers after the Oklahoma City 
bombing, however, will not prevent future attacks that 
use different means. As psychologist John Horgan notes, 
“Easily accessible components are the primary ingredients 
of today’s terrorist bombs.” 9 Terrorists will continue to 
adapt and create explosives with what is available to them, 
and the internet will continue to provide innovative tech-
niques to assist in the process. Sageman goes on to warn 
that “these new [terrorist] groups … become dangerous 
when they hook up with a trained bomb maker.” 10 Joining 
forces with an experienced bomb maker no longer has to 
happen in a distant terrorist training camp but can now be 
as simple as downloading an instructional video from the 
internet, and anyone dedicated enough to risk it can use 
this knowledge to create his own explosives. It becomes 
clear that terrorists, especially those working in countries 
where explosive components are not tightly regulated, are 
able to acquire all the necessary ingredients to carry out a 
bomb attack, with drones as the delivery vehicles. 
Rotary-Wing Aircraft
Among modern drones, helicopter-style drones deserve 
special attention due to their extreme maneuverability. A 
video posted on YouTube by a group of researchers from 
the University of Pennsylvania demonstrates the impres-
sive aerial maneuvers of quadcopter drones (called quadro-
tors in the video). These quadcopters do midair flips, fly 
through rectangular openings with a clearance of less 
than 3 inches on each side, and attach to fixed surfaces (by 
means of Velcro pads).11 Combined with GPS technology 
to guide the aircraft to within one meter of a target and 
laser range-finder devices that instantly identify precise 
grid coordinates from over 3,000 feet away, one could 
potentially land a quadcopter almost anywhere. This 
technology could be used for high-profile attacks such as 
assassinations of leading government officials. In 2013, for 
example, an activist group was able to land a quadcopter 
drone directly in front of German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel as she spoke before a large crowd in Dresden. The 
entire video of this event can be seen on YouTube.12 The 
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most alarming aspect of the event is that the ground-based 
security forces were completely helpless to prevent the 
drone from landing in front of the podium where Merkel 
was speaking. The chancellor herself seemed uncertain 
as to what actions should be taken. Despite a small lift 
capacity, commercially available quadcopters can carry 
enough explosives to seriously harm or kill a person. The 
incident in Dresden clearly demonstrates both the ability 
of drones to bypass traditional security measures and the 
unpreparedness of security forces to counter such a threat. 
Another video posted by the University of Pennsylvania 
research group demonstrates the ability of 20 quadcopters 
to fly in formation to create a swarming effect.13 While 
one explosive-laden quadcopter might not reach its target 
or might cause only minimal damage, a swarm of the 
aircraft could cause serious harm. Even without explosives, 
a swarm of quadcopters could be aimed at the engines of 
a commercial airliner and cause it to crash. Flocks of birds 
are already known to cause serious harm if they are sucked 
into a jet engine, but the metal of a quadcopter drone 
would be much more devastating. The quadcopters in 
the University of Pennsylvania videos are state-of-the-art 
UAVs with proprietary software operating in a controlled 
laboratory setting, and could not currently be used 
outdoors with the same precision. But the technology to 
move these quadcopters out of the lab is being developed, 
and we should expect commercial drones to have these 
capabilities in the near future. What is more, as with all 
technology, costs and prices will fall dramatically as the 
devices are commercialized.
GPS technology allows for attacks against stationary 
targets, but technology is available to accurately strike 
moving targets as well. The Google Lily is an autonomous 
quadcopter drone—currently being marketed to skiers, 
surfers, and extreme sports enthusiasts—that uses GPS 
technology to record video of someone who is wearing a 
synchronized tag in an armband.14 Its current range from 
camera to tag is only 100 feet, but a commercially available 
antenna could greatly increase this distance. In addition, 
the Google Lily drone does not require line-of-sight with 
the tag to operate. Someone with violent intent could 
surreptitiously place one of these tags, which are small, 
inconspicuous, and undetectable by current security 
measures, on the intended target, and the drone, carrying 
a timed or remote-controlled explosive, could then be 
programmed to fly to the location of the tag. This would 
effectively turn a drone with Google Lily technology 
into a guided missile. If the tag is carried onto an aircraft, 
the drone could have the same effect as a surface-to-air 
missile, most potentially during takeoff or landing (to 
mitigate the greater speed of the airliner). This is one 
example of how commercially available products are fur-
ther bridging the gap between the previously inaccessible 
technologies of modern militaries and the assets available 
to terrorist organizations. 
Appeal to Terrorists and Terrorist 
Organizations
Up to this point, the discussion has focused on the tactical 
capabilities of drones and how they could be used to 
conduct terrorist attacks—information that is relevant 
to those with the day-to-day responsibility of defending 
against and preventing terrorist attacks. This section looks 
at why the use of drones is appealing to terrorists and 
terrorist organizations.
The Benefits of Precision
Precision targeting, made possible through the use of GPS, 
is appealing to terrorist organizations for the same reason 
it is appealing to any military: it not only allows the 
attacker to precisely hit the intended target, but assuming 
accurate targeting intelligence in the first place, also 
equally prevents an accidental strike on an unintended 
target. Just because a terrorist organization uses violent 
means against civilian targets does not mean that it is 
immune from the backlash that results when the wrong 
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people are killed. Horgan comments that “a myth about terrorist violence in 
the popular media is that it is often uncontrolled, frenzied, and vicious. While 
terrorism is often vicious, it is rarely frenzied and uncontrolled; when it is, it 
runs the risk of losing significant support.” 15 The history of the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) provides two examples, both from 1993. In the first incident, as the 
IRA escalated its attacks against increasingly aggressive British Loyalists, an IRA 
cell targeted some local paramilitary leaders who were believed to be meeting 
on the upper floor of a commercial fish shop on Shankill Road in Belfast.16 
The attackers intended to plant a bomb with a timed fuse at the location of the 
meeting, but it detonated prematurely and killed nine civilians. In the second 
incident, a bomb that detonated in a Cheshire shopping area killed “two young 
boys and prompted significant protest in England and Ireland.” 17 These botched 
attacks brought widespread condemnation down on the IRA during a time 
when gaining public support was vital to the organization. The attacks failed for 
two reasons: the unpredictability of the explosives and the inadequate means 
the group used for delivering the explosives to the intended targets. The exact 
reason why the explosive on Shankill Road detonated prematurely is unknown, 
but it was probably due to the use of a timed fuse—a common tactic of the 
IRA. Programming a bomb to detonate based on exact GPS location coordinates 
instead of relying on a timer creates a more reliable precision weapon and avoids 
the backlash that results from killing unintended targets.
Another reason why drones appeal to terrorists and terrorist organizations is 
that they are much easier to acquire and transport than conventional weapons. If 
a dedicated individual can overcome the obstacle of creating a reliable explosive 
component, then a terrorist attack can be conducted almost anywhere. A major 
strength of the US intelligence network has been its ability to intercept terrorists 
as they attempt to acquire conventional weapons. This was demonstrated by a 
1982 FBI sting operation that uncovered an IRA weapons smuggling ring (whose 
shipment, incidentally, included a remote-controlled model airplane),18 as well 
as multiple operations since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in which FBI agents posed 
as arms dealers to bring down terror cells in their infancy.19 As a result, conven-
tional military-grade weapons have been difficult for terrorists in the United 









States and Western Europe to acquire. Drones, on the other hand, are already 
available online, with more advanced models appearing every year. 
Finally, drones allow attacks to be conducted anonymously and therefore increase 
the probability that an attacker will not only survive the attack but also avoid cap-
ture. This lessens the recruitment burden for terrorist networks, allows attackers 
to perfect their tactics by participating in multiple attacks, and appeals to those 
who prefer to pursue violence as a lifestyle choice rather than as a sacrificial duty. 
A drone provides this anonymity because it takes the burden of delivering the 
explosives away from the attacker, who otherwise risks being filmed by security 
cameras or identified by witnesses, or is expected to die, and places it on a ma-
chine. In addition, a drone could be launched from a concealed location by means 
of a timer and then fly to its intended target using GPS, long after the perpetrators 
have left the area. It is possible that an attacker would have enough time to fly to 
a foreign country and watch the results of the attack from abroad. The explosive 
could even be configured to detonate once the drone reaches a pre-configured 
grid coordinate. This process would require slightly more technical expertise but 
is well within the capabilities of many amateur hobbyists.  
Regulation Lags behind Technology
The lack of effective government regulation is another appealing aspect of using 
drones to conduct terrorist attacks. Currently, fixed-wing drones can be modi-
fied by amateur hobbyists to carry heavier payloads like explosives, but they are 
not as effective as rotary-wing drones at precision targeting. The rotary-wing 
drones available to the public are still relatively small and would require sig-
nificant upgrades to increase their lift capacity. While hobbyists have gained 
a lot of experience working with fixed-wing drones, rotary-wing technology is 
still beyond the skills of most amateur enthusiasts. Larger rotary-wing models, 
however, are being widely developed in the commercial sector and include 
drones with a lift capacity of up to 70 pounds.20 The use of such drones is still 
heavily regulated, but corporations are actively lobbying to expand their use. 
This lobbying has already resulted in a presidential memorandum, issued in 
February 2015, that called for “a plan to safely integrate civil UAS [unmanned 
aircraft systems] into the National Airspace System by September 30, 2015.” 21 
In reality, this regulation is already behind the times. Many US companies have 
been experimenting with the technology without waiting for Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) approval. “The FAA’s ban on commercial drone use means 
that much of the rush toward drone adoption is happening in the shadows.” 22 
Furthermore, “because the FAA lacks the manpower to police the entire national 
airspace at all times, many companies get away with flying their commercial 
drones until someone brings it to the agency’s attention, at which point a 
cease-and-desist letter goes out.” 23 This cumbersome progression toward FAA 
regulation brings up two alarming aspects of the spread of commercial drone use. 
The first is that, in the absence of regulation, the use of these aircraft has already 
fostered a secretive distribution network that could allow a large rotary-wing 
drone to be sold to terrorist organizations either directly or through interme-
diaries. The second point is that the slow pace of FAA approval for commercial 
drone use has brought to light the agency’s inability to effectively monitor the 
country’s vast domestic airspace. Even if full coverage were possible, many of 
these aircraft are still small enough that radar technology might mistake them 
for large birds or miss them entirely.24 
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The United States is not alone in this struggle to regulate 
its airspace. The Birmingham Policy Commission of the 
United Kingdom published a report in 2014 noting that, 
“in the wrong hands, RPA [Remotely Piloted Aircraft] could 
become a dangerous and destabilizing delivery system. We 
doubt how far the proliferation of the various enabling 
technologies … can be controlled.” 25 Findings from this 
report stress the urgent necessity to regulate RPA use, 
publicize and enforce existing laws, and alert the Ministry 
of Defence and law enforcement agencies of the potential 
use of RPAs for criminal or terrorist activity. The report also 
emphasizes that the United Kingdom is not in a position to 
influence the international regulation of RPAs, due to their 
widespread proliferation on the global market.26 
India is another country that has had considerable dif-
ficulty regulating the use of drones. Similar to the slow 
progress made by the FAA in the 
United States, India’s Directorate 
General of Civil Aviation (DCGA) 
has not effectively regulated 
the use of small recreational or 
commercial drones. Analyst Nidhi 
Singal writes that “the long wait 
for the DCGA to issue guidelines 
has not helped … as drones have 
become a common sight despite 
the ban.” 27 If countries with estab-
lished institutions for the regula-
tion of airspace are incapable of 
regulating drone use, then it is easy 
to imagine that areas of the world 
racked by terrorist violence, such 
as Nigeria, Syria, or the Levant, 
are highly susceptible to the threat 
of drone terrorism. Even without the technical expertise 
required to turn a drone into an explosive-carrying aerial 
platform, the devices could still be used non-lethally to 
conduct aerial reconnaissance. Terrorist groups such as 
Boko Haram, for instance, would greatly benefit from 
deploying drones to learn for certain whether security 
forces were present before the group conducted an attack, 
or to give an early warning of attacks against its own sites.
Online Expertise
The internet provides an excellent, anonymous forum 
for instructing would-be terrorists on the technical 
requirements for drone attacks. Sageman elaborates on 
the growing trend of instructing terrorists online: “The 
growth of the Internet has dramatically transformed the 
structure and dynamic of the evolving threat of global 
Islamist terrorism by changing the nature of terrorists’ 
interactions. ... The average age of terrorists arrested in 
Europe and Canada from 2005 onward has dramatically 
decreased.” 28 According to terrorism specialist Alan 
Krueger, “88% of the time, terrorist attacks occur in the 
perpetrator’s country of origin,” and “the perpetrators 
tend to be middle class or upper middle class.” 29 These 
characteristics are ideal for recruiting someone who would 
be inclined to use a drone for a terrorist attack. A teenager 
or 20-something who is already comfortable learning from 
the internet could learn to configure a drone, and many 
youth are already interested in and excited about recre-
ational drone use. Most importantly, the recruit could live 
and work in proximity to the target, and all of the neces-
sary equipment is available for purchase and affordable to 
anyone in the middle or upper classes. Sageman also notes 
that, as demonstrated by al Qaeda, the trend of recruit-
ment also favors the use of the internet: “The prospective 
mujahed took the initiative rather 
than waiting for someone to ask 
him to join the jihad. Instead of a 
top-down process of the terrorist 
organization trying to recruit new 
members, it was a bottom-up pro-
cess of young people volunteering 
to join the organization.” 30  
The desired end of this process 
is to have such groups or indi-
viduals act independently, using 
their own resources to conduct 
terrorist attacks in line with the 
overall goals of the organization. 
Jason Burke, an investigative 
journalist, describes the dangers 
of this recruitment strategy in 
his analysis of the 2004 Madrid terrorist attacks. “The 
attackers were not experienced Al-Qaeda operatives 
parachuted in from overseas as initially suspected, but 
were first-generation Moroccan and Tunisian immigrants 
who had been living in Spain for some time. ... Spanish 
intelligence and police investigators concluded that the 
bombers were acting largely on their own.” 31 Two of the 
most disturbing aspects of the Madrid attacks are that the 
targets were chosen without the approval of the central al 
Qaeda leadership and that the attacks were not controlled 
to meet the goals of the organization. This statement may 
seem ludicrous considering the violent nature of al Qaeda 
and the nature of its historical targets, but as Burke writes, 
“Killing crowds of ordinary commuters on their way to 
work was far harder to sell to potential sympathizers and 
thus risked delegitimizing the cause as a whole.” 32 He also 
notes that the bombers did not embrace the traditional 
martyrdom favored by al Qaeda.33 These attackers would 
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likely have conducted follow-on attacks if they had not been quickly detained. 
The implication is that while al Qaeda is bad, individuals who become self-
radicalized and choose targets at random have the potential to be much worse 
and even more difficult to stop. Armed with drones, these self-radicalized groups 
or individuals would have the capacity to conduct extremely lethal attacks, evade 
capture, and carry out additional attacks essentially at will. 
The Psychological Impact of Drones  
This article has discussed the potential effectiveness of using drones to conduct 
terrorist attacks, but their effectiveness alone does not make them appealing. 
Drone strikes must also achieve the desired psychological goals of the terrorist 
organization or individual. Horgan writes, “When we consider Al-Qaeda’s 
additional expectations of political destabilization and galvanization of extreme 
Islamic sentiment against Western interests, the allure of terrorism as a psycho-
logical strategy and psycho-political tool to otherwise disenfranchised extremists 
becomes apparent.” 34 Although al Qaeda is only one terrorist organization 
among many, the group’s psychological goals are generally similar to other 
terrorist groups throughout history; only the ideology and opponent change. 
Therefore, Horgan’s comments are relevant to the question of whether drones 
achieve the goals of terrorist organizations in general.  
Achieving Political Destabilization
The most effective tactics used by terrorists—aside from the unprecedented 
use of hijacked airplanes as guided missiles on 9/11—have largely been ground-
based. They have involved attacks with small arms, infiltration to emplace con-
cealed explosives, and suicide missions in which explosives were carried either 
on an individual or in a vehicle. The targets for many of these attacks have been 
public places where, seemingly, the victims were randomly selected and had no 
connection to the police, military, or government. Horgan explains why such 
attacks are highly effective at achieving the psychological goals of terrorists. 
The fact that the apparently random victim of this kind of violence 
is arbitrarily selected to die shocks and sickens people, and this 
unexpectedness leads to personalization of events even at an indi-
vidual level. It is seen as terrible and unjust, the way in which anyone, 
particularly non-combatant bystanders, can be at the wrong place 
at the wrong time and be killed in the name of some cause that the 
victim has possibly never even heard of.35
“Terrorist violence,” Horgan points out, “is predicated on the assumptions that 
apparently random violence can push the agenda of the terrorist group onto an 
‘otherwise indifferent public’s awareness,’ and that, faced with the prospect of a 
prolonged campaign of terrorist violence, the public will eventually opt for an 
acceptance of the terrorists’ demands.” 36  
To date, al Qaeda and other radicalized Islamist organizations seem to have 
achieved many of their psychological aims. They have conducted horrific attacks 
and awakened public awareness of their existence, but they have not yet achieved 
their overall goal to, as former US deputy national security advisor (and current 
CIA director) John O. Brennan described it, “terrorize us into retreating from 
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constant state of dread cannot be maintained forever is illustrated through a slow 
habituation of the terrorist audience to the situation. For the terrorist, audience 
acclimatization poses problems: if the audience adapts to tactics, the terrorist’s 
influence diminishes.” 38 This readiness to adapt is where the Western public cur-
rently stands with regard to terrorism. Due to the persistent ground-based threat, 
security measures have been upgraded in response. For example, a 2008 Govern-
ment Accountability Office (GAO) report lists several physical security measures 
that US embassies have implemented in recent years, as seen in figure 1.39 
 THE PSYCHO-
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Figure 1: Key security measures at a notional  
embassy compound
These include placing buildings at a specified “standoff ” distance from main 
roads, anti-climb walls, anti-ram barriers, and blast-resistant building construc-
tion that includes shatter-proof glass. The GAO has also recommended that 
US embassies be relocated from dense urban areas to areas on the outskirts of 
capitals that can accommodate the recommended security measures. In this 
regard, the psychological aim of al Qaeda to reduce US influence abroad has 
been effective. Instead of occupying a prominent place in the center of foreign 
political power, many US embassies have adopted a bunker-like mentality that 
serves as a symbolic limitation to their international prestige and a physical limi-
tation to American personnel’s interactions with the public. This overly cautious 
approach paints the United States as being fearful and out of touch with both 
foreign politics and daily life. 
Nevertheless, al Qaeda and similar Islamist terrorist groups have not achieved 
all of their psychological goals because the “audience acclimatization” that 
Horgan described is ongoing. Prominent domestic sites in the United States 
and other Western countries have adopted similar precautions to those found 
protecting embassies in domestic defense of terrorist attacks. As a result, people 
in major Western countries are regaining the sense of security that they lost on 
11 September 2001, 11 March 2004, and 7 July 2005, because their perception 
of security is reinforced every day as they navigate through metal detectors, bag 
searches, anti-ram barriers disguised as decorative flower pots, and a myriad of 
other defensive measures. Whistleblower revelations concerning the US National 
Security Agency’s highly intrusive surveillance of private citizens should be 
alarming to a liberal democracy, but instead the revelations have further rein-
forced many Americans’ sense of security and thereby reduced the psychological 
influence of terrorism.40 To regain the initiative, terrorists must conduct a suc-
cessful attack that bypasses these security measures in such a way that the public 
will no longer feel they are protected from seemingly random acts of violence.     
Drones may provide the means for terrorists to regain the initiative and reach 
their psychological goals of destabilizing Western societies. The glaring gap 
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in all of the above-mentioned ground-based security measures is that they do 
not provide protection from aerial attacks by anything smaller than a manned 
conventional aircraft, a weakness easily exploited by drones. This problem was 
publicly demonstrated in two separate events in early 2015, when a piloted gyro-
copter and a rotary-wing drone embarrassed the US Secret Service by landing on 
the White House lawn.41 As technology improves, it is likely that the semblance 
of security that has been recreated through expenditures of vast resources and 
time will be destroyed the moment a successful drone attack forces the public to 
realize, once again, that they are not as safe as they thought they were.  
Galvanizing Extreme Islamist Sentiment 
Perhaps nothing has been more controversial in the United States’ current fight 
against radical Islamist terrorism than the use of drone strikes. Political scientist 
Avery Plaw writes that “between June 2004 and the end of 2011, the CIA is 
widely reported to have carried out 300 covert drone strikes in Northwest Paki-
stan that have killed more than 2000 people, some of whom were civilians.” 42 
In recent years, this program has been extended and drones have now been 
used in Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and most recently, in the fight 
against ISIS. Plaw describes the parallel narratives that characterize the US drone 
program. On the one hand, John Brennan said regarding the US drone program 
in Pakistan, “For the past year there hasn’t been a single collateral death because 
of the exceptional proficiency and precision of the capabilities that we’ve been 
able to develop.” 43 The narrative adopted by the Pakistani press, on the other 
hand, is much different, as Plaw makes clear. 
The Pakistani daily, Dawn, reported in January 2010 that “of the 44 
predator strikes carried out by US drones … over the past 12 months, 
only five were able to hit their actual targets … but at the cost of over 
700 innocent lives. … For each al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorist killed 
by US drones, 140 innocent Pakistanis also had to die.” 44 
Whether the Pakistani press’s numbers are correct is irrelevant. The Pakistani 
public and wider regional audience will undoubtedly believe local sources over 
statements made by Western officials. Claims of civilian casualties have also 
been made outside of South Asia and the Middle East. Social anthropologist 
Jeffrey Sluka commented that “the drone strikes have already caused well over a 
thousand civilian casualties, have had a particular affinity for hitting weddings 
and funerals, and appear to be seriously fueling the insurgency.” 45  
The use of drones by the United States and the United Kingdom has also been 
cited as a motivation for terrorism by the attackers themselves, including the 
foiled 2010 Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, a US citizen of Pakistani 
heritage.46 US drone strikes have been a source of humiliating defeat for members 
of al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorists, but they have also been a source of great 
anger within the international Muslim community—an anger that terrorists can 
exploit. “Given the controversial use of drones by the US and UK in many parts 
of the Muslim world, the ability to strike at the homeland with such a device 
must be very attractive to many terrorist groups as the ultimate expression of a 
paradoxically symmetrical asymmetric warfare.” 47 If terrorists could use drones 
against targets in the West, it would provide a psychological victory for their 
members and serve as a recruitment tool aimed at the citizens of countries 
targeted by drones. In addition, by citing US drone strikes as the reason for retali-
ation, such attacks might force apathetic Western populations to pay attention 
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to the problems in their own governments’ drone programs—and potentially 
motivate homegrown terrorists to take action.
To many people, the idea of drones as weapons may seem futuristic and within 
the grasp of only the most technologically advanced militaries of the world. 
Therefore, if a terrorist organization could effectively use drones, it would 
achieve instant legitimacy. Hezbollah has already realized this and began to 
incorporate drones into its arsenal as early as 2004. In 2012, Hezbollah opera-
tives launched a drone from Lebanon that flew 35 miles into Israel and was shot 
down near the town of Dimona—the site of an Israeli nuclear complex.48 This 
incursion into Israeli airspace was clearly a psychological victory for Hezbollah 
because it exposed the vulnerability of Israel’s primary source of military power 
over its neighbors—its nuclear weapons. Although the Hezbollah drones lag 
behind those of Israel and the United States in sophistication, they do provide 
a powerful psychological tool for Israel’s enemies. The rapid technological 
evolution of drones in the commercial market may greatly reduce this gap in 
capability between the drones of Hezbollah and the drones of the West in the 
very near future.  
Final Thoughts
This article describes the capabilities of drones, how they could be used to con-
duct terrorist attacks, and how they may become the ideal platform for terrorists 
to achieve their psychological goals. The question remains, however, whether it 
will take a successful drone attack before Western security agencies implement 
the changes necessary to counter this threat. 
While the challenge presented by drones as potential terrorist 
weapons is real and growing, this does not mean that nothing can be 
done to counter it. Various measures have been suggested as defenses 
against drone attacks, such as electromagnetic jamming, deeper 
perimeter defense of airports, physical barriers on buildings, and 
even high-powered fiber optic laser guns, but such measures will 
only be implemented if the threat from drones is acknowledged, 
debated, and acted upon.49  
The article does not cover appropriate defenses against drone terrorism. 
Its purpose is to make clear that the use of drones is rapidly growing, their 
technological capacity is increasing, and the threat that they will become a 
tool for terrorism is real. Burke writes that prior to 11 September 2001, “no one 
had imagined terrorists ever using tactics like those that the hijackers were to 
adopt.” 50 The intelligence community, he notes, admitted that “the nature of 
the threat was not ‘understood’ at the time … ‘due to a failure of imagination.’ ” 51 
This failure of imagination continues to be a lethal weakness that will be ex-
ploited by terrorist organizations, which will constantly seek out new and more 
effective methods of attack. The rapid proliferation and technological improve-
ment of drones may profoundly change the way terrorists conduct attacks and 
what they will be capable of accomplishing. v 
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Countering Extremist Groups in  
Cyberspace: Applying Old Solutions  
to a New Problem
LTC Robert Schultz, US Army
Finding ways to counter an adversary that is not physically 
observable poses a significant challenge, especially when that adversary is 
operating within the vast domain of cyberspace. For various extremist groups 
that promote hatred and violence, cyberspace provides a virtual safe haven where 
they can promote their causes, raise funds, communicate, and grow. Based on the 
increasing number of extremist websites, it appears that the considerable efforts 
to degrade these online operations have had little overall effect. This outcome 
points to the need for innovative strategic solutions to counter these extremist 
groups in cyberspace.1 Rather than creating new strategies that require a tremen-
dous amount of brainpower, manpower, and money, however, new forms of two 
old operational concepts from land and naval warfare over the last few centuries 
could work in tandem to counter the cyberspace strategies of extremist groups. 
The first concept is called a false-flag operation, a deceptive maneuver that 
allowed a navy’s ships to approach enemy vessels and launch a surprise attack 
at close quarters. A virtual false-flag maneuver could be used in cyberspace to 
disguise operations intended to undermine an adversary’s web-based operations. 
Second is the high-risk and deceptive concept of pseudo operations, in which an 
agent infiltrates an adversary’s physical location and poses as a member of the 
target group for the purposes of gathering intelligence and disrupting operations. 
These two operational concepts are provocative because they have sometimes 
been associated with the use of “dirty tricks,” especially in cases where sponsor-
ship and oversight were haphazard.2 This article therefore also suggests a legal 
framework for executing these operations feasibly and legitimately, by reinvigo-
rating the age-old practice of issuing letters of marque and reprisal.
The Need for Novel Solutions
What makes extremist groups a unique threat in cyberspace is that the majority 
of them cannot be tied to a recognizable or accountable body, such as a nation-
state. It was easy for the United States and its allies to tie provocative behavior 
to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and even easier to identify the “bad 
guys” during the transparent struggle for world domination with Nazi Germany 
and imperial Japan in World War II. Today, most extremist groups are acepha-
lous—composed of dispersed organizations and individuals and lacking any 
clear command structure—which makes them even more difficult to identify 
and target using conventional military power.3 To be successful, they must be 
able to instill loyalty among their members through near-constant communica-
tions, and in this regard, their lack of a centralized structure has made them true 
beneficiaries of cyberspace. Utilizing websites and social media outlets, extremist 
groups enjoy unparalleled global reach with which to organize and conduct 
operations such as recruiting, fund-raising, and training.
In light of increasing illicit activities in cyberspace by a multitude of extremist 
groups, the United States and its allies should acknowledge that tools for the 
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application of offensive cyberspace operations against these threats are needed. 
Before turning to new strategies, however, the extremists’ opponents might look 
to some old concepts to meet these new threats.  
The advent of web-based information technology has made it possible for many 
governments to carry out their own covert operations and create new opportuni-
ties in cyberspace to counter extremists.4 Few extremist groups that currently op-
erate in cyberspace, despite being equipped with various degrees of information 
technology and a cybersecurity infrastructure, have the capability to detect their 
opponents’ counter activities. This is due, in part, to the loose organizational 
structure of most extremist groups, which does not support the training and 
resources required to detect and counter hackers, viruses, or false personas. With 
these favorable conditions, it is time to encourage the integration of offensive 
capabilities such as false-flag operations, pseudo operations, and the issuance of 
letters of marque and reprisal into cyberspace counterterrorism strategies.  
False-Flag Operations
False-flag operations are secret or disguised operations intended to deceive an 
adversary into believing the operations are being executed by groups or states 
other than those that actually planned and implemented them.5 The term false 
flag originated in naval warfare. A warship would attempt to deceive an enemy 
vessel’s crew by hiding its flag or replacing it with one that looked like a friendly 
flag, in order to maneuver close enough to launch a surprise attack and destroy 
or capture the target before being fired upon. This tactic, although rarely used 
in modern times, has long been legally acceptable under the US Law of Armed 
Conflict, which permits the wearing of enemy uniforms prior to engaging in 
combat.6 The use of false-flag operations largely faded away in the mid-1800s 
(with the important exception of the German Navy Raiders during both World 
Wars). Many nation-states maintained that these operations were being carried 
out without proper oversight or governmental control, primarily by pirates 
whose atrocities were then wrongly blamed on other nation-states.7 This of 
course would not be the case for these operations carried out under official aus-
pices in cyberspace. Such deceptions are, in fact, legitimized at the international 
level under Articles 37–39 of the Geneva Convention, which state, 
Ruses of war are not prohibited. Such ruses are acts which are in-
tended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly 
but which infringe no rule of international law applicable in armed 
conflict and which are not perfidious because they do not invite the 
confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under that law.8 
Used in cyberspace, a false-flag operation could disguise deceptions in a similar 
manner. Additionally, where traditional false-flag operations used a disguise 
to approach the enemy, the interaction between the deceiver and the deceived 
is reversed in cyberspace. The target must actively choose to visit the false-flag 
website for the deception to work. Because posting web-based content is far 
different from engaging in physical combat, any requirement to eventually reveal 
the identity of the sponsor remains a question for legal scholars. Web-based 
false-flag operations thus are more akin to “black” or covert deceptions in which 












False-flag operations in cyberspace involve developing 
websites, blogs, and chat rooms that mirror a targeted 
extremist group’s ideology. The first steps are for cyber-
deceivers to develop web-based content that is consistent 
with the targeted group’s narrative and then to redirect 
the group’s followers to the false site. Skilled coders could, 
for instance, execute seamless redirections from targeted 
websites to false-flag sites. Next, as readership and mem-
bership grow, the content on the false-flag sites gradually 
changes. Over time, the narratives shift subtly, to influence 
the audience into believing the target group’s ideology is 
corrupt, for instance, or so devious and untrustworthy 
that supporters feel compelled to terminate their online 
association with the extremist group.10  
For example, the recent trend of using online radicaliza-
tion to fill the ranks of ISIS could be countered through 
the use of false-flag operations that deliberately under-
mine the bond of trust between those who may want to 
join the cause and the extrem-
ists. False-flag websites could 
highlight the group’s atrocities, 
against Muslims in particular, 
and thus help delegitimize the 
movement. Alienating extremist 
groups like ISIS from the inter-
national Islamic community 
through false-flag operations 
would not only degrade such 
organizations in the short term 
but also potentially discredit 
their online activities over the 
longer term. 
Implications of False-Flag Operations
There are three effects we can expect to see if false-flag 
operations are successful in undermining the bonds 
of trust between targeted online extremist groups and 
would-be supporters. First, because false-flag operations 
target the legitimacy of the extremists, we would expect 
to see measurable changes in online activity, such as 
decreases in membership, fund-raising, blog postings, and 
chats, as well as increases in the antagonistic and denun-
ciatory messages posted on false-flag websites. Second, 
we would see targeted extremist groups begin to police 
or even attack other like-minded websites they did not 
directly manage as they came to question the veracity of 
the others’ ideology or suspect rivals of being the source of 
their websites’ problems.11 Finally, we would also expect to 
see an overall change in the extremists’ use of cyberspace, 
as they and their supporters—even if they detected the 
false flag—felt less free to operate openly in the virtual 
medium. 
False-flag tactics are already being used to some extent to 
counter online extremism, but only in a defensive manner 
or to collect intelligence. The concept of false-flag opera-
tions presented here is unique because it applies deception 
as an offensive tool to counter extremist activity online.
Pseudo Operations
Another effective deception based on an operational 
concept used previously against insurgent and terrorist 
organizations is the pseudo operation. Pseudo operations 
traditionally used disguised military forces to infiltrate an 
adversary’s area of operation in order to gain targetable 
intelligence.12 Historically, the British have had the most 
experience and success with pseudo operations, which 
they utilized in the anticolonial insurgencies of the post–
World War II period, such as 
the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya 
(1952–1960).13 The British first 
developed the concept as early 
as the Boer War (1899–1902), 
however, as part of their coun-
terinsurgency strategy against 
Afrikaner guerillas.14
In cyberspace, a pseudo opera-
tion may be used to infiltrate an 
extremist group’s virtual area of 
operations through websites, 
blogs, and chat rooms for the 
purposes of gathering intelligence and disrupting its 
online operations. By targeting the organization’s existing 
online members, pseudo operations could be used to 
weaken the bonds of trust between the extremist group’s 
leadership and its virtual community. Unlike false-flag 
operations, which focus on audiences that are not already 
members of the targeted extremist group, such as poten-
tial recruits and donors, pseudo operations in cyberspace 
work to get inside the targeted extremist group, gather 
information, and disrupt the organization from within. 
Conceptually, web-based pseudo forces could “role play” 
as active members and supporters in order to gain access 
to the inner workings of a targeted extremist group’s 
online operation. Once inside, the pseudo force would 
begin collecting intelligence on group members and their 
activities. As specific targets within the online organiza-
tion were developed, the pseudo force would begin 
exploiting rifts between members and groups within the 
organization through the use of misinformation and 
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similar tactics. Ultimately, the bonds of trust between 
loyal supporters and the extremist group’s leadership 
would be undermined to the point that the group would 
lose many of its members or even disintegrate.
Identifying the right selection criteria for the personnel 
who would conduct web-based pseudo operations is 
critically important. To mitigate the chances of compro-
mise, the first step would be to recruit team members 
for these operations from various organizations, to keep 
their association with each other sufficiently vague and 
help mask the team from the internal security apparatus 
of a targeted extremist group. History has also proved 
that the best executors of pseudo operations are those 
who enjoy adventure rather than those who are or once 
were extremists themselves, or those who could be swayed 
by peer pressure. The adventure seekers and risk takers 
were much more reliable and easier to retain for future 
operations.15 With the explosion of online gaming over 
the past 20 years, finding motivated individuals who enjoy 
the excitement of role playing and are comfortable in the 
relatively secure and low-cost environment of cyberspace 
will likely be easy.  
The effectiveness of pseudo operations is also proportional 
to the level of approval and support provided by senior 
civilian and military leadership. Cyberspace, in effect, 
helps alleviate concerns about risk and the danger of com-
promise because of its inherent anonymity and the ability 
to operate with minimal risk of physical consequence. 
Incorporating pseudo operations into future counterinsur-
gency strategies will leverage the powerful effects that can 
be brought to bear against extremist groups in cyberspace.
Implications of Using Pseudo Operations 
If pseudo operations are effective, we would expect to see 
three observable effects. First, since pseudo operations 
directly attack the internal workings of an extremist 
group’s online operation, we should see a decrease in the 
group’s overall cyber operations and an increase in security 
measures at targeted sites. The need to improve security 
would also increase the operating costs for the extremist 
group’s cyber presence. Signals of increased security might 
include more frequent notifications for members to 
change their passwords or the use of image credentialing 
to verify user identification. Second, since an important 
aspect of pseudo operations is to create and exploit rifts 
between members of the extremist group’s online com-
munity, we would expect to see the group splinter or even 
disappear altogether. Third, pseudo operations by design 
induce dissent and distrust within the organization, 
and the anonymity of cyberspace only exacerbates these 
types of fissures. Trust among its members is vital to the 
strength of any illicit organization, and members of the 
extremist group—who would already be on alert because 
of heightened site security—would grow distrustful of 
each other in regular online activities such as chatting and 
blogging. Members’ trust in the organization’s leadership 
would diminish, along with the group’s ability to recruit 
and carry out operations.
Whether it is the potential for operators to be com-
promised or the implications of associating itself with 
former insurgents, the United States has not had a 
doctrinal concept on pseudo operations, nor has it used 
pseudo operations as part of a military strategy—cer-
tainly not in cyberspace.16 With the advent of cyberspace 
as a global common domain and the precipitate rise 
in extremist messaging online, however, there is a new 
opportunity—and need—to reinvigorate pseudo opera-
tions as an operational concept. 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal
False-flag and pseudo operations in cyberspace require 
a domestically and internationally acceptable policy, a 
legal framework that justifies their use, and a recognized 
necessity for their continued practice. For the United 
States, these requirements can be found in its Constitu-
tion, which states that the US Congress has the power “to 
declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and 
make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.” 17 
In the days before the United States possessed a strong 
naval force, and for individual states without strong 
navies, letters of marque and reprisal offered an alterna-
tive method of defending interests on the high seas. The 
issuance of these letters became the strategy of choice at 
a time when many governments found themselves short 
on both revenue and naval vessels.18 Rather than have to 
pay for naval operations against an enemy, the govern-
ment simply granted private ship owners, commonly 
known as “privateers,” the legal authority to conduct naval 
warfare, raid ship-borne commerce, and seize adversaries’ 
ships.19 In return, the privateer was paid with a portion of 
whatever goods he captured, which served as an incentive 
to capture as much of the opponent’s shipping as possible. 
The English crown used this concept, known as priva-
teering commissions, as early as the thirteenth century: 
private individuals would be commissioned to infiltrate 
an adversary’s territory for the purposes of retaliation or 
retribution against specific people believed to have com-
mitted offenses against the king.20 In 1765, the concept of 
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letters of marque and reprisal was written into the Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, which state,
These letters are grantable by the law of nations, whenever the sub-
jects of one state are oppressed and injured by those of another; and 
justice is denied by that state to which the oppressor belongs. In this 
case letters of marque and reprisal (words in themselves synonymous 
and signifying a taking in return) may be obtained, in order to seize 
the bodies or goods of the subjects of the offending state, until sat-
isfaction be made, wherever they happen to be found. Indeed this 
custom of reprisals seems dictated by nature herself; and accordingly 
we find in the most ancient times very notable instances of it.21
Simply put, a marque is a pledge to someone or something. Reprisal is retaliation 
for perceived violations or harmful actions. A reprisal could be the seizing or 
destruction of property or persons, and could range from a small-scale attack 
to major operations against the adversary.22 Therefore, a letter of marque and 
reprisal would authorize a private entity or person to conduct reprisal opera-
tions anywhere in the world or—in the case of cyber operations—outside of it.
The situation today is not dissimilar, as extremist groups operate virtually un-
opposed in cyberspace, while many governments find themselves falling short 
in their efforts to confront them. Hence the value of letters of marque and 
reprisal, which would enable governments to deploy a private army of hackers, 
or cyber privateers, to legally and legitimately execute cyber activities like false 
flags and pseudo operations. The US military, having fought conflicts in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq for the past 14 years, finds itself in a conundrum of dimin-
ishing funds, resources, and people. Recent budget measures have dictated cuts 
in defense spending that limit the military’s ability to create new capabilities 
and formations. At the same time, the use of cyberspace by extremist groups is 
growing to the point where cyber warfare is a daily and continuous fight that 
must be won. Issuing letters of marque and reprisal to build a force of cyber 
privateers without the use of tax dollars could help limit the reach of extremists 
in cyberspace while legally justifying offensive cyber capabilities.
To build these capabilities, letters of marque and reprisal could be issued to 
any number of the private organizations or individuals that have expressed a 
willingness to counter extremist groups in cyberspace.23 History has several 
examples, such as the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in the Spanish Civil War, of 
privately-funded forces that fought for idealistic principles. Today, like-minded 
private organizations could recruit socially concerned and tech-savvy individuals 
to conduct false-flag and pseudo operations from their personal computers.24 For 
this concept to work, however, each letter of marque and reprisal would need to 
articulate in detail the parameters of the privateers’ activities, as well as economic 
incentives, if any. For example, the letter could prohibit conducting cyber attacks 
solely as retaliation for attacks against individual privateers. Additionally, the 
letters would need to define the financial incentives for cyber raids against an 
opponent’s exploitable data, such as personal and financial information. An 
appropriate incentive for a privateer would be the use of bank account data, or 
a portion of funds that may have been donated to a targeted online extremist 
group and confiscated by the cyber privateer. With the proper legal oversight, 
these prizes, or some portion of them, would be the privateer’s to keep. Potential 
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in cyberspace for these purposes. For example, following the deadly attacks on 
the French satirical publication Charlie Hebdo, outraged tech-savvy individuals 
and groups launched private cyber attacks on jihadist websites in an attempt to 
shut down their online propaganda.25 Imagine the outcome if these attacks were 
grounded in law, controlled by proper oversight, and incentivized with profit?      
In addition to false-flag and pseudo operations, cyber privateers could be issued 
letters of marque and reprisal to fill specific military requirements that the state’s 
military cannot or will not immediately meet. Fueled through the incentive of 
profit, the privateers could expeditiously begin cyber operations as stipulated 
under the letter.26 In the past, privateers have achieved mixed results while sup-
porting state militaries, whether it was because they operated beyond the scope 
of their contracts or because they fostered the perception that they existed solely 
for profit, and so such operations have yet to establish a positive reputation in 
national defense.27 To help correct this perception, governments can draw on a 
200-year-old mechanism for providing legal oversight of privateers: prize courts. 
Historically, representatives of a sponsoring government’s prize courts ensured 
privateers were not rewarded beyond the scope or the authority outlined in the 
specific letter of marque and reprisal.28 A prize court could make rulings on the 
sale or destruction of seized items and the distribution of any proceeds, or order 
the return of seized property or funds if the seizure was deemed unlawful. The 
same judicial concept could be applied today without the need to expand the 
size or scope of a state’s legal system.29 Under current law in the United States, 
for example, federal district courts throughout the country have exclusive 
jurisdiction in prize cases. No prize cases have been heard in the United States 
since the current statutes were adopted in 1956 because no letters of marque and 
reprisal have been issued in that time, but the system to provide judicial over-
sight already exists.30  
Understanding the circumstances and conditions in which a letter of marque 
and reprisal could be issued with regard to cyberspace is very important. Unlike 
land and naval warfare, targets in cyberspace are not physical and can be dis-
guised with false identifications and internet protocol (IP) addresses. The burden 
of proof to determine whether to issue a letter of marque and reprisal to disrupt, 
corrupt, influence, destroy, or deceive a targeted extremist group in cyberspace 
remains the same. These actions should be characterized by clear thresholds 
of legal action: first, officials would have to show probable cause to initiate 
offensive cyber operations, and second, the government would be required to 
demonstrate evidence of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt before a letter of 
marque and reprisal would be issued.31
Implications of Letters of Marque and Reprisal
Perhaps the best part about the strategic use of letters of marque and reprisal is 
that they are completely legal under current international law and US constitu-
tional law. The US Constitution gives Congress the authority not only to declare 
war but also to issue these letters, as an alternative to engaging in costly physical 
warfare. This alternative also empowers private citizens to work on behalf of 
the US government in a military capacity. Opponents to letters of marque and 
reprisal often point to the Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, ratified 
by 55 countries in 1856, which bans signatory nations from commissioning 
privateers.32 The United States, however, was not a signatory to this declaration, 
which pertains only to the letters’ use in naval warfare. To date there are no other 
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international laws pertaining to privateering that would 
preclude the United States from using these letters for 
cyberspace operations.33 
Nevertheless, attempts in 2001 and again in 2007 to introduce 
new legislation in Congress that would have authorized the 
issuance of letters of marque and reprisal to counter al Qaeda 
fell on deaf ears and were quickly dismissed.34 By recruiting 
and regulating talented cyber privateers to carry out false-flag 
and pseudo operations, the United States and its allies could 
implement a cost-effective campaign against extremist groups 
operating in cyberspace.35
Considerations for the Use of New 
Solutions in Cyberspace
With the legal backing of letters of marque and reprisal, 
false-flag and pseudo operations could be successfully 
integrated into a strategy for countering extremist groups 
in cyberspace. The following points, however, must be 
considered.  
1. Feasibility. Maintaining transparency between 
these operational concepts and the civilian 
authorities and laws that govern their use is much 
easier to do in cyberspace than in the physical 
domain. A cyber privateer operating under legal 
authority and supervision would have a much 
harder time hiding clandestine activity than would 
the captain of a ship on the open ocean. Letters 
of marque and reprisal, with their attendant legal 
infrastructure, make it less likely that a poorly 
constructed false-flag operation would be tied 
to or enable an actual terrorist attack, or that a 
pseudo operation would target a group that is only 
exercising its right to free speech.
2. Suitability. Normally, these operational concepts 
come with a limited shelf life because of their de-
ceptive nature. Adversaries in the physical domain 
would eventually catch on to methods such as 
infiltration by an undercover agent or disinforma-
tion operations.36 In cyberspace, by contrast, time 
could be on the side of the implementer. Although 
these operational concepts may take longer to be 
effective, the vastness and anonymity of cyberspace 
allows the false-flag and pseudo operators, sup-
ported by the issuance of letters of marque and 
reprisal, to continue to adjust methods, tech-
niques, and timing. In terms of targeting extremist 
groups in cyberspace, operational concepts and 
overarching strategies of this nature work best 
when their aggregated effects are achieved over 
time. 
3. Risk. Operations in cyberspace can be difficult to 
control. The risk of compromise should, however, 
be an acceptable part of doing business. Those who 
carry out these new solutions should assume their 
efforts will be compromised; it might be just as 
advantageous to the operators, however, if the tar-
geted extremist group does detect these offensive 
cyber operations. The extremists would be forced 
to adjust their online presence, and members and 
potential recruits would question the security 
of “trusted sites.” Additionally, in the event of 
compromise, false-flag and pseudo operators need 
merely to take the operation off-line and recon-
figure, and then reappear under another persona, 
avatar, or website. Finally, and perhaps most obvi-
ously, cyber operations of this nature assume less 
physical risk compared to their historical forerun-
ners. Cyberspace should prove to be a forgiving 
environment that continually allows for renewed 
innovation without the associated operational risk 
of loss of life and collateral damage. Regardless, 
common sense dictates that governments should 
not ignore any of these low-cost and relatively safe 
tools that can help them achieve their goals of 
countering extremists in cyberspace with greater 
effectiveness and efficiency.
Conclusion
Rapidly emerging cyber technologies, which have con-
nected every corner of the world, are being used quite 
efficiently by extremist groups for recruitment and fund-
raising. Concepts such as false-flag and pseudo operations 
can be instrumental in developing strategic solutions that 
are legally reinforced by letters of marque and reprisal to 
counter extremist operations in cyberspace. Numerous 
defensive cyber-security tools—often of dubious effective-
ness—have been developed and implemented, but more 
offensive capabilities are needed in cyberspace to counter 
emerging threats in the twenty-first century. When it 
comes to countering extremist groups in cyberspace, false-
flag operations, pseudo operations, and letters of marque 
and reprisal can provide myriad creative options from 
which to choose. v 
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The Comprehensive Approach: A Silver 
Bullet or the Loch Ness Monster?
LTC Sándor Fábián,  
Hungarian Army
The way militaries understand what constitutes a threat to 
security has gone through a significant transformation since the end of the Cold 
War. Single peer-on-peer military threats of the past have given way to complex 
forms of violence and upheaval that simultaneously threaten both national and 
global peace and security. The natural consequence of this transformation is 
a fundamental change in the way nations approach crisis management, a role 
that has radically expanded over the course of recent conflicts in terms of tasks, 
timelines, and the number of actors involved.1 By the beginning of the twenty-
first century, both individual states and international organizations had painfully 
learned that their traditional, sequenced crisis management procedures did not 
deliver the results they expected.2 Despite “on-paper” success in many crisis areas, 
the world has seen numerous seemingly resolved conflicts relapse into violence 
since the early 1990s. 
Many scholars, supported by research that has explored the recent failures 
in crisis management, argue that the fundamental problem is due to “poor 
coordination and collaboration between the actors involved,” which has led to 
“wasted resources, poor effectiveness, and lack of sustainability.”3 The concept 
of a comprehensive approach (CA) to crisis management was born out of these 
discussions, and the term came to be widely used among both national and 
international crisis management professionals. Now CA is cited everywhere from 
the lowest to the highest levels of decision makers and practitioners as if it were a 
silver bullet for solving contemporary conflicts. But is it?
What Is a Comprehensive Approach?
As a result of the shortcomings of crisis management in recent conflicts, a 
number of international organizations, including the United Nations, the Eu-
ropean Union, and NATO, along with individual states, have taken significant 
steps to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of their crisis 
management efforts. These initiatives have “resulted in the development of a 
range of concepts for acting comprehensively.” 4 Although these concepts share 
some common ground, in the end all of them have been fundamentally shaped 
by the national and organizational contexts in which they were developed. 
No single, universally agreed definition of CA exists. Given this fact, it seems 
more appropriate to think about CA as a cluster of concepts rather than as one 
common concept. There are at least three identifiable categories of CA, based 
on the bureaucratic levels at which CA is implemented: national, intra-agency, 
and interagency.5
CA at the National Level
A number of countries, especially those involved in recent crisis management 
efforts, “have been experimenting with improving coherence between their 
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national management of domestic challenges as well 
as international operations.” 6 Different terminologies 
inevitably arose to describe the application of CA at the 
national level, including the whole-of-government ap-
proach;7 DIME, a US concept that refers to the four types 
of power a government can bring to bear (diplomatic, 
information, military, and economic); PMESII (political, 
military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure 
systems), a US military acronym from systems analysis; 
and the Canadian 3D approach (defense, diplomacy, and 
development), to name a few prominent examples. It does 
not matter what name is used—all of these concepts aim 
to harmonize the policies and actions of various govern-
mental departments around a certain issue to achieve 
greater effectiveness. These approaches include the coor-
dination of the “departments and agencies responsible for 
defence, foreign affairs, and international development 
issues,” a grouping that is sometimes stretched to include 
other departments or ministries, such as trade, finance, or 
justice.8 The concepts are based on the assumption that 
more meaningful and sustainable effects can be achieved 
in crisis management “when the various government 
departments involved pursue a common strategy, [and] 
have a shared understanding of the problem, a common 
theory of change, and an agreed plan for implementing 
such a strategy.” 9 
It must be admitted that many of these national ap-
proaches have had some promising results, including 
putting “mechanisms in place for regular meetings to 
exchange information” and coordinate actions;10 the 
establishment of integrated offices; the development of 
joint funding mechanisms; and the development of a joint 
national strategy with regards to specific crises. While the 
implementation of CA on a national level may be useful 
for creating consistent national policies, it is not sufficient 
to address contemporary international crises. National 
approaches are developed mostly in a vacuum, where the 
focus is on national interests and concerns. If a country’s 
CA policy fails to consider the strategies, interests, and 
abilities of the other actors and organizations involved 
in an international crisis, it will be more difficult for that 
country’s agencies and personnel to effectively interact 
with others in the field—especially because the national 
agencies’ hands will already be tied by national interests 
when they arrive in the conflict zone. These agencies will 
also be less flexible and adaptable in a foreign environ-
ment. Last but not least, national approaches in general 
seem to be too “state-centric”; in other words, they 
fail to properly consider the roles of civil society, the 
private sector, and international organizations in crisis 
management.
Intra-Agency Concepts of CA
International organizations have their own intra-agency 
concepts for CA as well, and like the national ones, there 
are significant differences among them. Three of the many 
ideas developed in recent years are particularly relevant to 
this discussion. 
The United Nations’ Integrated Missions concept 
refers to a type of mission where there are 
processes, mechanisms and structures in place 
that generate and sustain a common strategic 
objective, as well as a comprehensive opera-
tional approach among the political, security, 
development and human rights sectors and, 
where appropriate, humanitarian UN actors 
at the country level.11 
The European Union’s Civil-Military Coordination 
Concept 
seeks to ensure and guide a Comprehensive 
Approach particularly at the political-stra-
tegic level, ranging from the planning phase 
to execution of a mission. The “Crisis Man-
agement Procedures” as well as the “Crisis 
Management Concept,” which is developed 
individually for each operation, are geared 
towards ensuring that the Comprehensive 
Approach concept is applied in the EU’s crisis 
management activities.12 
Finally, NATO’s Comprehensive Approach
is NATO’s planning blueprint. This is to 
be achieved by expanding its approach for 
military planning to include all civilian and 
military aspects of a NATO engagement. … 
[NATO’s] approach primarily seeks to improve 
the external cooperation with civilian actors 
and other international organizations.13 
Although the very existence of these approaches is a 
significant step forward in international crisis manage-
ment, all of these organizations have a long way to go to 
develop coherent policies that will make the concepts 
work. As of now, all of these approaches “suffer from 
internal, institutional and interagency rivalry,” and even 
more from disagreement and fragmentation among the 
organizations’ member states, which have consistently 
failed to speak with one voice.14 Furthermore, it seems 
that the intra-agency approaches face an “ideological 
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gap between the political/military actors on the one side and humanitarian 
actors on the other.” 15 Although this is a problem for both the UN and the EU, 
it most severely affects NATO and could potentially block the alliance’s efforts 
to bring humanitarian partners on board with CA. Last but not least, the most 
challenging problem for international organizations is to develop a model for 
cooperating among themselves and synchronizing their differing approaches.
Inter-Agency Approaches to CA
The third category of CA concepts, the inter-agency approach, is best described 
as a whole-of-systems approach: 
Instead of seeking coherent and complementary approaches between 
governmental actors or within one organisation, CA, at this level, 
addresses the relationships and structures that exist among and be-
tween the plethora of international and local actors and organisa-
tions engaged in a given context.16 
The inter-agency approach arose from the context of concept development and 
experimentation, such as the Multinational Experiment series. This approach 
addresses “the relationship between actors both at a strategic level as well as 
in the field. The pre-conditions for acting comprehensively in these different 
contexts vary significantly.” 17 Recent crisis management operations have in fact 
tended to expose the lack of a unified strategy, which makes the implementation 
of CA in the field no more than an attempt to coordinate the activities that derive 
from various existing strategies.18 The inter-agency approach has never been 
effectively operationalized because it is inherently complex and “there are only a 
few strategies or suggested working methods that concretise CA at this level.” 19
It seems obvious that despite CA being used so frequently in crisis management, 
there is no universal agreement about what CA entails or even how it should 
be defined. The different CA approaches “exist because they fulfil different 
functions, use different resources and have varying goals and ambitions.” 20 
One common denominator can, however, be identified: CA is a mind-set. “It 
includes recognition of oneself as part of a system and an understanding that 
effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability can be achieved if the interdepen-
dencies that exist within this system are responsibly managed.” 21 There have 
been numerous attempts to concretize and implement CA, which usually have 
“resulted in the establishment of structures and processes for coordination and 
collaboration. How these structures or processes are outlined depends on the 
nature of each system and what possibility there is to direct and coordinate the 
system.” 22 
As long as CA is used as a highly conceptual, singular term, without understanding 
“how the various interpretations vary and what effect each of them has on how 
CA should be implemented, assessed and prepared for,” the approach will never 
be a blueprint for effective crisis managment.23 A number of questions need to 
be answered. How will the dependencies (e.g., resources and action timelines) be 
managed? What incentives are needed to ensure coordination and cooperation? 
How will the harmonization of actions and goals occur? How will key leaders be 
trained? How do participants ensure that the necessary capabilities are devel-
oped? Until everyone agrees on the answers, CA will not be a silver bullet for 
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crisis management, but only a myth like the Loch Ness monster: lots of people 
talk about Nessie, some may even believe it exists, but no one has ever been able 
to prove its existence beyond a doubt. v
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Dr. David Kilcullen, Caerus Global Solutions Interviewed by Dr. Doug Borer,  US Naval Postgraduate School
This interview is taken from the collection of the Combating 
Terrorism Archive Project (CTAP).1 On 13 August 2015, Dr. Doug Borer sat down 
with counterinsurgency expert Dr. David Kilcullen to talk about current trends 
in counterinsurgency planning and operations, and the fight against ISIS.2 Dr. 
Kilcullen’s books include The Accidental Guerrilla (2009), Counterinsurgency 
(2010), and Out of the Mountains (2013).3
DOUG BORER: Dave, I would first like to address your own experience as 
someone at the center of counterinsurgency, in theory and in practice, over the 
last decade or so. What are the greatest improvements you have seen in that time, 
in terms of both the conceptual thinking and practice of counterinsurgency?
DAVID KILCULLEN: That’s a great question. These days we have an incredibly 
high degree of both familiarity and competence on the part of US military 
combat units operating in a real warfare environment that really didn’t exist 15 
years ago. I would put US forces today up against any force on the planet in the 
last 100 years in terms of their ability to conduct this kind of unconventional 
warfare operation. We have also seen vast improvements in US capabilities. 
There are capabilities available to your average line infantry battalion or artillery 
battalion today that only existed in Special Operations Command back in 2001. 
Capabilities that only existed in Hollywood in 2001 are now regularly applied by 
high-end, tier-one special mission units. 
While the military’s conceptual understanding of counterinsurgency has 
dramatically improved, however, the United States, as a nation, has failed to 
close the gap between military success on the ground and a range of political 
reconciliation, stabilization, and economic development issues. The military has 
repeatedly created the conditions to achieve a political outcome, only to watch 
political organizations fail to follow through. That’s not to shift blame from 
the military to somebody else; it’s just to say that the improvements in military 
capability haven’t necessarily been matched by improvements on the civilian side 
of government. 
BORER: When you served as an advisor to coalition forces and saw these capa-
bilities shift over time, where did you see the line of friction between providing 
security and order in these environments, and actually developing the local 
institutions of governance in, say, Iraq or Afghanistan?
KILCULLEN: I would argue that this issue is partly why we have seen, at best, 
a mixed outcome in both countries. If you put military guys—who have their 
own people out in harm’s way—in charge of the overall mission, then of course 
you are going to find that force protection becomes a high priority. There is a 
negative element of force protection, which is bunkers and blast walls and so on. 
But there is also a positive element of force protection, which is getting out and 
destroying the enemy before it can close in and destroy you. Either way, you end 
up with a fairly heavy emphasis on kinetics and on the intelligence side, what I 
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would call “force protection risk,” as distinct from mission risk. In other words, 
the distinction is between things that can hurt the force and things that can 
undermine the success of the mission. You tend to find yourself committed to 
a structure of dependency, where the local actors depend on your presence. You 
create a safe environment, and you improve the situation to a dramatically better 
level than the locals can, because you have all these resources. At that point, it 
becomes really difficult to let go and allow failure. 
One of the Afghans I engaged with in 2009 said it best. He said, “Look, there 
is no question that if the US military fights the Taliban, the US military is going 
to win. That’s not the issue now. The issue is, what about the Afghan military? 
How do we get the Afghan military to the point where it can win, initially with 
support from the US military, but then subsequently without them?” So, the 
outcome of each individual combat engagement eventually turns out to be less 
important than institution-building. The trick is to recognize that tipping point. 
When is it no longer crucial to win every engagement, but crucial to get the 
locals themselves out on the ground? The other question is, how do you get the 
people who have been responsible for stabilization up to this point to say, “We 
have made things really good. Now we’re going to let the situation go back to the 
way it was temporarily, because that’s the path we have to take to get the locals 
up to speed”? That’s tough. 
Iraq is a good example. We went in with three objectives that were actually 
incompatible: we wanted to democratize, we wanted to stabilize, and we 
wanted to create a new economy. The dictatorship was a completely state-based 
economy. The problem was, back in 2005–2006, we democratized before the 
country was stable, and then we surrendered control over the new leadership to 
the Iraqi people. But too many Iraqis had no intention of working with those 
leaders to achieve a stable outcome. You have to think about sequencing those 
different objectives carefully, because you are always going to have objectives that 
are incompatible and parameters that are hard to optimize. It’s a classic design 
problem, and there is no getting around it. I think our big mistake in Iraq, and 
to some extent, Afghanistan, was to surrender control over a lot of the tasks that 
needed to be done to keep the country stable before stability had really been 
reached, in the name of democracy. It is extraordinarily hard to get that control 
back. Then, in fact, we never did. 
BORER: Do you think it’s possible for a Western country to get involved in these 
types of conflicts without projecting itself as the role model—as in, “You have to 
become a democracy if we are involved”?
KILCULLEN: I do think it’s possible. There are even a few historical cases, like the 
British in Amman, Jordan, in the 1960s and 1970s, or possibly El Salvador, where 
the United States has only a light footprint. The influence is more indirect, with 
the implication that the local government is in charge of its own destiny and we 
are just there to help it execute that. But as soon as you have a US general officer 
and a satellite dish on the ground, things change. Somebody starts talking back 
to Washington, and people’s careers begin to build up around a certain outcome. 
The fundamental role of the embassy shifts significantly, and it becomes very 
difficult to avoid a kind of commitment trap where you want it more than they 
want it. And then it’s impossible for you to disengage because you end up doing 
all of the hard work. 
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Looking at our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, I 
think it’s a bit of a cop-out to say that stabilization and 
democratization didn’t go well because Western countries 
just can’t do this. Maybe they can but just didn’t do a good 
job. Right? I don’t think we know the answer to that yet. 
I would argue that neither Iraq nor Afghanistan is a fair 
test of concepts if you didn’t plan to execute the concepts 
in the first place. I have had this discussion with people 
around counterinsurgency theory. There are many great 
critiques of counterinsurgency theory, but it’s not a fair 
critique to say, “It didn’t go well in Afghanistan, so that 
proves counterinsurgency doesn’t work.” It would be like 
treating someone who is sick with half the recommended 
dosage of antibiotics and then saying the drug doesn’t 
work. You didn’t follow the plan. I think that’s the case 
in Afghanistan. We did the job halfway and then let the 
Afghans handle it. Whether counterinsurgency works is an 
unanswered question, in my view, but this particular case is 
not a definitive answer to that question.
BORER: But will this be a case 
of history repeating itself ? For 
instance, after Vietnam, the US 
military wanted to avoid these 
types of wars. But we just keep 
reinventing the same old coun-
terinsurgency wheel, because the 
organizational construct goes back 
to what it does best—which is 
breaking things.
KILCULLEN: Yes. You mentioned 
the way bureaucracy operates. 
There are institutional pathways 
within the US government that 
mean we always do things a certain 
way. And while the Balkans are not like Iraq, and Iraq 
is not like Afghanistan, Americans are still who we are, 
so in each of those cases, at least half the equation is the 
same. There is certainly a tendency within the armed 
forces, at the political level, to say we want to avoid ever 
getting into a counterinsurgency environment again, and 
we want to avoid ever again having to do what we did in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. People are shying away from a lot 
of lessons learned. I think that’s a very understandable 
human reaction, but it’s not necessarily the best pathway 
to a better outcome next time. There are painful lessons 
that we really need to understand. It’s as wrong to say Iraq 
and Afghanistan prove that counterinsurgency works as it 
is to say those conflicts prove counterinsurgency can never 
work. We’re paid to be smarter than that. Until we figure 
out what actually happened on the ground, it’s going to be 
hard to come to any kind of judgments.
The issue, of course, is also obscured by politics, with 
Democrats blaming Bush for invading Iraq in the first 
place and Republicans blaming Obama for leaving Iraq 
and allowing ISIS to return. A similar discussion is now 
brewing around Afghanistan. I think it behooves those of 
us who are professionals to set aside all the political bullshit, 
for lack of a better term, and really look at the facts.
BORER: There is a presumption that small countries can 
reproduce what the United States is doing. Do you have 
any thoughts on that, based on your experience in the 
Western coalition?
KILCULLEN: I think it’s a classic error to believe that our 
capabilities can be replicated by a partner or by certain 
members of our coalition. One example you see is people 
copying drones and trying to field their own drone 
programs because that is what they think they should be 
doing. People also try to copy and replicate the time- 
sensitive targeting cycle. It’s a lot like saying, “I want to 
be a high-end cardiac-thoracic 
surgeon in an operating theater” 
when, in reality, you are a bush 
doctor in a village somewhere. 
Without the right resources, you 
are worse than useless, because 
you’ve structured yourself around 
the expectation that you’ll have 
certain information at certain 
periods, certain communications 
tools, and certain reaction mecha-
nisms that you may not actually 
have. I think there is a real danger 
in trying to copy something that 
seems sexy and useful without any 
real ability to accomplish it. 
That said, I think that we have often also failed by ne-
glecting to look at what is working on the ground and then 
creating something similar but not exactly the same—
something designed to work in that specific environment. 
A classic example would be village stability operations in 
Afghanistan. Initially, it was about helping the Afghans, 
who already knew how to fight, determine ways to build 
legitimate, local-level political authorities so they could 
attack the Taliban from a political and governmental 
standpoint. Within six months, it became the formation 
of local Afghan militias to fight the Taliban. In other 
words, we went from something that was fundamentally an 
armed propaganda and political agitation activity designed 
to help local populations organize local governance, to 
putting an SF team on the ground to deal with infiltration. 
This is a typical pathway, where you take something that 
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is small and works, and then rapidly pump it up into something much bigger to 
replicate that success. And then you find that there was something magical about 
the way it was done originally that just doesn’t survive the transition to a large 
project—and it all falls apart. That’s the tragedy of a lot of what we do. We go in 
and pump money into something that works, just to watch it break.
The counterexample, which I think is a positive one, is what we have seen in 
Colombia. The Colombians have really gained ownership and taken control of 
what is going on there, and they have designed a series of equipment solutions 
and procedural solutions that work for them. They have listened to our advice, 
they have thought about it, and then in many cases respectfully said, “That’s 
great, but we are going to do it another way instead.” The result is a set of locally 
appropriate technologies that suit their needs and are, by definition, affordable 
and legitimate. It’s not a matter of Americans coming in and trying to apply a 
template of something that works for us in a radically different environment. The 
Philippines is another example where it has worked, but the Balikatan exercise 
structure is fairly unique to the Philippines.4 And in the case of Colombia, there 
is a remarkable pool of talent on the Colombian side. The human capital is 
dramatically better than what we saw in Iraq or Afghanistan, where people have 
come out of 30 years of war and 40 years of dictatorship, and naturally need a 
period of recovery before they can get back on their feet. 











THE BEST WAY 
TO ACHIEVE 
AN IO GOAL IS 
TO SHOOT THE 
RIGHT PERSON 
IN THE HEAD.
BORER: To an outside observer, it might seem that insurgents put far more 
emphasis on information operations [IO] than counterinsurgency operators do. 
Can you speak to the importance of information operations in both insurgency 
and counterinsurgency strategies?
KILCULLEN: The answer to that depends on what you mean by information op-
erations. I think insurgents often decide what their information strategy is going 
to be and then structure all their operations—including communications and 
kinetic operations—around achieving that particular goal. The classic example 
would be the Taliban in 2006 and 2007, when you saw a Taliban commander 
on Al Jazeera doing interviews. One of the things he did was issue general 
information directives, and then local commanders would design operations to 
support that message. In other words, they decided on the message first and then 
planned the operation to support it. We take the opposite approach, designing 
the operation first and then deciding how to sell it. This becomes the IO plan. 
IO is literally an afterthought for US operators. For the Taliban, if that statement 
the commander made on Al Jazeera was an operations order, the order itself 
would be the IO plan, and all of the supporting appendices would be the physical 
operations that were carried out to fulfill the plan. So the insurgents completely 
flip the way that they approach IO and kinetic operations.
This strategy was short-lived in the case of the Taliban. After their spokesman 
[Taliban commander Dadullah] Akhund was killed, they adopted a completely 
new and less effective model. So that is my other point: sometimes the best way 
to achieve an IO goal is to shoot the right person in the head. Sometimes it’s a 
kinetic action that is going to have the IO impact you were hoping for. It may be 
that your strongest messaging is not leaflet drops and radio and the internet, but 
just removing a key player from the battlefield. There are plenty of examples of 
this effect in Iraq and Afghanistan, where enemy activity in a given sector drops 
off to zero. And it’s not because of any particular change in ideology but just 
because you managed to wipe out the right guy. 
Some research shows that whether a population supports a particular group 
ideologically or subjectively has very little to do with the degree of cooperation 
with that group. It’s much more about who is creating a set of rules and sanctions 
that make the population feel safe by bringing predictability to their lives. I 
argue in one of my books that you can characterize that as “competitive control.” 
Hearts and minds, at least insofar as getting people to like you, are much, much 
less important than we like to think. Behavioral change tends to follow incen-
tives that you correct through a normative system. Some of those are through 
communication, but a vast majority of them are administrative. 
BORER: Maybe you can come back around to that again as it relates to ISIS. In 
your recent article, “Blood Year,” you describe ISIS as a state-building enterprise, 
but you stop short of calling it a state.5 Yet you seem to be uncomfortable with 
Audrey Cronin’s calling it a pseudo-state.6 Have your thoughts evolved since you 
published that article?
KILCULLEN: Yes, they have, and I am in the middle of turning that article into 
a full-length book. The environment has dramatically evolved since I finished 
writing that article. The United States is a signatory to the 1933 Monte-
video convention, which says that there are four criteria an entity must 
meet to be considered a state in international law.7 First, you have to have 
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a territory—a permanent territory that you control. 
Second, you have to have a stable population within that 
territory; it can’t be nomadic or transient. Third, you 
have to have a government that claims authority over 
that population. And fourth, you have to be capable 
of contributing to relationships with other states. The 
convention says explicitly that you don’t actually have to 
be recognized by other states to have relationships; you 
just have to be able to participate in relationships. 
If we apply those four criteria to ISIS, we can see that it 
controls territory—it’s about the size of Israel, or even a 
little larger now. It also controls a permanent population 
about the size of Norway’s. ISIS has its own economy, with 
roughly $600 million in revenue per year. And while that 
is small for a state, it’s large by terrorist standards—bigger 
than almost any other insurgent group in history. So it has 
an economy. Third, it has a government that exercises a 
degree of control over the popula-
tion. We may not like that govern-
ment or agree with its methods or 
even consider it to be effective, but 
it is a government. And finally, ISIS 
sells electricity and water to the 
Syrian government, and it trades 
oil on the black market, and it has 
the ability to enter into interna-
tional relations. 
So I disagree with Dr. Cronin, 
but only because she calls ISIS a 
pseudo-state—which technically 
means a fake state, like it’s pre-
tending to be a state when it’s not. 
I think it is a para-state—that it’s almost there. It’s on the 
verge of meeting, or is already meeting, all four of those 
key criteria. 
This is not to suggest that we should recognize ISIS as 
a state. I think that would be a significant mistake. For 
example, people who challenged Australia to support ISIS 
are subject to be charged under what’s called the Foreign 
Recruitment Act of 1977. But if you support a state and 
travel to join the armed forces of that state, you have a 
defense under that act. As soon as we declare ISIS a state, 
those people who support ISIS can defend their actions 
under that act. 
So, on the one hand, there are good legal and political 
reasons not to call ISIS a state. But on the other hand, 
we do need to treat it as a state-like entity for targeting 
purposes. This is not a counterinsurgency environment; 
ISIS is not an insurgency. There is actually no danger that 
we will be sucked back into a counterinsurgency, because 
it’s not an insurgency. ISIS is running a conventional fight, 
controlling cities. It’s a state—a state-like entity. Yes, it’s 
a revolutionary state that is trying to overthrow the state 
system, but that’s not unique to history. The Soviet Union 
before 1924, or China after 1949, or the Islamic Republic 
of Iran after 1979—these are all now states, part of the 
international state system, but all of them started off 
with the goal of overthrowing the entire system and then 
creating something better. It’s unlikely, but not impossible, 
that ISIS will follow a similar path. 
BORER: In the article, you also note that there is a lack 
of political will today to treat the conflict with ISIS as a 
state, or state-like, fight. Under what conditions could you 
foresee a change in that attitude?
KILCULLEN: That, to me, is the 
most important critique of what I 
write in “Blood Year.” Dr. Cronin’s 
critique—and it might be true—is 
that there’s no way at this point 
that the current US administra-
tion or the American people will 
support a full-scale, conventional 
fight against ISIS. I think she 
might be right about that.
We’ve seen two major changes in 
just the last month, and we have 
yet to learn the outcome or the 
impact of those changes. One of 
them is Turkey’s entry into the 
war, which has not only significantly increased the pain 
ISIS is suffering but also brought the Turks into direct 
conflict with some of the Kurds who are fighting most 
effectively. The other is the Iran nuclear deal. And while 
personally I’m not convinced that the deal will prevent 
Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon in the long term, I 
do think it may create the basis for some form of collabo-
ration between Iran and the United States for stabilizing 
both Iraq and Syria. That may have been the real geopo-
litical reasoning behind the administration’s push for the 
deal. Frankly, I am not confident that it will work, because 
it would severely alienate—and already has alienated—the 
vast majority of our allies in the region. We need to ask 
ourselves, “What am I trading here, and am I getting 
more than I’m giving away by pissing off the Israelis and 
the Saudis and everybody else for the sake of getting the 
Iranians on board?” 
ISIS IS NOT AN 
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It might come down to Syria. I don’t think there is any hope that we can stabilize 
Iraq or solve its problems until we reach some kind of resolution in the Syrian 
civil war. We are not going to get a political resolution until we can convince the 
majority of armed actors that they are better off negotiating than continuing to 
fight. That’s the military role: to do enough damage—much like in Kosovo—to 
the Syrian Arab Republic, to ISIS, and to others, to convince them that the better 
option is negotiation. I will also repeat something I have heard a lot from Syrian 
peace activists in the last six months, which is that ISIS needs to go, Assad needs 
to go, but the regime needs to stay. We need some kind of framework to allow 
for a long-term political resolution. This is where the Iranian nuclear deal and 
other factors may start to lay the foundation for a collaborative approach. Until 
we do that, we can beat back ISIS forever in Iraq, but it’s not going to make a 
long-term difference. 
BORER: Going back to The Accidental Guerrilla, which seems to have launched 
your public career, do you think that term—the “accidental guerrilla”—and the 
concepts embedded in the book could help us understand the phenomenon of 
the lone-wolf terrorist?
KILCULLEN: Yes, I do. Let me say up front, though, that I think the idea of an 
accidental guerilla is, at some level, an easy insight. Obviously, when you send a 
large expeditionary force into somebody’s home turf, you are going to piss off a 
lot of people, and some of those people are going to take up arms against you. 
The point I was trying to make in The Accidental Guerrilla is that “radical” is not 
the start of any insurgent group’s life cycle. They tend to emerge on the side of 
law and order, clean government, or identity. They gain a lot of support initially. 
And then they outlive their welcome, and they radically piss everybody off, 
and that’s when you start to see the rise of internal opposition. What we did in 
many cases—Iraq and Afghanistan are both good examples—was intervene in 
the middle of that life cycle and then turn everybody against us when, in fact, 
those groups were already losing a lot of support. If we had gone about it in a 
different way, we may have been able to accelerate the cycle and watch them get 
kicked out on their ear without having to intervene. That’s a great answer, and an 
argument for what we should have done after 9/11, though nobody involved at 
the time would have adopted that point of view. 
Of course, it’s arrogant to say in hindsight, “Oh, that’s what we should have 
done.” But you can apply the same idea to the lone-wolf terrorist phenomenon. 
An analogy I use in the book is this: Imagine that a criminal gang moves into 
your neighborhood and starts robbing the rich people’s houses on the other side 
of town. If the police come in and start demolishing houses in your neighbor-
hood and running checkpoints to find the bad guys, that will just turn everybody 
in the neighborhood against the police. That’s the accidental guerilla syndrome. 
And it has actually happened to a lot of people in Muslim-minority communi-
ties in the West since 9/11. 
In my view, there are three really negative dynamics from what Western coun-
tries have done. One is that exact phenomenon, the accidental guerrilla. Guys 
from Manchester start bombing in London, and suddenly there is this massive 
security crackdown on a bunch of young blokes in Manchester and the Mid-
lands. And soon you end up with another crop of guys who are thinking differ-
ently about the British state. 
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The second outcome is within the Muslim communities in our own societies—
the United States, Australia, France, Britain—after 9/11. These Muslim commu-
nities established their own contact groups of notables and elders, and the idea 
was that the government would engage with them and run policies by them so 
that these communities could police themselves with their own internal security 
systems. What it actually did, though, was move older, mostly male, religiously 
and socially conservative elders to the top of the community hierarchy, to act as 
middlemen for groups of young people who were already pissed off. In essence, 
it further alienated members of those communities who were already alienated. 
Now, not only were they feeling disenfranchised and alienated from the parent 
society, but they also felt cut off from their own society. This is the case particu-
larly with women who join the Islamic State—a kind of double disenfranchise-
ment. It’s ironic but true that, in some ways, a young woman is going to win 
more respect in ISIS than in the Pakistani community in London. 
The third issue, along those same lines, is young people. We are seeing a young 
crowd of people joining ISIS. These recruits are war-on-terror natives; they have 
grown up in a post-9/11 environment that is, in our view, a temporary aberration 
but for them is the norm. And their reaction to this “new normal” is a feeling 
of disenfranchisement and a desire to take action of their own. I think this is a 
key consideration regarding where the accidental guerilla syndrome has come 
home to roost domestically since 9/11. Other examples fall under the category 
of what French philosopher Michel Foucault called “boomerang effects,” where 
you manage a colony overseas a certain way and then turn around and apply the 
same kinds of techniques to the domestic population. I think we are seeing this 
already with things like domestic surveillance. Certainly the disenfranchisement 
and alienation of Muslim communities in the West is a great example of the 
accidental guerilla syndrome as well. 
BORER: When you look back at history, is there any period—the Thirty Years’ 
War, for example—from which we can draw parallels that might help us make 
sense of what is going on today?
KILCULLEN: You mentioned the Thirty Years’ War in Europe. The former prime 
minister of Iraq made that comparison more than once. What he is talking about 
is the emergence of a region-wide Sunni-Shi’a proxy conflict in the Middle East. 
One of the key lessons there is to realize the West’s limited potential to influence 
the situation. If this is another Thirty Years’ War, then within that analogy the 
United States probably plays the same role as the Ottoman Empire. Imagine if 
the Ottoman sultan had tried to make peace in the middle of the Thirty Years’ 
War. It would never have happened, right? In fact, many of the European state 
systems involved eventually unified in opposition to perceived threats from the 
East, from the sultan. In some ways, the West creates a unifying effect, but it’s 
a unification by opposition to other people. As soon as we try to influence the 
situation or play the role of mediator, we run up against the fairly sharp limits of 
what we can do. 
Another example is one we touched on earlier while discussing Audrey Cronin. 
She wrote a really useful paper, almost 10 years ago now, about what she called 
the electronic levée en masse.8 She was looking at the period immediately fol-
lowing the French Revolution, when this massive explosion of printing tech-
nology, literacy, and the ability to build bridges between people with the written 
word led to significant shifts in the patterns of warfare. You went from small, 










professional armies that fought for a per-
sonal sovereign for a defined number of 
months per year in accordance with very 
specific rules to recruiting these mass 
armies motivated by public propaganda 
issued through print communications. 
What we are seeing now is, I think, the 
effect of a massive explosion in elec-
tronic connectivity, particularly in the 
developing world, since the year 2000. 
My go-to quote is that, in the year 2000, 
there were 30,000 phones in the whole 
country of Nigeria. Today there are 113 
million. That’s a 280,000 percent increase 
in just over a decade. And we are seeing 
similar rates of increase in many of the 
countries affected by the Arab Spring, in 
Eastern Europe, in sub-Saharan Africa, 
and in Latin America. The result is a 
radical shift in the information environ-
ment, and in the ability of non-state 
actors to organize action, transmit 
messages, and share information. 
Dr. Cronin wrote that paper well before 
most of this happened, so it’s very 
prescient in that respect. The nine years 
since that paper came out have reinforced 
her point: What is new about the 
current operation environment is not the 
weaponry, and it’s not the tactics, and it’s 
not the types of actors. It’s the oppo-
nent’s ability to communicate and share 
information and organize in near-real 
time, enabled by this massive explosion 
of connectivity. That’s something we 
want to think about carefully when 
considering where our capabilities need 
to go next.
BORER: I usually like to end with the 
“king for the day” question. If we could 
make you king for the day—if you were 
the next US president, and you had the 
ability to bypass Congress and do one 
important thing for US national security, 
what would you do?
KILCULLEN: Wow, that’s a great ques-
tion. This is going to sound weird, but I 
think the solution to many of our mili-
tary problems over the last 15 years lies 
Hundreds of thousands of Bahrainis taking part in march of loyalty to martyrs
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in a complete restructuring and revamping of civilian capability. We often leave 
the military hanging by asking them to do something that is not their job, that 
is actually the job of another agency, only to find that that agency just doesn’t 
have the capacity, or the capability, or the political willingness to go out on the 
ground and do it. I would focus most of my efforts during my one day, then, on 
enabling civil agencies in the US government to partner effectively with military 
forces on the ground. There are lots of factors involved, but most important is 
making people understand that it’s not acceptable to just leave everything to 
the military. There is a whole-of-nation requirement here, and if you are unable 
to execute your side of the operation, you will continually put the military in 
an unwinnable situation. It will only be able to achieve its goals halfway and 
then fail to close the gap to the desired political outcome. This is a big lesson for 
us from the last 15 years. But the very fact that you have to frame the question 
hypothetically means that it will never happen, right? So, knowing this, we have 
to think about what we should do next, and when.
BORER: On behalf of the school and the Department of Defense Analysis, I 
want to thank you for this interview.  v
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American Force: Dangers, Delusions,  
and Dilemmas in National Security
Reviewed by MAJ Bradley J. Krauss, 
US Army
A lengthy absence from the academic world can make return-
ing to graduate school an intimidating proposition. Those of us who have been 
military practitioners more than theorizers over the past decade have found 
it necessary to push aside introspective thought in favor of preparing for the 
current or next challenge. When the time finally comes to make the leap back 
into academia and expand our minds’ ability to think critically about the 
world, we inevitably face some start-up costs: recalling and dusting off long-
forgotten theories, catching up on domestic and international events and their 
consequences, recalling the lessons of history that apply to current realities, and 
thinking critically about where we stand as citizens and professionals. If I could 
recommend one book to a friend who is preparing to embark on a graduate-level 
study of national security in general or defense analysis in particular, Richard K. 
Betts’s American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security 
would be that book.1 
This collection of essays, some not previously published and others recently 
revised, focuses on the United States’ role as the sole post–Cold War superpower 
and the current threats to its continued peace and security. Betts’s dedication of 
the book to a young Army officer killed in Iraq at the height of the surge in 2007 
may initially lead the reader to think that American Force is an overall condem-
nation of American interventionism and militarism, typified by the second 
invasion of Iraq in 2003. This assumption would be only partly true. While Betts 
is highly critical of the invasion of Iraq under false pretenses, he does not oppose 
the general principle of using military force to achieve political objectives. He 
does favor using the military decisively in circumstances where it can genuinely 
further US national interests. Betts also notes that not every adversity requires 
military force and not every upheaval is truly a threat. In sum, American Force 
seeks to both define the national security landscape and lay out options for those 
charged with maintaining it.
In “Part I: The Post–Cold War Hiatus,” Betts describes how the United 
States effectively built the NATO alliance as an extension of American power 
and influence to deal with the Soviet Union. This strategy proved effective: it 
brought about the USSR’s collapse, ended the Cold War, and ushered in an era of 
US unipolarity. With the end of the persistent threat of large-scale nuclear war, 
the United States no longer feared a debilitating attack from a single near-peer 
competitor but began to suffer unexpected lesser pinpricks from smaller devel-
oping states and non-state actors. No longer hindered by the need to confront 
communism and the Soviets at every turn, the United States was free to inter-
vene wherever it saw fit. What US leaders must do more effectively, Betts argues, 
is first determine the criteria for intervening militarily and once the decision 
to intervene is made, fully commit to resolving the crisis—and avoid jumping 
only halfway across the ditch.2 Additionally, while the threat from weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) is still very real, today we expect them to arrive under 
the radar, in the hands of a rogue actor instead of atop a state’s intercontinental 
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ballistic missiles. Betts contends, however, that the United 
States still relies too heavily on using its nuclear capability 
to deter states; those actors most likely to use WMD 
do not have a return address against which states can 
retaliate.
“Part II:  History Strikes Back” tackles the difficulties 
and challenges facing the United States in the post-9/11 
world: terrorism, military interventions ranging in scale 
from covert action to outright war, China’s rise, and 
Russia’s resurgence. In most cases, Betts notes, terrorism 
offers a high psychological impact compared to the 
relatively minor physical damage it imparts, and so will 
remain a popular tool for those who oppose the United 
States’ global primacy but are ill-equipped to match its 
military might. For those instances 
in which the United States does 
consider confronting an identifi-
able opponent with force, Betts 
argues that the US military must 
maintain a minimum spectrum 
of capabilities, from deterrence to 
counterinsurgency to conventional 
superiority. This will ensure that 
the US effort will be both effective 
(the policy objectives are achieved) 
and efficient (success comes at the 
lowest possible cost in blood and 
treasure). Despite the fact that 
neither China nor Russia can rival 
raw US military power and profes-
sionalism, China’s continued rise as 
a regional hegemon in the western 
Pacific and Russia’s attempt to 
reassert power against NATO 
represent the only true threats to 
unipolarity. Betts advises that both should be countered 
through either a multilateral approach, the reassertion of 
Western hegemony, or a balance of power. He underlines 
this entire discussion on the use of force with an argument 
that the preemptive use of force has validity in interna-
tional law, while wars of prevention are in essence acts of 
unprovoked aggression.3 In the twenty-first century, one 
of the more tempting preventive measures is air strikes. 
Betts warns that when weighing the merits of such a strike 
ahead of time, decision makers should consider not only 
what they know the strike might destroy but also what 
might be hidden from them and left intact.4
Finally, in “Part III: Decision and Implementation,” Betts 
questions how accurate Samuel Huntington’s models of 
civil-military relations are today, given the drastic changes 
in the geopolitical environment since The Soldier and the 
State was published in 1957.5 Betts notes that although 
most democracies’ civil-military relations tend to lie 
somewhere between the extremes of outright hostility 
and perfect harmony, the system works as long as senior 
military leaders don’t become political appointees and 
the military and political leaders can openly discuss their 
views with each other. He then seeks to answer the ques-
tion of whether even a well-crafted strategy—a necessary 
preparation for waging war—can tie political objectives 
to military outcomes in a meaningful way. To do so, 
he outlines 10 critiques of how well strategies (and by 
extension, strategists) predict the best way to link policy 
with operations to achieve victory.6 To avoid sounding like 
a pessimist regarding the importance of aspiring to good 
strategy, Betts provides a rebuttal 
to each critique. He concludes that 
for strategy to be effective, the use 
of force should generate signifi-
cantly more benefits than costs; 
strategies should be kept as simple 
as possible; and policy makers 
need a strong understanding of the 
military tools they seek to deploy. 
Before concluding this section, 
Betts takes on a topic that tends to 
be a lightning rod in discussions 
of this nature: defense spending. 
He notes that US defense spending 
today is at about the same level 
it was (adjusted for inflation) 
during the Cold War, even though 
the United States no longer 
faces a near-peer enemy like the 
Soviet Union. The Pentagon, he 
concludes, should focus on emerging threats and avoid 
frivolous spending on individual services’ pet projects or 
the pursuit of new capabilities at the edge of the “realm of 
the possible.” 
Now that I’m in the second quarter of my graduate 
studies, I find that American Force offers an informative 
perspective on many of our class discussions. Betts has 
something valuable to say for anyone who needs to get 
the juices of critical thinking flowing or generate some 
original thought in class. For instance, his discussion of 
the military interventions in Kosovo and Bosnia were 
directly relevant to our studies of peacekeeping opera-
tions in a class called “Joint Military Operations,” and his 
critiques of strategy would have made for lively discus-
sions in the Naval War College’s “Strategy and Warfare” 
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course. Betts’s explorations of nuclear deterrence, China’s rise, just war theory, 
and civil-military relations would be useful background for deterrence studies. 
Finally, the material he covers on “big small wars,” terrorism, cyber warfare, and 
military interventions is centrally relevant to studies of conflict in the informa-
tion age.
One area where Betts could have provided a more in-depth analysis concerns 
US options for dealing with the rise of militant Islam. He gives cursory atten-
tion to radical Islamism within the context of his chapter on “Terrorism” but 
suggests that terrorism is a reaction within the Muslim world to US hegemony 
and the worldwide propagation of Western media, politics, and popular 
culture. In fact, Betts gives fewer than four pages to addressing the root causes 
of violent jihad, and even fewer to evaluating whether terrorism is simply a 
tactic chosen to pursue broader political objectives. He may have done this 
intentionally to avoid getting bogged down in an unsolvable argument over 
motives and intentions. Instead, he emphasizes that because the actual risk of 
becoming a victim of Islamist terrorist violence within the United States is 
so ridiculously low (and will remain low, unless a group like al Qaeda gets its 
hands on WMD), there is little need to waste time and energy worrying about 
solving the underlying issues. He seems to propose that the United States 
should resign itself to the ire of the Muslim world because, on the one hand, 
it won’t back down from its obligations and commitments in the Middle East 
and on the other hand, the prospects that the United States will be able to 
effectively recast itself as a benign force for good in the region are very low. In-
terestingly, one danger that Betts does acknowledge is a future war, not against 
sub-state Islamist actors but “against a coordinated international coalition of 
revolutionary Islamist regimes.” 7 If the rise of ISIS over the past year represents 
the beginning of such a movement, perhaps Betts will reconsider his position 
and entertain the notion that the United States should devote greater energy to 
understanding and addressing the underlying motivations of jihadist violence 
instead of trying to simply bomb these groups into submission.
One other small point of contention I have with American Force is its imprecise 
use of the term “unconventional warfare” (UW). For special warfare practitioners, 
like me, this term has a very specific meaning that involves using an auxiliary, 
underground guerilla force to disrupt, overthrow, or coerce a government. 
American Force first addresses “unconventional warfare” in the introduction 
with the claim that “unconventional, irregular, or asymmetric warfare … takes 
place in the midst of civilian populations and collateral damage is usually ex-
tensive—and it is unconventional warfare that is most common in the unipolar 
world.” 8 UW practitioners would argue that, by our definition, unconventional 
warfare is uncommon, especially from a US perspective. Furthermore, uncon-
ventional warfare itself is not inherently violent, though it can use violence as a 
tactic. In chapter five, Betts refers to Iraq and Afghanistan as “unconventional 
wars” and also claims that “technological substitution for manpower gives 
the modern American military its edge, but it cannot be applied very well 
in unconventional warfare.” 9 I believe the confusion is unintentional and 
that Betts uses “unconventional warfare” interchangeably with “asym-
metric warfare” or even “counterinsurgency” to describe the characteristics of 
a given war, rather than using the professional definition of it as a method for 
waging a specific type of warfare. Only readers like me, with specialized knowl-








truly meant to appeal to the national security practitioner, however, then Betts 
should pay more attention to the precision of his terminology.
In the preface to American Force, Betts worries that readers who are practitioners 
of national security may find American Force glib, arrogant, or inhumane. To the 
contrary, I found his arguments to be insightful, thought provoking, relevant, 
and devoid of partisan rhetoric. American Force is a well-rounded exploration of 
US national security policy and the use of military force that is a must-read, not 
only for experienced and aspiring practitioners but also for the average reader 
who is interested in understanding current US activities abroad. v 
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1  Richard K. Betts, American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and 
Dilemmas in National Security (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2011).
2  Betts, American Force, 12. Betts quotes from Carl Von Clausewitz’s 
famous treatise, On War: “A small jump is easier than a large one, 
but no one on that account, wishing to cross a wide ditch, would 
jump half of it first.” Betts returns to this metaphor several times 
to highlight instances where a military objective is known but the 
commitment to achieving it is half-hearted or incomplete and 
leads only to failure. For the original quote, see Book VIII, chapter 
4 of Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Clausewitz.com, n.d.: http://
www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/BK8ch04.html
3 People are sometimes confused about the difference between 
the terms preemptive war and preventive war. One side starts a 
preemptive war when it receives or perceives a credible, active 
threat of aggression from an opponent and chooses to act first. 
International law upholds the right of a state to preempt an 
imminent attack. A preventive war, by contrast, is launched 
by one side against a perceived opponent with the intention 
to prevent a possible future threat from arising. International 
law does not recognize a right to launch preventive war.
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6 See Betts, American Force, chapter 10: “Plans and Results: Is 
Strategy an Illusion?”
7 Ibid., 286.
8  Ibid., 13.
9  Ibid., 153.




The Hour between Dog and Wolf Reviewed by LT Adam Karagouz, US Navy
The hour between dog and wolf, that is, dusk, when the two can’t 
be distinguished from each other, suggests a lot of other things 
besides the time of day. … The hour in which … every being 
becomes his own shadow, and thus something other than himself. 
The hour of metamorphoses, when people half hope, half fear that 
a dog will become a wolf. The hour that comes down to us from 
at least as far back as the early Middle Ages, when country people 
believed that transformation might happen at any moment. 
 — Jean Genet, Prisoner of Love1
Is there a relationship between the biological processes of the human body and 
our decision-making ability? According to John Coates, author of The Hour be-
tween Dog and Wolf: Risk Taking, Gut Feelings, and the Biology of Boom and Bust, 
the answer is an emphatic yes. Coates, a former derivatives trader turned neurosci-
entist, uses a fictionalized vignette of a Wall Street trading house to highlight the 
drastic changes in body chemistry that humans undergo during stressful events, in 
particular decision making under conditions of uncertainty.2 The vignette reveals 
how corporate cultural incentives blend with the biological stew of chemicals and 
hormones circulating inside the average 20- to 40- year-old male trader to create 
the ideal conditions for irrational exuberance during market upswings and “exces-
sive pessimism” during downticks. Coates refers to the latter condition as “learned 
helplessness,” a state in which the traders feel that they have no control over their 
lives, and exuberance is replaced by withdrawal and depression.
Coates traces Western thought about human behavior back to Aristotle, on 
whom he bestows the title of “first biologist.” 3 According to Coates, Aristotle 
did not draw such a stark mind/body distinction as philosophers who came after 
him—he viewed human beings as holistic systems in which perfect reason was 
impossible to attain due to the nature of emotion. Today, scientists are slowly 
warming up to the holistic approach as they learn more about the role that chemi-
cals in the body play in how humans both perceive reality and make decisions.  
Coates cites research indicating that three situational factors cause a spike in 
cortisol (the hormone associated with stress) in the human body: novelty, 
uncertainty, and uncontrollability.4 The presence of one or more of these factors 
has a marked effect on decision making. With the spike in cortisol comes a 
lowered appetite for risk. Coates highlights advances in sports psychology that 
reveal that training can make it possible to adapt to these stress factors in much 
the same manner that muscles are conditioned by physical exertion.5 Advances in 
our understanding of mind and body can be incorporated into training scenarios 
to improve both performance and resilience. This has interesting implications 
for efforts within the military and law enforcement to develop more resilience 
in their personnel—a process sometimes termed “stress inoculation.” Coates also 
describes the toxic effects of chronic stress on the human body and cutting-edge 
attempts to mitigate it, in particular a method called “mental toughening.” This 
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is a field of inquiry involving physiology, neuroscience, and sports medicine that 
investigates how humans react to novelty.
In another fascinating passage, Coates points to the presence of a “testosterone 
feedback loop” in male primates as a contributing factor to irrational exuberance 
in market performance (a majority of traders are male).6 He describes research 
that shows that the bodies of two competing males experience a surge of testos-
terone in preparation for an imminent conflict. The winner of the contest receives 
an additional spike in the hormone, while the loser’s hormone surge quickly 
dwindles away. This is also known as the “winner effect,” a well-documented 
outcome of perceived victory in some sort of competitive endeavor between male 
primates: the winner gets increased testosterone, the loser increased cortisol. 
Likewise, as male Wall Street traders execute profitable trades, their confidence 
and aggression are heightened by the flush of additional hormones triggered by 
success. In an organizational construct that rewards short-term profits and bold 
action, this is a recipe for disaster.
The main point Coates is making is to warn about the dangers of overconfidence 
and how the biological processes within the human body can foster overcon-
fidence. This observation has concrete applications to the special operations 
world. SOF leaders regularly face decisions about whether to launch an operation 
under suboptimal conditions, for instance, with minimal intelligence or at the 
edge of environmental limitations for a given mobility platform. For example, 
perhaps an assault force learns from tactical questioning while on target that the 
targeted individual is several city blocks away but about to depart the area. The 
ground force commander must quickly weigh many competing variables, such 
as asset and force availability and conditions on the ground, before deciding 
whether to move to another location. Excessive aggression or overconfidence in 
these situations can lead to mission failure, as some have learned the hard way.
In one section, Coates alludes to the benefits of “thermal stress” for increasing 
resilience and mental toughness in human beings. If true, it would seem to 
confirm that there are added and unforeseen benefits to SOF training, with its 
emphasis on arduous environmental conditions. He writes:
One type of toughening [regimen] is especially intriguing, and that 
is exposure to cold weather, even to cold water. Scientists have found 
that rats swimming regularly in cold water develop the capacity to 
mount a quick and powerful arousal, relying on adrenaline more 
than cortisol, and to switch it off just as quickly. When subsequently 
exposed to stressors they are not as prone to learned helplessness. 
Some tentative research has suggested that much the same thing 
occurs in humans. People who are regularly exposed to cold weather 
or who swim in cool water may have undergone an effective tough-
ening [regimen] that has made them more emotionally stable when 
confronted by prolonged stress. It is surmised by some researchers 
that the exercise itself, coupled with acute thermal demands, provides 
these people with an enviable pattern of stress and recovery. Perhaps 
the same effects could result from the Nordic practice of a sauna 
followed by a cold plunge.7
Coates points out that women and older men (roughly defined as over 50) 
are not subject to the same fluctuations of testosterone as young men, and 
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he advocates that such individuals be included in teams that are involved in 
high-risk decision making.8 Men experience a slow decline in testosterone from 
their mid-20s onward, and for this reason become gradually less susceptible to 
its influence. I am reminded of a quote attributed to the ancient Greek philoso-
pher Plato regarding the “passion” of emotions that youth experience (and that 
we now know are caused by hormones such as testosterone):
In particular I may mention Sophocles the poet, who was once 
asked in my presence, How do you feel about love, Sophocles? Are 
you still capable of it? To which he replied, “Hush! If you please: to 
my great delight I have escaped from it, and feel as if I had escaped 
from a frantic and savage master.” I thought then, as I do now, that 
he spoke wisely. For unquestionably old age brings us profound 
repose and freedom from this and other passions.9
Women produce one-tenth the amount of testosterone that a man of similar 
age does and generally take longer than men to make decisions. Women are not 
necessarily more risk-averse, Coates points out; it’s just that their time horizon 
is different.10 He cites a 2001 study that followed thousands of male and female 
traders over a six-year period. The women in the study outperformed the men 
by 1.4 percent, and some researchers point to the fact that they traded their 
accounts with much less frequency than the men. Thus, while the women in 
the study may have taken longer to make decisions, they did take risks and did 
so in a more long-term, strategic manner than the men. Coates asserts that a 
more even balance of men and women working in financial markets “could not 
possibly do any worse than the system we have now” and that the inclusion of 
different types of risk evaluation would create a more stable market.11 Missing 
from Coates’ analysis, however, is the effect of hormones on women—in 
particular how fluctuations in their chemistry and the aging process may alter 
their perceptions and decision making in a manner different from their male 
counterparts.
This finding that the varying biological processes of young men, women, and 
older men can produce different risk evaluations across the groups is a thought-
provoking, hormone-based take on the concept of “groupthink,” in which a 
desire for conformity and group cohesion overrides critical analysis. It also has 
relevance to the current debate regarding the inclusion of women on special 
operations teams. According to Coates, their presence would have a positive 
effect on decision making. The inclusion of women and older men would 
provide a more hormonally balanced team that would be better able to evaluate 
risk versus gain in an ambiguous environment and thus prevent biologically in-
duced groupthink from prevailing. This is a credible argument, and I agree with 
Coates, but improved decision making is only one facet of including women 
in SOF teams. Other aspects of this issue, such as unit cohesion and a myriad of 
second- and third-order effects, remain questions to be answered. Also, how the 
nuances of women’s biology will influence their performance in a SOF setting is 
an area that requires further study and analysis. 
In this thought-provoking book, Coates urges readers to follow the age-old 
adage to “know thyself ” and reminds his readers that an integral part of 
self-knowledge is an understanding of the chemistry swirling inside the body. 
This chemistry has a marked impact on perception, resilience, and importantly, 










conception of the body and mind, rather than conventionally held philosophies 
that separate the two. Finally, Coates recommends having a diversity of ages and 
genders on teams to add stability to high-risk decision-making and temper the 
pull of body chemistry on reason and rationality.  v
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Turn: Washington’s Spies: A History Lesson  
on Irregular Warfare 
Reviewed by Ian C. Rice 
If you are interested in learning about one of the most impor-
tant irregular warfare campaigns in American history, AMC’s American Revolu-
tionary War television series, Turn: Washington’s Spies, is a great place to start.1 
Based on historian Alexander Rose’s book Washington’s Spies: The Story of 
America’s First Spy Ring, Turn combines drama, suspense, and intrigue to bring 
to life the spies of the Culper Ring—relatively unknown yet important and 
audacious actors in early American history.2 For those readers who have more 
than a casual interest in the dynamics of insurgencies and counterinsurgency 
operations, Turn also offers some thought-provoking reminders that population-
centric conflicts may be more similar than they are unique—a consideration that 
merits continued investigation in our modern era of persistent irregular conflict.  
In the year 1776, the British are pressing General George Washington’s army on 
the battlefield, and the Continentals (as the colonial forces were called) need 
more human intelligence if they are going to change the course of the war in 
their favor. Continental officers Major Benjamin Tallmadge (Seth Numrich) 
and Lieutenant Caleb Brewster (Daniel Henshall) devise a scheme to recruit 
Americans to collect information on British military activities near New York 
City. To their surprise, Abraham “Abe” Woodhull ( Jamie Bell), an old child-
hood friend from their hometown village of Setauket on Long Island, is their 
first—albeit reluctant—recruit. After Abe is arrested for smuggling cabbage 
across the Long Island Sound to British-held New York, Ben and Caleb soon 
convince him that spying for the American cause is preferable to jail. And so, 
with the help of another childhood friend, Mrs. Anna Strong (Heather Lind), 
Abe begins collecting intelligence for Washington’s army. As Rose describes it, 
colonial Setauket was a typical small community where “everyone knows each 
other.” 3 Thus, establishing a spy ring in such a community required confidence 
in one’s close associates as well as knowledge of who might reveal the spies to the 
occupying British. For Abraham Woodhull and the Culper Ring, operations on 
Long Island were even more challenging because the area was well behind British 
lines and traditionally had a strong loyalist support base.4 
Though Abraham and Anna, as the rebellion’s operatives in Setauket, are the 
focal characters of the series, Turn also showcases many of the other historical 
figures who play prominent parts in Rose’s book. Most notably, General George 
Washington (Ian Kahn), Major General Benedict Arnold (Owain Yeoman), 
Major John André ( JJ Feild), and Major Robert Rogers (Angus Macfadyen) 
follow plotlines that build on their large roles in American history. This ad-
ditional character development helps breathe some life into these legendary 
figures, who are often remembered only for their most famous deeds (or in some 
cases, their infamous misdeeds).  
Although Turn offers interesting glimpses of eighteenth-century American life, 
including realistic-looking costumes, some creative use of blue-screen backdrops, 
and of course, many scenes filmed in the beautifully preserved town of Colonial 
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Williamsburg, Virginia, the plot is slow to develop, especially for a television 
spy series. This slow build-up of characters and plot follows Rose’s account, 
however, and should be expected from a historically-based spy story. An 
actual covert spy ring needs significant time to build itself and develop 
channels for collecting useful information, all while staying hidden. To 
prevent the story of the Culper Ring from being boring television, therefore, 
Turn’s writers have predictably spiced up the characters and added some 
additional plotlines, just as they might for any television crime or spy drama. 
Turn has three love stories—and two of these are even love triangles! These 
side plots are endowed with enough colorful and suggestive content to keep 
cable viewers entertained. Across the first two seasons, the challenge for Turn 
seems to be how to skillfully interweave the main plotline of the Culper 
Ring’s spying exploits and the overall history of the war with the numerous 
interpersonal dramas so that viewers stay engaged.  
Is Turn historically accurate? Not exactly. But while Turn’s writers have 
not kept the plot historically pristine, Rose’s historical account provides 
the inspiration for the series. For instance, some episodes deviate from the 
chronological order of certain historical events to help build the subplots 
and support character development. In one case, the central agent of the 
Culper Ring, Abraham, is credited with reporting to General Washington 
on the Hessian garrison in Trenton. This report then becomes the catalyst for 
Washington’s famed surprise attack on that mercenary force on 26 December 
1776.5 In reality, Woodhull was not recruited as an agent until the spring 
of 1778, well after this important American victory.6 There are other minor 
inaccuracies scattered throughout the episodes, but they do not detract from 
the overall storyline, and they add some interesting color to a television series 
that is trying to distill a large amount of historical material into an already 
short season of 10 one-hour episodes. Thus, Turn may not be the best source 
for studying the American Revolutionary War, but it is a great starting point 
for those who are interested in investigating the real history behind this 
television series.  
Though Turn takes creative license with some historical details of the 
American Revolutionary War, the series writers have done their homework 
when it comes to depicting irregular warfare. The first two seasons sustain 
recurring themes that remind us that, regardless of the time and location, 
population-centric conflicts are often similar. The first theme, which runs 
through season one, can best be described as “The Battle for Setauket,” in 
which the tiny British garrison struggles to keep the favor of the Setauket 
residents. Unfortunately for the soldiers, the British command manages to 
anger the people of Setauket through a series of arrogant missteps intended 
to improve the garrison’s fortifications. Prior to this, many of the towns-
people appeared tolerant, if not supportive, of the British garrison, but the 
soldiers’ disrespectful treatment of the elders and traditions of the town 
turns American opinion from tacit support to overt antagonism. This kind 
of situation is not unique to eighteenth-century Setauket, but has played 
out in countless other villages with many different occupiers, whether in 
Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Northern Ireland, or Vietnam, to name only a few 
examples. In irregular conflicts, the population remains the decisive terrain 
to win. The arrogant choices of the British garrison in Setauket lost it the 
small foothold it had among the people.
















































































Turn’s writers have also nicely crafted a conflict between the British garrison 
commander, Major Edmund Hewlett (Burn Gorman), and his aggressive 
subordinate, Captain John Graves Simcoe (Samuel Roukin). To the casual 
viewer, this is just a classic conflict of supervisor versus conniving subor-
dinate. As the two men struggle for power, their disagreements over style 
and demeanor become more clear. Anyone who studies irregular warfare, 
however, will recognize that at the core of this interpersonal rivalry are quite 
different understandings of how to best ensure that Setauket and its people 
stay under the heel of British authority. On one side stands Hewlett, who 
relies on his intellect and legal authority as the town’s military government 
representative to maintain order. Although Hewlett is portrayed as an overly 
educated, quirky, and paranoid military commander, he is convinced that the 
best way to “tame” the colony is by “winning hearts and minds” in Setauket. 
With their invocation of this Vietnam-era cliché, Turn’s writers have typecast 
Hewlett as a strategist who prefers counterrevolutionary methods that do 
not immediately require the use of military force. 
Juxtaposed to Hewlett, Captain Simcoe is temperamentally imposing and 
physically intimidating—clearly a leader you want on your side in a fight. 
Simcoe sees himself as a loyal subject of the British Crown and as such, 
empowered to use all means necessary, especially brutal intimidation and 
violence, to ensure the Empire’s subjects understand their place. Simcoe is 
more than just a bully, however. He is a tactically capable military leader, as 
we learn across the series’ first two seasons: skilled in single combat as well 
as conducting operations to root out the American rebels—though perhaps 
he enjoys administering his brand of authority a little too much. Because he 
is driven equally by violence and ambition, Simcoe is often shortsighted in 
how he selects options to deal with the colonial subjects of the crown. In one 
scene, Simcoe shows his disdain for all American colonists, loyalist or rebel, 
when he reminds one rebel of who actually owns the town of Setauket. 
Except it isn’t your town, is it? It belongs to our king. By rights. 
It’s the arrogance of the colonies that you forget this. That’s why 
I joined the Royal Army. To remind you in Guiana, the Carib-
bean, and now New York. I have enjoyed reminding you all over 
the world.7 
Turn also reminds us that human intelligence operations are integral to 
winning population-centric warfare, whether the spy is a hidden insurgent 
biding her time to strike or a counterinsurgent perpetually visible as a symbol 
of order and authority.8 This theme is apparent throughout the first two sea-
sons of Turn: the paranoia of secret agents is everywhere, whether in sleepy 
Setauket, bustling New York City, or even in Washington’s own camp. 
In colonial New York, there were spies, and there were also spy catchers, just 
as today there are networks of insurgents and terrorists and those who hunt 
and attack those networks. This aspect of irregular warfare is also not lost 
on the writers of Turn. They remind us that one of the greatest heroes of 
the American colonial period, renowned for his daring feats of bravery and 
endurance, was also a feared British mercenary who stalked and captured the 
young rebel spy Captain Nathan Hale.9 To this day, Major Robert Rogers (of 















































































fighter, although he actually fought against the young United States during 
the Revolution and remains more legend than fact.10 There is not even an 
authenticated likeness to associate with his exploits.11 His duplicity is ac-
curately depicted in the series: Rogers is not only a villain to the Americans; 
he is equally despised by his British masters because of his brutal tactical 
methods and his use of “Negroes, Indians, Mulattos, and Rebel prisoners” 
to fill the ranks of his irregular troop called the Queen’s Rangers.12 Rogers 
recruited men for their tracking and fighting abilities rather than for their 
social status and trained them in unconventional tactics to conduct raids 
and ambushes in support of British intelligence efforts against a sometimes 
equally unconventional enemy. His skills as a raider and a spy hunter, both 
in fact and as portrayed in Turn, were not all that different from today’s 
special operations forces that attack networks of agents, couriers, financiers, 
bomb makers, and safe houses.
As I noted at the beginning of this review, Turn is entertaining television if 
one does not mind slow plot development and a few historical inaccuracies. 
More importantly, for those who analyze and study irregular conflicts, Turn 
can be a haunting reminder of the timeless nature of population-centric war-
fare. Although the places and players may change, the dynamics of this type 
of conflict often remain the same. The first two seasons are available through 
a variety of online vendors for your binge-watching enjoyment. Once you 
are hooked on the series and have caught up, you’ll be happy to know that 
season three will premiere in the spring of 2016 on AMC.13  v
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The 2005 Iraqi Sunni Awakening: The Role of the Desert Protectors 
Program 
by William Knarr 
Issue Date: October 2015
Dr. Knarr tells the story of Al Sahawa, the Awakening, in Iraq from a perspec-
tive that is different from most narratives. Many associate the beginning of the 
Awakening with Sheikh Sattar Abu-Risha’s 14 September 2006 proclamation 
in Ramadi, where he coined the term Al Sahawa. However, Dr. Knarr contends 
that the Anbar Awakening, as a movement, started in the northwest of Al Anbar 
16 months prior to the sheikh’s proclamation, with the Albu-Mahal tribe in 
Al Qaim District along the Syrian/Iraqi border. The Albu-Mahal realized that 
they could not fight Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI) on their own and pleaded for help 
from the coalition and the government of Iraq in what would become a fight 
for survival. The foundation for developing that partnership was a little known 
program called the “Desert Protectors.” The development of the Desert Protec-
tors and the Awakening movement in 2005 has tremendous lessons for today 
as a newly formed coalition organizes to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL), an outgrowth of AQI.
These new JSOU Press publications are available electronically on the JSOU Library Management System website: 
https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications 
Special Operations Research Topics 2016  
Issue Date: June 2015
The JSOU Special Operations Research Topics 2016 publication presents a list 
of SOF-related topics that are recommended for research by those who desire to 
provide insight and recommendations on issues and challenges facing the SOF 
enterprise. As in the past several years, this list is tailored to address priority 
areas identified by USSOCOM. There are five SOF priorities: Ensure SOF Readi-
ness; Help Our Nation Win; Continue to Build Relationships; Prepare for the 
Future; and Preserve Our Force and Families. This publication also includes the 
Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) developed and maintained by the USSOCOM 
J5–Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate. These topics reflect a consensus of 
the SOF experts who participated in the Special Operations Research Topics 
Workshop as being particularly worthwhile for addressing immediate SOF needs 
and building future capacity for emerging challenges. Topics may be narrowed or 
otherwise modified as necessary to suit school writing requirements or maximize 
individual interests and experiences.
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